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ABSTRACT
This thesis asks and answers an important question in the heated debate concerning M.G.L.c.
40B, the state's Comprehensive Permit Law: "Do large-scale, high-density Chapter 40B multi-
family rental developments negatively impact nearby single-family property values in suburban
Boston communities?" We ask the question because of the widespread belief that one of
the strongest motives for resident opposition to 40B projects is the fear that homes values
surrounding these multi-family developments will decrease.
In an effort to resolve the debate, we design a rigorous research methodology to examine
the impact of introducing a large-scale multi-family rental development into a neighborhood
of single-family homes. We develop strict case selection criteria that identify nine 40B
developments located in eight suburban communities. These case studies represent some
of the most egregious, controversial, and dense Chapter 40B developments in the Boston
metropolitan area; in other words, a suburbanite's worst nightmare. After selecting the cases,
we establish conservative impact areas, which include only the single-family homes mostly
likely to be affected by each respective 40B development. Our process for identifying impact
areas restricts the boundaries to essentially abutters and immediate neighbors of each of the
nine developments. The purpose for carefully establishing such impact areas is to objectively
measure single-family home price changes over time as 40B developments are announced,
approved, constructed, occupied, and integrated into the resident communities.
We use hedonic (econometric) modeling to create comparative house price indexes for each
impact area along with an appropriate control area (the remainder of the host community) to
determine whether a decrease in home values has occurred over time within such impact
areas. The results of all nine case studies conclude that the introduction of large-scale, high-
density 40B multi-family rental developments in single-family neighborhoods does not affect
the value of adjacent homes. While it may seem reasonable, our findings show that, in fact,
the "rational economic" fear of potential asset value loss among suburban homeowners is
misplaced.
Additionally, we investigate community opposition against 40B developments by examining
the comprehensive permitting processes for each case study. The 40B process often
fosters an environment where projects are set up for contentiousness, pitting developers and
municipalities against one another. The "us versus them" effect of the statute contributes to a
process rife with mistrust, conflict, and vehement opposition.
It is the authors' hope that this study further informs participants in Massachusetts's affordable
housing debate and provides additional insight on some of the dysfunctional consequences of
the Chapter 40B statute.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Associate Department Head; Ford Professor of City and Regional Planning
Thesis Supervisor: Henry 0. Pollakowski
Title: Visiting Scholar, Center for Real Estate
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
THESIS PURPOSE
This thesis asks and answers an important question in the heated debate concerning
M.G.L.c. 40B, the state's Comprehensive Permit Law: "Do large-scale, high-density Chapter
40B multi-family rental developments negatively impact nearby single-family property values
in suburban Boston communities?" We ask the question because of the widespread belief
that one of the strongest motives for resident opposition to 40B projects is the fear that homes
values surrounding these multi-family developments will decrease.
Chapter 40B, also known as the Comprehensive Permit Law and Anti-Snob
Zoning Act, is a Massachusetts statute that enables developers to obtain state authorized
comprehensive permits in municipalities that are not in compliance with state affordability
criteria. Developments seeking comprehensive permits can override local zoning regulations
if (1) less than ten percent of a municipality's housing stock is defined as affordable; and (2)
a minimum of 20 percent of the housing units in the proposed development are affordable to
households earning less than 50 percent of the area median income (AMI) or 25 percent of the
housing units are affordable to households earning less than 80 percent of the AMI.
This study examines the relationship between nine large-scale, high-density,
multi-family rental 40B developments and single-family house value in eight communities
throughout suburban Boston. Comparative price indexes are created using hedonic modeling
to determine whether home values decreased over time as the result of a 40B development.
No effective differences were found between the home price indexes for the impact and control
areas in all nine case studies. We conclude that the introduction of a 40B development does
not negatively affect the value of adjacent single-family homes.
The qualitative analysis investigates the assumption that development opposition is
motivated by property devaluation. Through the examination of primary source material, little
evidence concerning property values was found. Formal development opposition is most
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often limited to technical issues regarding health, safety, and "consistency with local needs."'
Fear of property devaluation is not a tractable issue to use as the basis for the denial of a
comprehensive permit. Therefore, it is not surprising that we did not find evidence of this fear
even if it is tangible to residents and motivates opposition. What we did find was an ancillary
story of an arbitrary process where developers and towns are pitted against one another.
The nine projects are categorized into three groups: "Unopposed," "Contentious," and
"Highly Contentious" relating to the level of opposition the developments faced during the
permitting process and which entity granted the final permit decision, be it the town, Housing
Appeals Committee, Superior Court, Appellate Court, or Supreme Judicial Court. These
categories are used to show how the 40B process has been framed and re-framed over time.
We discovered that the 40B process can be conceptualized in terms of three stages:
"Stage 1-introduction" - the developer introduces a project to the town; "Stage 2-Debate" - the
permitting process negotiations and bargaining between the developer and municipality; "Stage
3-Resoultion" - final permit decision. The three stage process was formulated with respect to
the highly contentious developments. We found that highly contentious projects often occur
when towns are unprepared and thus forced to be reactive towards new development and
developers are able to come in and propose whatever project they choose. The permitting
process puts the two parties at odds, setting the stage for a high-stakes zero sum game.
Stage 2 of the process takes place with little negotiation or bargaining between developers
and municipalities and a permit denial from the town. This denial leads to an extensive stage
3 with a long, expensive legal process, incentivizing developers to maximize project density to
compensate for extra costs; and leaving towns with little leverage once the courts render the
permit decision.
The contentious developments are also used to describe how the 40B process has been
reframed over time. Initially the process was framed in such a way that resulted in an either/or
solution of receipt or non-receipt of a comprehensive permit. With the contentious projects,
developers and towns begin re-framing how to proceed with stage 2 of the 40B process by
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learning that they could both have a better end result if they negotiate and bargain during the
permitting process. The municipality ends up making the final permit decision in stage 3 as
opposed to the developer appealing the permit through the higher stakes court system.
When towns are proactive and both the towns and developers make concerted efforts
to negotiate in good faith, the end results are less controversial projects that incorporate the
needs and wants of both parties. It is important to note that this zero sum game has changed
as a consequence of the 40B framework shifting over time. Particularly with Franklin School,
Lexington was able to completely reframe the context in which the developments received
a zoning override. The town created an alternative model for new development in their
community, instead of having the developer come into the town and propose a project in
stage 1; they turned the tables on the process and proposed a project to developers forming a
whole new process. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below juxtapose the highly contentious Kimball Court
against the town-sponsored Franklin School.
Figures 1.1, 1.2 Kimball Court, Woburn (left) and Franklin School, Lexington (right)
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
It has been shown in other contexts that multi-family affordable developments
do not negatively impact surrounding property values. This study is the first of its kind
in Massachusetts. Our thesis applies rigorous and objective quantitative and qualitative
research methods to explore the assumptions of neighborhood devaluation resulting from the
introduction of 40B developments.
We design a comprehensive research approach that from a methodological perspective
creates the highest probability that our study will identify a negative relationship between the
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introduction of a 40B development and single-family house prices. We select cases using rigid
criteria. The selected 40B developments had to be: (1) located within the Boston metropolitan
area, (2) permitted between the mid-1980s and 2000, (3) follow a rental tenure structure, and
(4) embedded in single-family residential neighborhood. This process identified a group of
projects that are both larger and denser than the typical 40B development. It could be argued
that the case studies are the types of developments that suburbanites fear most: the worst
neighbor that one would hope to have. If there was ever a 40B project to cause a negative
impact on surrounding property values, it would be the large dense developments examined
in this study.
We identified impact areas to ascertain the effect of introducing a 40B development into
a single-family neighborhood. How an impact area is defined is critical to achieving accurate
and unbiased results. We carefully and conservatively drew impact area boundaries according
to strict criteria, which resulted in impact areas that are almost exclusively abutters of the
development. Impact area designation is done on a case by case basis; we cannot simply
apply one generic formula such as drawing a % or % mile radius around the development
capturing all the homes in the area. Our procedure includes review of aerial photos, zoning
maps, road maps, discussions with municipal officials, and site visits.
This thesis uses hedonic modeling techniques to create comparative sales price
indexes for an impact area and control area (the remainder of single-family homes in that town).
Implicit in hedonic modeling is the assumption that home buyers assign value to the individual
characteristics that make up a house (size, style, number of rooms etc). Hedonic modeling is
a statistical tool used to estimate the value of these structural attributes. Our models estimate
both the value of a house and the effect of time on house value to price a typical house over
time. We build and compare house price indexes for impact and control areas to determine if
house prices were affected by the introduction of 40B developments.
The methodology employed for the qualitative portion of the thesis was originally
intended to describe reasons for why residents and municipalities oppose the projects
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and ascertain the level and extent of community opposition to the proposed developments
during the comprehensive permitting process. We planned to measure the local context of
community opposition over time beginning with the initial comprehensive permit application
to the Board of Appeals through the final granting of the permit. Primary sources including
ZBA meeting minutes, permitting hearing records, ZBA decisions, and court documents were
examined to achieve this goal. However, we found another story of a three stage 40B process
that commonly pitted towns and developers against one another. This was the case when
towns were reactive towards new development allowing developers to propose large, dense
projects often completely at odds with the comprehensive and land-use planning in the town.
Alternatively, proactive towns are able to negotiate and bargain with developers to create
amicable development solutions. We then used these two stories to narrate a much richer and
nuanced story through the examination of why a controversial political and institutional 40B
process sometimes fails and sometimes succeeds.
OVERVIEW OF ISSUES
Increased housing production is necessary to sustain regional growth and economic
viability in Massachusetts, but commonly resistance is fierce to high-density development and
the development of multi-family affordable housing. The following section reviews the history
of the 40B statute as an effort to combat racial segregation and supercede local restrictive
zoning practices, comments on recent housing trends in the state, and gives a brief overview
of the local context of exclusionary zoning practices and opposition to 40B developments.
Chapter 40B: A History, Description and Results
Massachusetts' Chapter 40B statute was written in 1969 partly in response to rapid
suburbanization during the first half of the twentieth century which "created a geography of
inequality that led to the Kerner Commission in 1968 to state that we are 'moving towards
two societies, one black and one white - separate and unequal.' 2 From a contemporary
standpoint Chapter 40B (40B) is seen as a law before its time, "based on a remarkably early
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recognition by its proponents that exclusionary zoning practices, such as large minimum
lot size requirements and bans on multi-family housing, play a significant role in driving up
housing costs and causing the dominant spatial pattern of economic and racial segregation
found in most metropolitan areas of the United States."3 The law was intended to stem the
tide of widespread segregation in Massachusetts by giving the state the authority to supercede
suburban exclusionary zoning regulations.
However the passage of 40B was not completely altruistic. The law was also seen as
a chance at retribution for a coalition of urban politicians who wanted to get back at the liberal
suburban legislators who forced Boston public school desegregation in 1966.4 The bill was
fiercely contested in the state legislature and in the end passed narrowly in the House and by
just two votes in the Senate.5
The 40B statute has two main objectives: production and mobility. The production
objective is to increase the supply of both affordable and multi-family housing in Massachusetts.
The mobility objective is to provide opportunities for low- and moderate-income (particularly
minority low-income) families to move out of the concentrated poverty of the inner city into
suburban areas with increased educational and economic opportunities.6
Specifically, General Law Chapter 40B "was enacted to provide expeditious relief from
exclusionary local zoning by-laws and practices which might inhibit the construction of low and
moderate income housing in the Commonwealth's cities and towns."7 Pursuant to the statute,
"a qualified builder wishing to build low or moderate income housing may file with a local board
of appeals an application for a comprehensive permit instead of filing separate applications
with each local agency having jurisdiction over the project."8 If a local zoning board denies
an application for a comprehensive permit, the developer may appeal to the Housing Appeals
Committee (HAC), and the HAC will review the decision "to determine whether the board's
decision is reasonable and consistent with local needs."9 The local zoning board has the
burden of proving that the development will cause health, safety, environmental effects that
outweigh the need for low and moderate income housing. If the HAC finds that the decision of
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the zoning board is not reasonable and consistent with local needs, it can direct the issuance
of a comprehensive permit by the board.10
Chapter 40B is responsible for creating approximately 30,000 housing units, nearly
18,000 of which are privately-owned rental housing units that are affordable to households
earning at or below 80 percent of the AM. 1 Despite the very tight and expensive housing market
throughout metropolitan Boston, this desperately needed housing supplied by comprehensive
permits is often strongly opposed by local communities and single-family homeowners in part
because of a fragmented process which is set-up to pit developers against municipalities.
Housing Trends
Massachusetts is in the mist of a housing crunch. There is a growing gap between
the supply and demand of housing in Massachusetts; this is particularly problematic as
many metropolitan communities are at or near build-out capacity. The state's population has
continued to grow while the new construction of housing has declined. The Boston metropolitan
area's population grew by more than 4.8 percent between 1990 and 2000 according to
the 2000 Census, from 2.6 million to nearly 2.8 million residents.12 Concurrently, while the
area's population has been increasing, the number of housing units permitted annually in
Massachusetts has declined significantly over the past few decades: from an average of
31,000 units per year during the 1970s to only 17,000 per year throughout the 1990s.
The decline in permitting of multi-family housing is even more striking, dropping from
an average of 14,000 per year in the 1970s to 1,300 per year for most of the 1990s.13 More
recently, permits for private housing - apartments, stand-alone homes, and condominiums - in
the first six months of 2003 were eight percent lower than in the first six months of 1998, half
that of permits issued nationally for the same time periods.14 Even more striking, according to
a recent op-ed article in The Boston Globe, Massachusetts ranked 47 h in the country in multi-
family housing starts in 2002, in the same league as large rural states such as Wyoming and
North Dakota with less than 10 percent of the population of Massachusetts'.15
Population growth and declining housing production are partly responsible for the
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recent explosive spike in housing prices. Another major reason is the artificial constraint on
land throughout Boston's metropolitan area imposed by the preponderance of large lot single-
family zoning in suburban communities. As can be seen in Chart 1.1, the communities in our
study have all seen explosive house price growth in the last ten years, with a median increase
of 130 percent, and a median increase of 84 percent in just the past five years.
Chart 1.1 Median Home Sales Price Index for Studied Communities
Median Single Family Home Sales Price Index
1993-2003
2.50 -
2.25 -
2.00 -
1.75-
1.50-
1.25-
1.00-
0.75
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
-- Burlington -- Lexington --- Littleton -0- Mansfield -+- Norwood - Randolph --- Wilmington -++- Wobum I
Source: The Warren Group - Town Statistics, http://rers.thewarrengroup.com/townstatslsearch.asp
Subsidized Housing Trends
Just as housing prices have been rising, so has the amount of subsidized housing.
Many argue that subsidized and affordable housing production has not been rising fast
enough, falling well short of meaningful benchmarks. The following Figure 1.2 presents the
percentage of subsidized housing stock in all of Massachusetts' cities and towns as of April
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2002. As can be seen below, the majority of the communities that have reached the goal of
ten percent are the cities such as Boston, Lawrence, Lowell, Worcester, and Springfield. The
Boston metropolitan area (outlined in blue), with a slightly higher concentration of subsidized
housing as a percentage of total housing stock, is still not even close to meeting the goal of
developing affordable housing to the level of ten percent of a community's housing stock.
Figure 1.3 Massachusetts' Subsidized Housing Inventory Map
State of Massachusetts
Percentage of Subsidized Housing by Municipality
SII
NECTA Boundary
Percentage of Affordable Units
0-2.5
2.5-5
7.5 -10
10+
Source: Mssachusets Departnent of Housing and Community Development,
Subsidized Housing Inventory s of Apr. 2002
The Boston metropolitan area as a whole has not been successful in reaching the goal
of ten percent of the community's housing units deemed affordable. As can be seen in Table
1.1, only eight percent of the metropolitan area's communities have achieved the ten percent
goal. Additionally, more than half of the area's communities have less than five percent of
their housing stock defined as affordable. However, it is important to note that when Chapter
40B was passed in 1969, only two municipalities in the state met the ten percent minimum; so
significant progress has been made, just not close to the actual goals set out by the statute.
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Table 1.1 Boston Area Municipalities Subsidized Housing Inventory
Boston Metropolitan Area Municipalities Number Percent
Muni w/ 0-2.5% Sub Hsg 24 15%
Muni w/ 2.5-5.0% 69 45%
Muni w/ 5.0-7.5% 33 21%
Muni w/ 7.5-10.0% 16 10%
Muni above 10% 13 8%
Total 155 100%
Source: MA Dept of Housing and Community Development, Subsidized Housing Inventory, April 2002.
Exclusion and Opposition
Exclusionary zoning and local opposition in suburban communities have significantly
hindered both multi-family and affordable housing production. Massachusetts' has a strong
tradition of home rule by which municipalities are free to pursue their own self-interest
irrespective of the constraints and resources of surrounding communities and the metropolitan
region. Municipalities use exclusionary zoning practices such as large lot single-family zoning
to "manage growth" and "preserve community integrity". These types of land use controls
effectively close the door to the suburbs for lower income and working class families under to
guise of insulating local residents from the urban problems associated with poverty.
One of the reasons why Chapter 40B has been so contentious is that the law
supercedes the control over the most significant tool suburbs have - zoning - to maintain
complete autonomy over their community. 40B is seen as a way to force the suburban door
open and in doing so letting in lower-income families and the problems of urban poverty.
Residents are loath to accept 40B developments in their neighborhoods and spare no effort
to block comprehensive permit applications. There are scores of websites and protest groups
with a primary mission of destroying the statute. One such group from Marshfield wrote a song
to protest 40B posted on their website (to be sung to the tune of The Beatles' "Let it Be"):
When I find myself without a permit / D., H., C., D. comes to me / Speaking words of
dollars, 40B
And in my search for profit I It is standing right in front of me / Speaking words of dollars,
40B / 40B, 40B, 40B, 40B / Whisper words of dollars, 40B
And when the angry people who are / Living in the town agree / They must fight injustice,
40B / For though they may be targets, there is / Not a chance that they'll concede / They
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will find an answer, to 40B / 40B, 40B, 40B, 40B / yeah They'll find an answer, to 40B /
40B, 40B, 40B, 40B / Whisper words of dollars, 40B.16
The arguments presented in opposition to 40B developments are numerous and often
pertain to traffic and congestion, architectural design and contextual sensitivity, property value,
municipal budgeting, and environmental impacts. We believe that when you cut through the
rhetoric most often citizen opposition can be distilled to a fear of neighborhood devaluation.
Thus residents are acting in the interest of wealth preservation by protecting the value of the
asset that is most often the largest component of an individual's investment portfolio.
THESIS ORGANIZATION
In the following chapters we review relevant literature, detail our research methodologies,
examine the impact of 40B developments on surrounding property values, and present new
findings regarding the opposition to 40B projects and process.
Chapter 2 consists of a review of literature addressing the triad of local political autonomy,
zoning and exclusionary practices; the economic backed expectations of homeownership;
community opposition trends; and the effect affordable housing has on surrounding residential
property values in other metropolitan areas.
Chapter 3 describes the case selection process and identification of each impact areas.
Our diligent treatment of these issues sets this thesis apart from other studies and establishes
our objective perspective.
Following the case selection, Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework for using
hedonic modeling and details the specific econometric methodology used in this study.
Chapter 5 presents our empirical findings. We describe each impact area and review
the results of each case study by discussing the price indexes and explaining the components
of each hedonic model.
Chapters 6 details the methodology employed for the qualitative portion of the study. In
Chapter 7, the authors use primary sources to narrate the comprehensive permitting processes
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for each case study and examine why a controversial political and institutional 40B process
sometimes leads to either failure or success.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and ties the findings from the quantitative and
qualitative studies together. The authors pay special attention to the conditions under which
40B developments were permitted with particular emphasis on the comprehensive permitting
process as each case study is unique. Our results inform a conclusion about the validity of
resident opposition to 40B developments based on the assumed diminution of property value
and provide additional insight on some of the dysfunctional consequences of the 40B statute.
(Endnotes)
1 "Requirements and regulations shall be considered consistent with local needs if they are reasonable
in view of the regional need for low and moderate income housing considered with the number of
low income persons in the city or town affected and the need to protect the health or safety of the
occupants of the proposed housing or of the residents of the city or town, to promote better site and
building design in relation to the surroundings, or to preserve open spaces, and if such requirements
and regulations are applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing.
Requirements or regulations shall be consistent with local needs when imposed by a board of zoning
appeals after comprehensive hearing in a city or town where ... low or moderate income housing
exists which is in excess of ten per cent of the housing units reported in the latest federal decennial
census of the city or town or on sites comprising one and one half per cent or more of the total land
area zoned for residential, commercial or industrial use." Source: M.G.L. c.40B, § 20 - Definitions.
2 Stonefield, Sam. Symposium: Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but Limited Power
and Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 Western New England Law Review, 2001.
3 Krefetz, Sharon Perlman. The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit
and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Legislative Effort to Overcome
Exclusionary Zoning, 22 Western New England Law Review, 2001.
4 Stonefield, 2001.
5 Krefetz, 2001.
6 Stonefield, 2001.
7 Zoning Board of Appeals of Greenfield v. Housing Appeals Committee, 1983.
8 Zoning Board of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing Appeals Committee, 1982.
9 Wellesley ZBA v. HAC, 1982.
10 Wellesley ZBA v. HAC, 1982.
1 Heudorfer, Bonnie. The Record on 40B: The Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Affordable Housing
Zoning Law. Citizens' Housing and Planning Association, June 2003.
12 For the purposes of this study, the Boston metropolitan area is defined as the 155 municipalities in
the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy New England Metropolitan City and Town Area (NECTA) Census area.
13 Heudorfer, 2003.
14 Reidy, Chris. "Builders: Permit process boosts costs," The Boston Globe, July 29, 2003.
1 Hindman, Matthew. "A worthy strategy for affordable housing," The Boston Globe, March 27, 2004.
16 Marshfield Action, Inc. "The 40B Song," http://marshfieldaction.com/ComicRelief/4ObSong.htm.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The following chapter is a review of literature regarding political autonomy, the
evolution of exclusionary zoning, the rise and role of homeownership in the United States,
and trends in neighborhood opposition. The literature reviewed in these three sections is
intimately connected, in that the political autonomy of suburban communities gave rise to the
ability of suburbs to practice exclusionary zoning. At the same time, suburbs were gaining
more autonomy and implementing restrictive zoning practices, homeownership rates were
quickly rising. The more the suburbs became populated primarily with homeowners, the
stronger the political influence these homeowners had, and the stronger their desire to protect
the investment they made in their homes. Homes became an investment good in addition to
a consumer good where people were just purchasing a place to live. Houses began to rapidly
appreciate and consumers started financing at higher loan-to-value ratios, making homeowners
more averse to any risk in their investment. Exclusionary zoning helped to protect them from
the risk that undesirable uses would be placed next door and thus negatively impact house
prices. The 40B statute is an effort to confront exclusionary zoning directly and override the
"closed" nature of many Massachusetts communities. There are many competing social and
economic theories on the fore mentioned subjects. We present some the relevant thinking to
frame this thesis's question. It is not our intention to prove or disprove any of the referenced
literature. The chapter concludes with a review of other hedonic studies examining the impact
of affordable housing development on surrounding property values.
POLITICAL AUTONOMY, ZONING, AND EXCLUSION
The connection between political autonomy, zoning and exclusionary practices are
strong, especially in a state such as Massachusetts which has one of the strongest traditions
of home rule and affords local municipalities more political autonomy than most states. It may
seem obvious to contemporary observers how these three actors have coordinated to create
a homogenized and often segregated suburban landscape. The original grant of authority
to local communities to incorporate and self-govern and the subsequent reinforcement of
their power to control land use and development through zoning was probably not intended
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to fragment regional politics and promote a misallocation of the region's natural, social and
economic resources. However, municipalities with local control act in their individual best
interest irrespective of the resources and needs of the larger community. Zoning is a blunt
but effective tool used by municipalities to guide land development and define community
character. The desire for community preservation coupled with the large-lot single-family
zoning pervasive throughout Massachusetts has effectively closed the door to the suburbs
by artificially inflating housing prices. This section reviews the tradition of local power and
the evolution of zoning and how these two actors contribute to the exclusionary attitude of
suburban communities in metropolitan Boston.
Political Autonomy
In his "Suburban Autonomy" chapter in The Politics of Urban America, Michael
Danielson discusses how "suburbia" has become essentially a political phenomenon. Suburbs
have wished for, and been granted, local autonomy which allows they to "control their own
destiny largely free from the need to adjust their interests to those of other local jurisdictions
and residents of the metropolis."1 This political autonomy allows suburban governments
to control their community however they see fit, even at the expense of other jurisdictions.
Danielson comments:
Since local governments in the United States bear the primary responsibility for the
provision of basic public services such as education, police and fire protection, as
well as the regulation of housing and land use, independence provides suburbs with
considerable control over the vital parameters of community life, including the power to
exclude unwanted neighbors.'
Gerald Frug in City Making discusses suburban autonomy as a method for maintaining
a significant level of community homogeneity. To achieve this, the state had to grant suburban
communities: "the right to incorporate as a separate municipality; immunity from annexation
by the central city; the ability to exercise land use control; the ability to legislate and provide
services solely in their own self-interest; the authority to tax the real property located within
municipal boundaries and to spend the revenue collected solely on local residents."3
According to Robert C. Wood, quoted in Danielson's chapter, political autonomy has
created metropolitan populations that have been broken up into "clusters homogenous in their
skills and outlook which have achieved municipal status and erected social and political barriers
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against invasion."4 This suburban homogeneity is self-reinforcing, the more homogenous a
community becomes leads to an increased desire for exclusion.
An explanation for the advance of these homogeneous clusters is offered by Arthur
O'Sullivan in his book Urban Economics. Suburban income segregation is the product of three
factors. The first being the relationship between the housing demand of wealthy residents
and the growth of cities. Wealthy residents demand high-quality housing and prefer to occupy
new housing rather than old housing. In a growing city, developers construct new, high-quality
housing in suburban areas where land is available. So, wealthy residents move to the suburbs
leaving lower-income residents to occupy the older urban housing stock. The second reason
wealthy residents leave the center-city is to isolate themselves from the problems associated
with low-income residents. The problems to avoid include crime, municipal fiscal shortcomings
and under-achieving schools. The third reason for leaving the central city is for suburban
zoning. Suburban governments can zone to exclude low-income resident thus providing
insulation from urban problems.5
Suburban Exclusionary Zoning
Wealthy residents found it appealing to segregate themselves away in the suburbs and
take refuge in suburban zoning, but why was zoning originally conceived and enacted in the
first place and how have local governments maintained the power to zone and in some cases
intentionally exclude?
The traditional and rarely challenged explanation for the advent of zoning stems from
the need to expand the power, efficiency and breadth of nuisance law and the ad hoc networks
of private land covenants. Leading up to the turn of the twentieth century incompatible
land uses were competing for the same or adjacent urban real estate. Heavy industry and
apartment buildings were encroaching residential neighborhoods. New York City is credited for
enacting the first zoning ordinances in 1916, yet many cities in other parts of the country were
developing similar ordinances at this time. Within twenty years a majority of municipalities in
the United States had adopted zoning ordinances. The intention of early zoning was to protect
the public good by ensuring adequate access to light and air, freedom from fire and panic, and
the preservation of morals. Atop the zoning hierarchy is the single-family house.
A slightly different explanation for the rise of zoning is put forth by William Fischel. The
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nuisances which are attributed for motivating zoning ordinances in the early twentieth century
were certainly present and abundant during the later half of the nineteenth century so why
wasn't zoning employed sooner? Zoning had been implemented in Europe since the 1870's.
Fischel theorizes that zoning in the United States is in response to the economic interests of
homeowners desiring to protect the value of typically the largest asset in one wealth portfolio,
the single-family house. In summary he argues that zoning arose because:
(a) new modes of transportation allowed people to separate where they lived from
where they worked and (b) the development of the bus and truck undermined traditional
means of protecting neighborhoods. Zoning was preferred to (or added to) covenants
because it protected the borders of covenanted land and could protect the municipal
tax base and service demands. That ability in turn made it attractive for suburban
municipalities to maintain their independence from the central city.6
Fischel explains that an economic rationale for zoning incentivized homeowners to
become the dominate voice behind suburban land use controls beginning as early as the
1920's. "Homeowners were numerous, well motivated, and lived in contiguous districts that
reduced the transaction costs of political organization. Having staked their savings in their
communities' character, homeowners became a major force in local politics. They supported
zoning, which had originally been proposed by homebuilding developers, and they made their
homes the primary object to be protected."7
Regardless of the intentions behind zoning, the validity and practice of zoning was
affirmed by the 1926 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Euclid v. Ambler Realty zoning case. Euclid
is a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio and in 1926 Ambler sued the Village of Euclid stating that the
village's zoning ordinance restricted and Ambler's use of their property. The Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance, concluding that the segregation of residential, business, and industrial
uses is paramount to an owner's property rights. The ruling specifically endorses the separation
of residential uses and the need to protect "the safety and security of home life."
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of
detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which
has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes;
that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in
order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the
residential character of the district."
The ruling goes on to conclude that the more apartment houses built, the more will come, "until
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finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed."9 The Euclid case determined that zoning and land use
controls are meant to protect and preserve property values and neighborhood character as
well as exclude undesirable uses. Another result of Euclid was that the Supreme Court upheld
(and later encouraged) the ability of a small local government to regulate land use as opposed
to regions or states.10
The Euclid case created a land use climate that gave rise to what is often referred to
as exclusionary zoning. This term refers to the ability of communities to create zoning districts
which "exclude apartments, mandate large-lot single-family homes, and separate uses.""
A primary motivator for exclusionary zoning regulations is "the desire to avoid the negative
effects of concentrated poverty. Suburbanites have a 'fear of falling' - a fear that a sudden
influx of poor people may cause the whole area to decline. They deal with this fear by banning
apartments and requiring large lots for single-family homes."1 In the Boston metropolitan
area, the banning of multi-family and higher density smaller single-family housing performs
two un-spoken and underlying functions: (1) keeping out the undesirables, and (2) driving up
housing prices making any sort of affordable housing out of reach for work class and many
middle class families.
America's rapid suburban development and the rise of suburban political autonomy in
the early twentieth century created the tendency for exclusionary zoning practices. Many of the
reasons for suburban exclusionary zoning, which has contributed to wide disparities regarding
the availability of affordable housing between central cities and their suburbs, concern the
fears of affordable housing and deflated property values.
Danielson connects the relationship between suburban politics and exclusionary
practices. This exclusion is achieved through controls such as zoning and building codes which
can be easily manipulated by residents in suburban communities but not urban neighborhoods.
These controls "protect the local turf from undesirable housing and residents." Additionally,
"The use of local powers over land, housing, and urban development to promote local social
views and protect community character are widely viewed as the most important functions of
local governments in suburbia."1
Even if local autonomy was not among the primary reasons for moving out the central
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city and into the suburbs, "most suburbanites quickly discover the utility of local autonomy
as a means of protecting their neighborhood, their social standing, their property values, and
the racial integrity of the local schools from outside threats."15 Frug discusses exclusionary
zoning at length in City Making. He comments that the "basic purpose of suburban zoning was
to keep Them where They belonged - Out. If They had already gotten In, then its purpose
was to confine Them to limited areas." 16 To this point, Danielson asserts that greater political
independence "strengthens the suburban community's ability to exclude, while the desire
to exclude both enhances the attractions of local autonomy and reinforces the suburban
commitment to the preservation of local control over the vital parameters of community life." 17
In effect, the two forces of political autonomy and exclusionary practices have reinforced one
another and contributed to the desire for even more local control and power.
Greater local political autonomy creates a climate where there is less interference and
involvement from regional and state actors. According to Danielson, "suburban governments
have been able to use their autonomy to influence housing opportunities with relatively little
outside interference. And because land-use patterns strongly affect local taxes and public
services, community character, and the quality of local schools, zoning has become the
essence of local autonomy for most suburbanites."18 This is one of the reasons why Chapter
40B has been so contentious; the law supercedes the control over the most significant tool
suburbs have - zoning - to maintain complete autonomy over their community.
In a Virginia Law Review Note on Chapter 40B, Paul Stockman, reiterates this concept
of exclusion with the assertion that "many municipalities suspiciously claim to use zoning to
'preserve the character of the neighborhood.' Although this sounds innocuous, such language
is frequently 'a code for the desire to preserve economic, ethnic and racial homogeneity.' 19
In addition to keeping "undesirables" out of their municipality, suburban governments present
fiscal arguments supporting exclusionary zoning. Stockman contends that:
many municipalities impose restrictive zoning laws in an effort to protect the tax
base and to keep local residential property taxes low... Municipal planners assume
that apartments and smaller homes, generating less taxes, are occupied by families
with lower incomes and more school-age children, who consume a greater share of
municipal resources. Large, single-family homes on spacious lots, on the other hand,
generate more revenue and attract wealthier residents who place fewer demands
on the municipality. Although theoretically intuitive, these assumptions are largely
empirically unwarranted.2 0
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The theory that multi-family and dense developments generate a higher need for services
while contributing less in local taxes has been put into question by numerous studies. One
such study is the Citizens' Housing and Planning Association's (CHAPA) analysis on the fiscal
impact of housing development in Massachusetts which found, among other things, that for
many communities in Massachusetts, population growth from new housing development does
not inevitably increase demand for services and raise municipal costs. The authors find there
is little correlation between increases in per capita costs and increases in population, and in
Massachusetts, the cost of municipal services are increasing regardless of growth. 21
The effect of exclusionary zoning on the housing prices is felt both locally and regionally.
A 2003 study conducted by Glaeser and Gyourko for the Federal Reserve titled "The Impacts
of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability" concludes that in regions with very expensive
housing, building restrictions such as zoning appear to be the cause the high housing prices.22
The study estimated that in metropolitan Boston, 85 percent of suburban houses are 87
percent more expensive than the cost of construction.23 The implication of Massachusetts'
exclusionary zoning is that housing prices are higher for everyone in the region.
This has become a serious problem not only for low-income families but also the middle
class with the recent rapid rise in housing prices in Massachusetts. According to Stockman,
"Exclusionary zoning once served merely to keep out the poor; now it constrains the dreams
of even the middle class. Many children of the suburbs find that they no longer can afford to
live in the communities where they grew up. Teachers, firemen, and policemen often cannot
live among those they serve because of the restrictive costs of housing."24 It is ironic that
the children and grandchildren of the original suburbanites responsible for developing these
restrictive zoning and land use regulations are now often unable to live in these communities.
THE RISE AND ROLE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
America has a strong tradition of fostering and encouraging homeownership. According
to the proponents of homeownership, it brings a cornucopia of economic and social benefits
to American society. Homeownership proponents claim it is key to the American Dream, the
hallmark of American society, and that owning one's home is the path to social and economic
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mobility. A large bode of literature gives provides support for the value of homeownership which
includes increased civic participation, neighborhood stability, high educational attainment,
better gardens, high self esteem, better physical and physiological health (as long as the
household is current on its mortgage payments), and greater attachments to place.25
The country's ideological commitment to homeownership traces back to the nineteenth
century when Thomas Jefferson pursued the Louisiana Purchase with the vision of a country
based upon independent citizens with their own land and homes.2 Scores of American
politicians and political commentators since Jefferson have espoused the benefits and need
for homeownership. To quote Walt Whitman, "A man is not a whole and complete man unless
he owns a house and the ground it stands on."27 In the 1920s, the praise of homeownership
continued with Calvin Coolidge pronouncing "No greater contribution could be made to the
stability of the nation, and the advancement of its ideals, than to make it a nation of home-
owning families."28 Herbert Hoover in 1931 stated that homeownership "is both the foundation
of a sound economic and social system and a guarantee that our society will continue to
develop rationally as changing conditions demand."29 Sixty years later, Bill Clinton continued
the support of homeownership, affirming that "throughout the life of our nation, nothing has
been more important as a building block ... than homeownership." 30
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) is one of the largest, most outspoken
advocates for homeownership. According to the NAR,
Homeownership is the cherished goal of people everywhere, but nowhere more so than
in America. To individuals, it is their key to the American Dream - their key to living the
good life. Beyond the benefit of individual satisfaction, homeownership provides two
other major benefits. First, it provides economic benefits through its contribution to
total economic output and to savings. Second, it benefits society. Homeownership is
the thread that binds the fabric of a democratic society together by fostering community
pride, social participation, and political stability.31
The NAR claims that nearly nine out of ten Americans feel that owning one's home is the key
to the good life, placing greater value on homeownership than owning a car, a good marriage,
or an interesting job.
Home as an Investment
A home is not just a place to live; it also brings a number of financial benefits to
homeowners. Increasingly, houses have become "both consumption and investment goods.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
28
At the time of purchase, owners make two different decisions simultaneously. They choose the
quantity and configuration of amenities ... while at the same time attempting to maximize their
expected financial return."32 Homeowners are not just purchasing a home to have a decent,
clean, safe place to live; they are buying homes because they are a good investment.
This argument is central to McCarthy et al's study of the economic benefits and costs of
homeownership, where the authors affirm that "Homeownership is a commitment to personal
financial security. Through homeownership a family acquires a place to live and raise children
and invests in an asset that can grow in value and provide the capital needed to start a small
business, finance college tuition, and generate financial security for retirement." 33 According
to the authors, on average, a suburban homeowner enjoyed a 40 percent increase in house
price between 1987 and 1997.3 As was stated in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the
communities in our study have all seen explosive house price growth from 1993 to 2003, with
a median increase of 130 percent, and a median increase of 84 percent in just the past five
years.
Not only are homeowners making a financial investment, they are also investing in
their family's success. James Johnson, in Showing America a New Way Home: Expanding
Opportunities for Home Ownership, backs up this claim, asserting that "Buying a home is not
only a financial investment (the greatest one most families make), it is also an investment in
the stability of a family - and consequently the health of a society."35 According to Johnson,
owning one's home is an investment that not only benefits the individual family, it is an
investment that benefits the block, neighborhood, and society as a whole.
However, not every study proves that homeownership is indeed the best housing tenure
decision for all people; some studies claim that homeownership is not the best investment
decision as well. The focus on homeownership as a wealth generating mechanism is not
necessarily true for all homeowners. Homes are assets for their homeowners, but their values
are tied to a wide range of externalities such as neighborhood quality, economic stability,
school district expenditures, and regional job markets. They are therefore highly depreciable
and can be fraught with risk.
Daniel Luria, in "Wealth, Capital, and Power: The Social Meaning of Home Ownership,"
defines wealth as the sum of physical and financial assets whereas capital is a part of wealth
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that enables its holder to control the labor of others. In his study, Luria makes assessment
that "Homes, although they may constitute a form of wealth in an accounting sense, do not in
general form a part of that wealth which grants control over one's life; homes may be wealth
but they are not capital."36 [Emphasis in original] In other words, a house is contributing to
the homeowner's net wealth, but it is not literally putting money in their bank account and
contributing to bettering their daily financial condition.
One of the problems with the increased focus on homeownership as a stable equity
investment is that a house's success as an investment is often dependent on externalities over
which the homeowner often has little control, such as neighborhood quality. Constance Perin,
quoted in Frug's City Making, comments:
Home ownership in a 'nice' neighborhood is often seen as the top rung in the long
climb up the ladder of life. Such an achievement can easily be threatened if the
neighborhood standards decline, and this decline is likely to be produced, people feel,
by neighborhood diversity - in particular, by the presence in the neighborhood either
of renters or of homeowners who cannot afford houses like one's own (whatever the
price).
McCarthy et al in The Economic Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A Critical
Assessment of the Research comment that these externalities affect the return on a
homeowner's investment. "Because most homeowners are highly leveraged ... house price
appreciation and depreciation have an amplified impact on the rate of return on housing
investment. In contrast to strictly financial investments, the return on homeownership is directly
affected by the behavior of the owner and other nearby owners."3 Additionally, the more
leveraged the house is (the higher the ratio of the mortgage to the actual value of the house),
the more risk the homeowner faces of devaluation from often uncontrollable externalities. The
authors' report makes a number of conclusions primarily advocating the financial benefits of
homeownership, but importantly, they also confirm that owning a home is not a guaranteed
investment strategy. "Housing investment ... suffers more extreme events than other assets.
This, in addition to the fact that homeowners tend to hold a larger-than-optimal portfolio share
in housing, exposes owners to higher overall portfolio risk."39
Edel et al in the 1984 book, Shaky Palaces; Homeownership and Social Mobility in
Boston's Suburbanization, analyze the historical trends in homeownership in the Boston
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metropolitan area. In their study, the authors found that home values in the region have often
been at the mercy of externalities such as neighborhood decline and public expenditures. Edel
et al observed that a home
is in one sense a consumer good, an alternative shelter to the apartment, the boarding
house, or the communal dwelling. The private home is also an investment in the land
on which it is located, and an admission ticket of sorts to a particular community and
political jurisdiction. It is thus subject to depreciation of various kinds... It could decline
in value if its property is affected by changes in economic activities or access; if the
surrounding community deteriorates; or if public services decline and taxes rise in its
political jurisdiction, or even if other communities duplicate its services.4 0
Of course, home values routinely rise, and have done so steadily over the last decade in the
Boston area; the authors make very clear that there are numerous economic forces that can
possibly reduce their value.
Daniel Luria's article examines the relationship between homeownership and wealth
versus capital investments through the examination of suburban Boston homeowners from
1890 to 1910. Luria's study found that "homeownership appears to have been of little help
to either the occupational or total wealth mobility of owners or their sons, and tended to tie
up a large portion of peoples' assets in an investment inferior to most."4 1 Luria contends that
fostering homeownership is not a remedy for differences between owners and renters or even
racial and economic inequalities in American society as so often is claimed: "There is little
evidence, at least in the period studied, that owners gained relative to renters. It does seem
to have been true, however, that owners tied up what savings they had in a form unlikely to
change the distribution of social power in a way beneficial to the working class."42
The Homevoter Hypothesis
William Fischel, in The Homevoter Hypothesis, argues that home values are the largest
part of most people's assets and that municipal taxes and expenditures directly translate into
the value of that asset. According to Fischel,
The reason that local governments perform better is that the benefits and costs of local
decision making are reflected in the value of property in the jurisdiction. The homevoter
hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the most numerous and politically
influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern for the value of their
homes to make political decisions that more efficient than those that would be made at
a higher level of government.
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Therefore, homeowners, or "homevoters" as Fischel calls them, will advocate and lobby in
their local communities to adopt the mix of policies that maximize the value of their primary
assets. Rohe et al in their study on the social benefits and costs of homeownership concur
with Fischel's assessment with regard to the financial incentive for homeowners to be active
in their communities:
Owners often incur significant expenses in both selling their existing homes and buying
a new one. If a deterioration in neighborhood conditions forces homeowners to move, it
can result in thousands of dollars in costs. Thus, there is a greater economic incentive
for owners to join neighborhood or community associations that work to maintain
physical and social conditions in their neighborhoods."
As the share of the home increased as part of a family's total wealth, homeowners
not only want to maximize the value of that asset, they also want to ensure that nothing will
adversely impact that asset such as new development, and in particular, affordable housing
development. Fischel argues that zoning controls, like minimum lot size zoning and excluding
multifamily development, act as a kind of home equity insurance.45
Rohe et al support Fischel's argument, but also discuss the darker side of the
homevoter hypothesis. The authors observe that homeowner groups often engage in efforts
to exclude various social groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and renters "thinking
that their inclusion would threaten both their economic and social-psychological investments
there. Participation at the municipal government level may also result in policies, such as
exclusionary zoning, that greatly restrict the ability of lower-income families to move into
communities." 46 They conclude that one of the most compelling theories for why homeowners
participate in local government "is that they seek to protect the economic investment in their
homes."47
NEIGHBORHOOD OPPOSITION
Neighborhood opposition to new development is a result of numerous motivations,
be it community characteristics, development characteristics, or just notions of the impact
of development on the surrounding community. Rolf Pendall, in his article "Opposition to
Housing; NIMBY and Beyond," studies the residential development approvals process in the
San Francisco Bay Area to examine the Not in my Back Yard (NIMBY) theory. He finds that
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residents not only have many reasons for opposing new development, but that opposition is
significantly dependent on community characteristics and the relationship between the type of
development to the community in which it is proposed, in other words, context matters. Pendall
is aware that there is not a single motivation that explains all the opposition to new housing, be
it concern for diminished property values or neighborhood quality, racial or class antagonism,
degradation of services such as schools, parks, open space, or impacts on property taxes and
fiscal health, and finally environmental degradation.48
Pendall studied opposition to new development in the San Francisco Bay Area, whose
"residents are among the best educated and wealthiest in the 25 largest metropolitan areas in
the United States and thus the most likely to mobilize against threats to their quality of life,"49
similar to the residents of metropolitan Boston. In determining the motivation for opposing
development, he examined three forms of protest/opposition: speaking at public meetings,
letters, and petitions. One of his primary initial findings was that when residents protested
against proposed developments on adjacent property, "most commonly, they expressed these
concerns because they lived in nearby single-family housing and wanted to maintain their
privacy or property values."50
Pendall also examined three community characteristic variables: income, dependence
on property taxes, and recent issuance of building permits (residential growth rate), to study
how they influenced opposition to new development.
The study of the relationship between community characteristics and opposition to new
development produced both expected and unexpended findings. Not surprising, projects that
were much more likely to generate opposition by neighbors were: (1) sited next to single family
housing; (2) multifamily and affordable developments, despite that few protests specifically
referred to affordable housing; and (3) in slowly growing communities. Also, projects proposed
on sites where development proposals previously failed all significantly contribute to increasing
the controversy of the project. Finally, projects in higher income communities generated fewer
protest than those proposed in lower income communities.51
THE EFFECTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON PROPERTY VALUES
Attempts to decipher how affordable housing affects adjacent residential property
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values are not new; studies on this topic have been conducted for decades and in many
cities throughout the country. We will first discus methodologies developed for measuring the
localized effects of housing externalities; then we review relevant studies.
The literature deals with two basic methodological issues: (1) how to capture the effect
of affordable housing and (2) how to compare prices. Two methods for measuring the effect
of affordable housing are presented in the following literature. One method is to establish a
control area and test area and then create price indexes for both areas. The difficulty with this
is finding nearly-identical neighborhoods to compare. The other method is to use one sample
and isolate distance. There are problems with this method also, like how to measure distance:
following the street pattern or as the crow flies.
There are three ways to approach the second issue of how to compare prices. The
first is outmoded; it looks at average or median prices between control and test areas. This
looses all the detail and makes it difficult or impossible to assign price changes to particular
attributes. The second method is to measure the changes when the same unit sells at least
twice during the study period. Because this measures change for the same unit no additional
attributes for the property and neighborhood are required. There are draw backs to this
repeat sales approach: only properties which sell twice can be used and there is not a good
way to account for alterations in the property which may affect value. The third method is to
use hedonic modeling to regress sales price against structural characteristics of the property
and neighborhood variables. This technique can be very precise but it has more stringent
data requirements to be effective. This study employs the hedonic method, more details are
provided in Chapter 4.
For purposes of this review, we sorted previous studies into two general categories
based upon research methodology. The division of studies by methodology nicely correlates
with when a study was conducted. The first category is of primarily older studies that use weak
methodologies that call in to question the validity of their results. Meanwhile, a second category
of recent studies employing sophisticated and rigorous analyses present sound results. It is
shown in many of studies that the nature of the affordable housing matters; the regulatory
program used to construct the affordable housing (Section 8, Low Income Housing Tax Credits
(LIHTC), etc.) as well as project characteristics such as building typology, design, tenure, and
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occupant profile affect property value differentially. Consequently, this literature review will
highlight many studies but focus on the second category of methodologically rigorous studies
that examine the construction of new affordable housing developments.
In the briefest overview of the first category of studies, the results of older studies tend to
conclude that property values are not detrimentally affected by a proximal location to affordable
housing units, and in some cases affordable housing had a positive affect on property value
(Guy, Hysom, Ruth 1985; Rabiega, Lin, Robinson 1984; Warren, Aduddell, Tatalovich 1983;
Saunders Woodford 1979). The majority of these studies prior to 1990 simply compare a test
area against a control area. The test and control neighborhoods were chosen to be similar with
one another. Property values of homes in the two areas were then compared. The problems
with this methodology are that: (1) many of the factors that influence housing value were not
controlled for; (2) the data was cross-sectional, meaning trends in housing value over time
were available (except Rabiega et al., 1984); (3) small sample sizes were used; and (4) the
delineation of test areas were completely subjective to the researchers opinions.
A 2000 study conducted by Maxfield Research Inc. entitled "A Study of the
Relationship Between Affordable Housing and Home Values in the Twin Cities" also fits into
this first category. This study concludes there is no evidence to support the claim that LIHTC
family rental developments eroded the property values in the subject areas. However, the
methodology used for this study is similar that used in the studies conducted prior to 1990. A
subject neighborhood was compared to a control neighborhood in the same sub market. Many
of the same faults of studies in the first group are applicable to the Maxfield study. Multiple
regression analysis and hedonic price modeling were not used; thus it is difficult to accept that
an accurate relationship between affordable housing and property values can be determined
based on the methodology.
The second category of more recent studies better controls for the many factors,
both internal and external, that may affect property value, specifically the influence of nearby
affordable housing. These studies use either repeat sales or hedonic modeling to create price
indexes.
A 1999 study by Briggs, Darden, and Aidala examines the construction of seven public
housing developments in Yonkers, New York. This study is similar to our research in that
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developments were politically charged and contested, and the physical characteristics of the
public housing developments are similar to some 40B developments we examine. In the Briggs
et. al study, the physical characteristics of each public housing development and demographic
traits of their occupants were all the same, however the size and political reception varied with
the location of the developments. Additionally, the demographics of public housing residents
were significantly different from the host neighborhoods in which the developments were
located. No evidence of "panic" sales was found in the few years after the occupation of
the developments and Briggs et al. conclude that public housing built in predominately white
middle-income areas does not affect the value of adjacent residential property.
Cummings and Landis (1993) study the impact of six new affordable housing
developments in California constructed by the non-profit BRIDGE Housing Corporation. All
but one of the developments had either no effect or a positive effect on housing sales values.
Cummings and Landis posit that design and construction quality influence the type of effect
(positive, none, or negative) affordable housing will have on surrounding house values.
Weinstein (2002) examines three new affordable housing developments in the San
Francisco Bay area that were also developed by BRIDGE Housing Corporation. The units in
all three developments are 100 percent affordable. The study uses hedonic price modeling to
create comparative price indexes for a "constant quality house" in a test area and control area.
In all cases the house prices in the test areas and control areas trended identically (there was
no statistically significant variation) after the introduction of affordable housing. This study
follows the example set by Ms. Weinstein as she successfully controls for the many factors that
influence house prices to create price indexes that capture the impact of affordable housing as
it is built, occupied and integrated into residential neighborhoods.
Goetz, Lam and Heitlinger (1996) analyze affordable housing developed and renovated
by community development corporations in Minneapolis. This type of affordable housing was
found to have positive effects on nearby property values. Goetz et al. studied public housing
and privately owned subsidized housing as well. However, these types of affordable housing
were found to devalue property.
Studies in the second category generally conclude that quality design and construction
plus contextual sensitivity can mitigate the impacts of proximal new affordable housing on
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surrounding property values. Well designed and well sited affordable housing does not
necessary diminish residential property values even if the projects are strongly contested.
Locating affordable housing in a neighborhood with a strong housing market is advantageous
to maintaining property value. In these cases, existing neighborhood amenities continue to
outweigh the potential dis-amenity of new affordable housing development. In cases where
affordable housing was found to negatively impact property values, the amount was relatively
small when the analysis controlled for other neighborhood characteristics.
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CHAPTER 3: CASE SELECTION
This chapter summarizes the methodology employed to first select the set of Chapter
40B multi-family rental developments to study, and, second, designate a conservative and
appropriate impact area around each of the study cases. The case selection process section
describes the detailed and orderly system used for finding an appropriate group of case studies.
All of the studied developments had to meet the following criteria: located within the Boston
metropolitan area, permitted between the mid-1 980s and 2000, rental tenure structure, and
finally, they had to be embedded in a single-family residential neighborhood. The impact area
section describes how we determined the appropriate, realistic number of single-family homes
likely to be affected by the Chapter 40B development. These impact areas are established
to examine price effects over time as the developments are announced, built, occupied, and
beyond.
CASE SELECTION PROCESS
The case selection process began with an examination of developments having
used Chapter 40B to obtain zoning relief. The Citizens' Housing and Planning Association
(CHAPA), in their June 2003 report on the effectiveness of Chapter 40B, assembled a list of all
40B developments, totaling 491 projects. Table 3.1 is a compilation of summary statistics for
the complete 40B project list. The mean project size is 58 units with a standard deviation of
60 units around the mean; these two parameters indicate that the majority of projects are 120
units or less in size. The median of the inventory list is a 37 unit project, and the most common
sized project is only 8 units. Evidence shows that most 40B projects are in fact relatively small;
a reality in opposition to the common assumption that all 40B projects are the big, high-density
developments feared by residents at public meetings. The largest size of any one permitted
development is 312 units. However, this maximum development size is somewhat misleading
for the reason that in projects with multiple phases, each phase must be granted its own
comprehensive permit and is recorded as a separate project.
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Table 3.1 Chapter 40B Developments - Summary Statistics
Total fl)zouninment Si 7
Mean 58
Median 37
Mode 8
Standard Deviation 60
Range 311
Minimum 1
Maximum 312
Count 491
This inventory of projects was broken down by a number of selection criteria to find
an appropriate group of cases studies. First, only projects within the Boston metropolitan
area' were eligible for the study. Second, the projects were required to have received their
comprehensive permit and have been fully developed between the mid-1 980s and 2000. This
time frame was necessary to satisfy the requirements of the quantitative analysis portion
of the thesis. 2 Third, we only wanted to examine multi-family rental developments, not
homeownership, and for projects to be mixed-income as opposed to 100 percent affordable.
Fourth, we tried to selected larger projects that were very dissimilar in size, bulk, form, and
density from the surrounding community. Our intentions for choosing large, rental, multi-family
projects was to find 40B developments with the highest likelihood of engendering community
opposition. We felt that these larger, more contentious projects would be the most likely to
generate fears of property devaluation and truly test the thesis' hypothesis that opposition to
multi-family development is often a result of unfounded fears of property devaluation.
After applying these selection criteria to CHAPA's 40B inventory list the number of
possible projects to examine was significantly reduced. With this shortened list of developments,
we then proceeded to identify the projects on GIS maps with data layers of streets, rivers, open
space, zoning, and land use designations to assure that the developments were not located
at the edge of the town and resided in residential neighborhoods. Additionally, we evaluated
the context of potential projects using aerial photographs in order to obtain a better sense of
whether projects were incorporated in residential neighborhoods or isolated from all residential
neighbors. The results of this analysis were staggering in that as soon as we mapped most
of the potential projects, we found the overwhelming majority of them either placed right at
the edges of towns, or cut off from the community by large amounts of open space, interstate
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highways, high-tension power lines, rail corridors, and industrial and manufacturing uses.
Finally, we made site visits to all the potential projects that we were left with after the
previous analysis was complete. This exercise was instrumental to determining whether or
not a project was really integrated with the community. We also met with planners, building
inspectors, assessors, and GIS specialists in order to obtain a better sense of the neighborhood
context for each of the developments. This phase of the case selection process was extremely
important in determining the final list of projects for the study.
Case Study Sites
We successfully identified nine 40B projects that matched our criteria. Table 3.2 shows
a compilation of the summary statistics for the projects examined in this study. These nine
projects have a median size of 139 units, and fall between a range of 24 units and 525 units.
The mean size of the projects in the study is 175 units, and there is a large standard deviation
of 152 units: our case projects vary substantially in size. The mean, median, standard
deviation and range of our sample are all higher than the values for the entire group of 40B
projects described above. This is due in part because we combined two multi-phase projects,
The Village and Mansfield Depot and Kimball Court Apartments, and examined them as if they
were each one large development.
Table 3.2 Study Sites - Summary Statistics
Study Sites:
Total Development Size
Mean 175
Median 139
Mode N/A
Standard Deviation 152
Range 501
Minimum 24
Maximum 525
Count 9
As can be seen by the following map of the study sites, the nine developments in the
study are dispersed throughout the greater Boston metropolitan area. Burlington, Woburn and
Lexington are clustered together along Interstate 128 northwest of Boston. Wilmington is just
north of these towns along Interstate 93. Littleton is further northwest of the city at the junction
of routes 2 and 495. Norwood and Randolph are south of Boston along the southern section
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of 128. Finally, Mansfield is southwest of the city at the junction of Interstates 95 and 495.
Figure 3.1 Map of Study Sites
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The following table details the characteristics of the individual projects including
their location, developer, total project size, the number and percentage of affordable units,
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density, year permitted and completed, comprehensive permit approval body, and category of
opposition.
Table 3.3 Study Sites - Detailed Statistics
Total Afford. % Density:Location Development Developer Units able Afford units/
Units acre
Burlington Stone Brook Farm Brook Farm LP 203 51 25.1% 14.0
Lexington Franklin School The Community Buillders 38 10 26.3% 11.9
Littleton Littleton Green Dementian Guschov 24 24 100.0% 10.0
First Littleton LP/State Street
Littleton Pond Side at Littleton Development 90 32 35.6% 9.0
Mansfield Mansfield Depot I & II Keith Development 245 71 29.0% 16.6
Norwood Olde Derby Village Wilson Street Trust 139 35 25.2% 15.4
Randolph Liberty Place Liberty Place Assoc. LP 107 27 25.2% 9.2
Wilmingtn Arboretum/
Wilmington Avalon Oaks AvalonBay 204 41 20.1% 9.1
Kimball Court
Woburn Apartments 1, 2 & 3 Joseph Mullins 525 127 24.2% 19.3
Location Development Year Year Comprehensive PermitPermitted Completed Approval Body
Burlington Stone Brook Farm 1987 1989 Supreme Judicial Court
Lexington Franklin School 1986 1988 Board of Appeals
Littleton Littleton Green 1986 1987 Board of Appeals
Settled in mediation with ZBA,
Littleton Pond Side at Littleton 1987 1989 developer, and HAC
Settled in mediation with ZBA,
Mansfield Mansfield Depot I & 11 1986, 1987 1988, 1989 developer, and HAC
Norwood Olde Derby Village 1985 1986 Superior Court
Randolph Liberty Place 1987 1989 Board of Appeals
Wilmington Avalon Oaks 1997 1999 Massachusetts Appeals Court
Kimball Court 1985, 1989, 1988, 1990,
Woburn Apartments 1, 2 & 3 1999 2002 Massachusetts Appeals Court
The use of our stringent selection criteria result in a short list of nine 40B developments
that are large, dense, multi-family rental, and controversial. In some sense, these projects
are a kind of 40B worst case scenario from the perspective of neighboring single-family home
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owners. If there was ever a 40B development to cause a negative impact on surrounding
property values, it would be one of these projects.
IMPACT AREA DESIGNATION
The impact area for each case study is intended to represent the neighborhood within
which the 40B development is located. The single-family houses within this designation are
the ones that can realistically be expected to feel the impact of a 40B development. Impact
areas try to incorporate a continuous network of roads and social interaction while taking
into account barriers such as geographic features and major infrastructure, zoning, and local
political divisions such as school districts. A specific set of criteria were used to identify impact
areas. For properties to be included in the impact area they must (1) be direct abutters or (2)
be part of a contiguous road network of primary and secondary streets radiating from the 40B
site; or (3) have a visual connection, and direct line-of-sight to the 40B; or (4) be adjacent to
open space connections, via playing fields and dedicated walking or bike paths. These criteria
define an area where all the houses feel the same severity of perception toward an imposing
40B development.
Ultimately, impact areas were determined on a case-by-case basis. It would have been
unrealistic and erroneous to apply a generic test such as drawing an arbitrary distance radius
around the development capturing all the homes in the area. Our decisions were informed by
analyses of GIS maps, zoning, aerial photographs, road atlases, site visits. Most importantly,
we held discussions with local municipal officials such as planners, building inspectors,
tax assessors, GIS specialists, and town managers in order to gain their perspective of
neighborhood impact by each 40B development. In almost every case these discussion
reduced the size of our preliminary impact area. This study's careful and conservative
treatment of the impact area limited its boundary to slightly beyond the direct abutters of each
development. Figures 3.2 through 3.5 are photographs of the impact area for three of the
case studies. The top left, top right, and bottom right photographs were taken from the 40B
developments looking out to abutting properties. The bottom left photo was taken from an
adjacent street looking into the 40B project from the surrounding neighborhood. As can be
seen in the photographs, all of these homes have direct site lines to the developments and the
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Figures 3.2-3.5 Impact Area Photographs
Top L - Kimball Court Apartments, Top R - Stone Brook Farms, Bottom L and R - Avalon Oaks
projects are truly embedded into single-family home neighborhoods.
Similar studies examining the relationship between affordable housing and residential
property value that were conducted in different parts of the U.S. loosely define an impact
area as a contiguous neighborhood fabric extending between one-quarter mile and one-half
mile from the site in question.3 This conventional thinking is not readily adaptable to our
study or Boston's suburban metropolitan area. These studies examined much more densely
developed neighborhood areas comprised of a continuous urban fabric. Such neighborhoods
are porous. It is easier to move from street to street and block to block and to travel farther
all while maintaining strong visual site lines and social connections. The porosity of well-
connected urban neighborhoods allows the relative feeling of proximity to extend farther away
from an impact site. In suburban Boston an impact area dissolves quickly in the vastness of
large-lot zoning.
Control Areas
This study simply defines the control area as the municipality in which the 40B
development is located. All but one 40B development examined in this study are located in
municipalities organized as towns with a public-meeting form of government. Municipalities in
Massachusetts are heterogeneous and are often small geographically. The strong allegiance
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to home rule and the marked differences in the range and quality of public services provided by
each municipality mean that houses are not always close substitutes among municipalities.
(Endnotes)
1 As described in the introductory chapter, the Boston Metropolitan Area for the purposes of this study
is defined as the 155 Massachusetts cities and towns in the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy New England
Metropolitan City and Town Area (NECTA) Census designation.
2 For this study we obtained every single-family home sale recorded betweenl982 and 2003. We
wanted to have data for a few years prior to the granting of the comprehensive permit and several
years after the development was complete to establish long and continuous price indexes.
3 Lyons and Loveridge, (1993) use % and % mile; Galster, Tatian, and Smith (1999) and Galster,
Tatian, and Smith (2001) use distance intervals from 500 ft. to 2000 ft.; Lee, Culhane, and Wachter
(1999) use % and 2 mile.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the methodology employed to investigate the impact of large,
dense, Chapter 40B multi-family rental developments on the value of surrounding single-family
homes. The first section of the chapter provides a theoretical framework for why we chose to
use the hedonic approach and how hedonic modeling works. The second section describes in
detail our econometric methodology.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
From an economist's perspective, the quantitative portion of this study is about
amenities and disamenities and how they relate to housing markets. We seek to learn how
housing consumers respond to the presence of an amenity or disamenity in a local housing
market. Some opponents of chapter 40B claim that multi-family rental housing developments
built under Chapter 40B constitute a neighborhood disamenity; we investigate this claim.
There are two ways to quantify the effect of a hypothesized disamenity on the sales
price of houses. One strategy is to isolate distance to a disamenity. This method attempts to
hold a set of factors constant while changing the distance between houses and the disamenity.
The sales price at different distances can be compared to determine if distance is significant
variable. We did not use this approach because it is not apparent that a pure distance variable
would capture the affect of a disamenity.1 Instead, a more effective strategy is to focus on price
behavior over time. This approach builds price indexes for a control area and an impact area
and then compares the two. House price indexes can be built in two ways: with repeat sales
or a hedonic model. We chose not to use repeat sales because only houses that sell twice
during the study period can be used in that method of analysis. The repeat sales requirement
excludes all houses that only had one sales transaction; subsequently many sales observations
would be lost. The hedonic modeling approach uses every house transaction, thus giving the
largest possible sample size. The results of estimating a hedonic model allow us to price a
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typical house over a time interval, yielding a price index.
Hedonic Modeling
So what exactly is a hedonic model and how does it work? Before we explain, let
us give a brief economics primer. The price of a house is the sum of a "bundle of goods
and services". Practically speaking, "goods and services" are the structural attributes of a
house and the neighborhood in which the house is located. Examples of structural attributes
include house size, lot size, and the number of bathrooms and bedrooms. Neighborhood
attributes are often considered amenities or disamenities; examples could include the school
district in which the house is located, proximity to open space or a park, or closeness to heavy
industry or major-transportation infrastructure. A hedonic model is a statistical tool that uses
multivariate regression analysis to estimate the value of each of these attributes. The hedonic
model depicts the relationship, whether positive or negative, between each attribute and the
sales price. Knowing the value of each attribute makes it possible to examine how the price
of a house changes by altering either the quantity of the structural attributes or differences in
neighborhood attributes.
The mechanics of hedonic modeling set sales price as the dependent variable on
the left side of the equation and all the attributes as independent variables on the right side
of the equation. Each attribute is represented by an independent variable and the estimate
of a variable's value is formally called a coefficient or parameter. Current hedonic modeling
literature indicates that the best way to represent a dependent variable such as house price
is as a natural logarithm.3 This format preserves the ranked ordering 4 of house prices while
allowing easier interpretation of independent variables. The coefficients for independent
variables are then interpreted as the percentage change in price resulting from an additional
unit of an independent variable.
We are interested in tracking how the sales price for a typical house changes with time.
To accomplish this goal a hedonic model needs two stages. The first stage prices a constant
quality house by estimating the value of each attribute and establishes a relationship between
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value and housing attributes, including year sold. The effect of time on sales price is thus
estimated by including the year a house sold into the hedonic model. In the second stage, the
hedonic results are used to "price" a typical house over time. Separate hedonic models and
indexes are created for both the impact area and control area.
Housing markets are information inefficient compared to markets for other securities
such as a stock exchange. This means that comparing and interpreting indexes requires a
little coaching. Take for example a perfectly efficient market. The knowledge about a negative
event would disseminate instantly and prices would react to this new information immediately.
To extend this example further, let's imagine that a housing market could be perfectly efficient
and that a disamenity is introduced into a neighborhood. When it is known that a disamenity
is appearing in the market, prices for homes in the same neighborhood as the disamenity will
drop sharply and then continue to track the larger market.
The reality is that housing markets are not perfectly efficient; they lack perfect
information. In the context of this study, some home buyers and sellers may not be aware
when a Chapter 40B proposal is accepted and slated for construction nearby, or even if a 40B
development already exists in the neighborhood. Then some players in the market may know
that affordable housing is being developed but not really understand the nature of the project or
the circumstances of the 40B process. Furthermore, even if someone has been fully informed
throughout the 40B process, uncertainty could still remain about the final product and who the
actual residents will be.
The various issues regarding information comprehension and dissemination mean
that the assimilation of knowledge about a particular event into the local housing market will
occur differentially over time. People react slowly to change. It is unlikely that homeowners
are going to sell their house tomorrow if they find out today that a development has received
approval. _Additionally, a house is not a liquid asset, it takes time to sell. There are also high
transaction costs associated with the sale of a house, which may prolong or prohibit a decision
to sell. As such, it is only practical for an evaluation of price change over time to focus on the
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few years closest to the event. The impact of an event is strongest relative to other external
factors in the years immediately following the event.
APPLIED QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY
For this study we made a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive research
strategy and methodology to best answer the question of whether 40B developments
influence the sales price of adjacent single-family houses. Our methodology draws from the
experience of other research in the field of housing economics. We look to studies 5 that use
hedonic modeling to isolate time in order to ascertain the effect of affordable housing when
it was first introduced. Hedonic modeling is the primary analytic tool of this study; however it
is by no means the only analysis we carried out. Our rigorous and comprehensive approach
strengthens the reliability of the study and increases the precision of our models. For example,
as described in the previous chapter, we conducted a thorough examination of each case
study and the host neighborhood of each 40B development to establish a realistic impact area.
We purchased transaction data from a third party vendor to assure that we obtain an accurate
and complete (or as close to complete) data set of all single-family homes sales in our case
towns.
The Hedonic Model
Great effort was taken to come up with the best specifications and dimensions to
compose reliable hedonic models for all the case studies. The most important component
of a reliable model is for the coefficients for the independent variables to exhibit a realistic
relationship with the dependent variable and have low standard errors. Thorough analyses of
descriptive statistics were undertaken to construct sensible explanatory variables. We chose
to represent the dependent variable (the sales price of a single-family house) as a natural
logarithm because of the advantage this functional form offers for interpreting the independent
variables' coefficients.
The first stage of our hedonic models defines a typical house by estimating its attributes.
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The attributes are represented by independent variables; we included independent variables
that are considered to be strong predictors of price. All of our models contain a combination
of the following predictor variables: house size, lot size,6 number or bedrooms, number of
bathrooms, and the year the house was built. The independent variables are included in
the models in one of two forms; as a continuous number or as a dummy variable. A dummy
variable represents a dichotomous relationship. Either a house contains two bedrooms are
not. When dummy variables are used, one of the variables must be omitted from the model.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a dummy variable coefficient is interpreted as the percent
change in price compared to the excluded variable. Let's look at an example from Woburn to
interpret the coefficient of the independent dummy "bathl.5." This dummy variable represents
all houses in the sample that contain one and a half bathrooms. The standardized coefficient
of "bath1.5" in the control area hedonic model is 8.4%. This means that having one and half
bathrooms in a house adds eight point four percent more value than only one bathroom,
holding all other variables constant.
Independent variables were selected after a thorough examination of the sample's
descriptive statistics. A complete table of descriptive statistics for each town can be found
in Appendices 5.2 through 5.11. Additionally, definitions of all independent variables are in
Appendix 5.1. House size and lot size are entered as continuous numbers; the actual square
footage of the attribute is used in the model. All of the other independent variables are
entered as dummy variables. Dummy variables are constructed by separating the values for
each variable into bins.7 Each bin then becomes its own dummy variable. We tried for each
bin to contain similar numbers of observations. To clarify this procedure let us look again at
Woburn for an example. Houses in Woburn contain as few as one bathroom or as many as
five. Houses with one bathroom became dummy variable "bath1," houses with one and a half
bathrooms became dummy variable "bathl.5," etc. Dummy variable "bath>=2.5" contains all
houses with two and a half or more bathrooms. Each dummy variable does not contain an equal
number of observations, but they are similar according to the natural distribution of the sample.
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Dummy variables for bedrooms were constructed the same way as those for bathrooms. The
dummy variables for year built were made a little differently. The amount of unique years in
which houses were built is expansive, so bins were roughly divided into quintiles. Each bin is
not equal because there are distinct patterns or cycles of building activity and bin ranges were
adjusted to align with these cycles. In all cases, the dummy variable representing the smallest
value was excluded from the model.
Our hedonic models also include independent dummy variables to represent time.
The year in which a house sold is used to trace price movements over time. Small sample
sizes in the impact areas drove the construction of the year sold independent variables. It
was necessary to construct bins that contained enough observations for accurate statistical
testing. We created bins by pairing years.8 Pairing years increases the precision of estimating
the effect of time. The procedure for pairing towns is relatively straightforward. All houses that
sold in adjacent years were combined into one bin. For example, all houses that sold in year
1983 and 1984 were placed into bin "1 983-'84." Each bin established the basis for creating a
dummy variable. Care was taken to group years with similar price changes. The sales prices
in 1984 should experience similar change or stability as those in 1983. Years were paired
using repeat sales indexes from Case Shiller Weiss for each town. The Case Shiller Weiss
indexes provide a baseline for establishing annual appreciation trends for our study.
Grouped Towns
Additional measures were taken to check the accuracy of our models and price indexes
for individual towns. We grouped some towns together and built new models and indexes for
the aggregated town samples. Grouping towns increases sample size, which reduces standard
errors and noise (random variation) in the year sold variables: thus generating more precise
indexes. We formed two groups of towns; one group is composed of Burlington, Lexington,
Littleton and Woburn the other group comprises Mansfield, Norwood and Randolph.9 We
grouped towns in geographic proximity that experienced similar house price appreciation and
had 40B developments introduced simultaneously. The expectation is that because these
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grouped towns exhibited similar market behavior they also respond the same to shocks and
externalities.
The methodology for selecting the two groups consisted of matching towns according
to the previously mentioned criteria: (1) geographic proximity; (2) 40B developments were
introduced at approximately the same time; and (3) annual house price appreciation trends.
Determining the first two criteria is straightforward. Towns do not have to share common
borders, rather just be located in reasonable proximity to one another; and they should have
40B developments introduced at approximately the same time. Annual appreciation trends
were compared using Case Shiller Weiss repeat sales indexes. All grouped towns tracked
identically from 1982 through 1994. Small variations occurred after 1994, but much of this
difference is attributable to inflation which is not controlled for in the Case Shiller Weiss data.
Hedonic Equation
A hedonic equation was used to generate the values that support the comparative
sales price indexes. Separate equations were constructed and estimated for both the control
area and impact area models. To obtain a price index, the coefficient of each independent
variable representing a structural attribute (interior square feet, lot size, bathroom, bedroom,
year built) is multiplied by its mean and then added to the constant. The coefficients for the
year sold interval are included. The matrix of values and corresponding growth rates of the
equations for each town can be found in Appendices 5.2 through 5.11
Analysis Period
We talked about the diffuse nature by which information is diffused into a housing
market in the first section of this chapter; housing markets are very complex and information
is absorbed differentially over time. As such, it is difficult to isolate the impact any one event
has on sales price. The best way to capture the influence of an event is to observe price
trends before, during, and after the event and look for substantial variations from the overall
trend. We create sales price indexes that begin before comprehensive permit approval and
that extend well beyond the initial occupancy of the projects. The twenty year time frame of
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this study (1983-2003) provides a long, continuous trend that moves through multiple market
cycles.
The analysis period around each 40B development is designed to include the years
in which the influence of the development was strongest. There are always many competing
factors affecting sales price of single-family homes, and as time moves on from the introduction
of a 40B the exogenous factors dilute and eventually replace the influence of a 40B. The
length of each analysis period varies slightly, but the definition is the same for all. In general, an
analysis period is three years long.10 It begins with comprehensive permit approval and ends
in the year when the project was placed in service.
Data
This study uses sales transaction data for single-family houses. We obtained records
for all transactions between 1987 and 2003, and most of the transactions between 1982
and 1986. In order to use transaction data in hedonic modeling, the records must contain
information about the structural attributes of the house in addition to the sales price and the
date it sold. All the requisite information is not complied by one agency in a uniform format.
Transaction data including address, sales price, date, buyer, seller, mortgage amount, etc.
is collected by the Registries of Deeds in Massachusetts. Records containing information
pertaining to property attributes are maintained by local, municipal assessors. We purchased
data from a third party vender, The Warren Group, to bridge the gap between registries' and
assessors' records. The Warren Group collects data from both sources and assembles it
into one database." For more information about The Warren Group's Real Estate Records
Service, please see Appendix 4.1.
The data sets for each case were cleaned to eliminate incomplete records and statistical
anomalies. In rare instances values for structural characteristics were not reported. An
example of an incomplete structural characteristic would be a sales record that was missing
the value for the size of the house. These incomplete records were removed. We also filtered
for the anomalies of "non-arm's length" transactions and lot sizes with extreme outlying values.
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All identifiable "non-arm's length" transactions were removed. Lot size is the only structural
valuable with extreme outliers. Extreme outliers for lot size were systematically selected and
removed.
(Endnotes)
1 The literature review discusses studies that attempted to isolate distance to affordable housing. This
methodology does not produce reliable results.
2 Rosen 1974.
3 Lusht 1997 and Malpezzi 2002.
4 Assume all sales transactions in a sample are sorted by price, if price is then converted to a natural
log the same order is preserved.
5 Weinstein 2002.
6 House size and lot size are measured in square feet.
7 A bin is the same as a category. It is a way to classify and group observations in a sample that have
a particular value.
8 The designation of time intervals is an arbitrary assignment. It does not matter how time is captured
(months, quarters, year etc.) as long as it is appropriate to the context of the model. Pairing years is
perfectly acceptable as the scope of this study extends twenty years and the purpose is to increase
observations to minimize standard error.
9 Wilmington is not include in a group because the Avalon Oaks 40B development was introduced a
decade after 40B developments in near by towns.
10 Variation in the length of analysis periods is do to the length of the development and construction
process. Small projects that were constructed quickly have shorted analysis periods, which large,
complex projects tend to have longer analysis periods.
" The Warren Group maintains an active database of complete transactions records from 1987
through the present. They also have an inactive database of just sales records from 1982 to 1986.
This inactive database does not include any structural attributes of the property. We wanted to use
records from the inactive database to extend the length of our sales indexes. However, to make
the records in the inactive database useful we had to merge them with the active database. The
merging process identified houses that sold in both databases and attached the structural attributes
of the house from the active database to the corresponding, incomplete sales record in the inactive
database. The merge was accomplished using the Select Query function in Microsoft Access setting
property address as the common field.
Merging the structural attributes of a house from the active database to the same house in the
inactive database assumes the characteristics of the house have remained constant over time (i.e.
no additions were made or the house was not replaced); or put another way the bundle of goods that
produced a sale price in 1982 is the same bundle that produced the sale price for the same house
in 2003. This merging process certainly caused some inconsistencies matching transaction records
with structural characteristics over time, but the likely degree of error is low. The resulting merge was
successful; however, the conversion rate for matching records was around 50% percent; meaning half
of the houses sold in the inactive database resold in the active database. The quantity of transactions
per year for the inactive database is about half the number of transactions in the active database. The
two databases were combined once each sales record contained the same types of information.
12 Sale price data were skewed to the right, meaning there was an abnormally high frequency of low
sale prices. This skewness is due in part to the presence of "non-arms length" transactions. The
removal of low price transactions representing "non-arms length" required subjective review; statistical
testing, graphic representation and common sense were used to screen records. All transactions
with a sale price equal to or less than $50,000 were selected for review. Scatter plots of price and
year sold were created to identify whether previously flagged transactions were outliers for the year in
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which they sold each year. The identified outliers were also compared against two standard deviations
from the sample mean. The identified outliers and suspected "non-arm's length" transactions were
compared to other structural attributes of the property and assessor information the see if the price
seemed appropriate. We considered the buyer and seller, mortgage amount, year built, interior square
feet and lot size. The sale of many low priced homes were transactions between family members or
had mortgages considerably larger than the sale price. Examples of these two scenarios would be a
house that sold for $30,000 but had a mortgage of $225,000; or a larger than average sized house on
three quarter acre lot that sells for $25,000 between family members. In one instance, the same sold
for $15,000 five times on the same day to different individuals all with the same last name. Seeming
abnormally low sales transactions and outliers the failed the "non-arm's length" subjective test were
removed.
13 The average lot size in many of the towns is around half acre (20,000 square feet), yet all towns
had some transactions with lot sizes of several acres (200,000 + square feet and in one instance 2.5
million square feet or 57 acres). All transactions with lot sizes over three standard deviations were
removed from the impact areas. The sample sizes in impact areas were too small to compensate for
extreme values and allow the hedonic models to reliably estimate variable coefficients.
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CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The empirical portion of this study employs rigorous statistical methodologies to
evaluate the impact nine, multi-family 40B developments have on the sales price of adjacent
single-family homes. The review of each case study includes a description of the impact
area, and a discussion and interpretation of house-price indexes followed by an explanation
of hedonic models. A comprehensive project profile and development background is provided
for each case study in chapter 7.
We begin with a thorough examination of the Kimball CourtApartments 40B development
in Woburn. The assessment of subsequent case studies will be brief; highlighting major trends
and explaining any substantive differences from the Woburn case. We are starting with Woburn
because Kimball Court is the largest development in our study and it is shockingly different
from, and out of scale with, the surrounding neighborhood. This development is the strongest
candidate for causing neighborhood devaluation. Furthermore, the hedonic models for the
control and impact areas do a good job estimating the coefficients, so it serves as a good
example case. The order in which the remaining case studies are reviewed corresponds to
how towns are grouped for the aggregate analysis. Results for individual towns will be given
first, followed by the results for the grouped towns. The grouped analyses are offered to
confirm our conclusions. The Town of Wilmington is not included in a grouped analysis; its
results will be presented independently.
WOBURN
The City of Woburn has seen three phases of the Kimball Court multi-family housing
development. All phases were permitted using chapter 40B, and each phase has a separate
analysis period. The analysis period for each phase begins with the issuance of the
comprehensive permit and concludes in the year each phase was placed-in-service. The three
analysis periods are not all the same length; these differences are related to the construction
and development timeline of each project phase. The impact area and the control area is the
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same for all phases.
Impact Area
Kimball Court is located on the western edge of town adjacent to the Burlington border.
We are only considering the single-family homes in Woburn as part of the impact area. The
boundary is rectangular shaped with three definitive edges formed by Burlington to the west,
Route 128 to the south and Main Street on the east. The northern edge is marked where
Merrimac Street intersects Main Street and winds west through residential streets to where
Pearl Street crosses into Burlington. The Kimball Court impact area is one of the largest in the
study in part because the development is so dominating that its presence radiates deeply into
the residential neighborhood. The topography of the impact area slopes from the north and
east toward Kimball Court. The grade affords houses close to Main Street and farther north
clear site lines of the seven-story, monolithic buildings.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are an aerial photograph and zoning map of the impact area and
surrounding neighborhood. The photograph clearly depicts the relational mismatch between
the form and scale of Kimball Court and neighboring single-family homes. Most of the open
space adjacent to the development provides a buffer only to Burlington; Woburn residents face
a hard edge with little or no transition (see figure 5.4). The zoning map reinforces the point that
Kimball Court is an island amid a single-family district. There are other non-residential uses to
the south facing 1-95/Route 128, but Kimball Court penetrates into the neighborhood opposed
to minding the periphery.
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Figures 5.1-5.4
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Sales Price Indexes
Chart 5.1 shows the house price indexes for the control and impact areas. Both
indexes track house price movements over time that is consistent with the Boston area's
market experience. House prices rose strongly through the mid-1980's peaking in late
1988 and 1989. In the first half of the 1990's prices witnessed stagnation and even some
depreciation. By 1996 the market had turned a corner and house prices rebounded sharply.
The control area followed the experience of the larger Boston market somewhat more closely.
House prices in the impact area had greater amplitude on the margins, posting stronger growth
on the up side of the cycle and deeper depreciation on the down side. In sum, both indexes
followed very similar price paths.
In the years after the introduction of each Kimball Court phase the impact area and
control area experienced similar appreciation in sale price for single family homes. In fact the
impact area saw greater appreciation than the control area in each year interval immediately
following the introduction of a new phase. Over the course of the entire study the compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) for sale prices was 14% for the control area and 14.5% for the
impact area. A table of the price index values and summary statistics can be found in Appendix
5.2. During the phase I analysis period, the control area saw a 26% CAGR, slightly greater
than the impact area's 24% rate. In the year interval comprising the analysis period for phase
11, the impact area grew at a more modest annual rate of 7%. The control area actually
experienced deprecation during this time at an annual rate of -1%. In the phase III analysis
period the control area rebounds and both areas log strong annual appreciation rates: 21 % for
the impact area and 18% for the control area. Overall it can be said that there are no effective
differences between the two price trends. The conclusion drawn from the comparative indexes
is that sale prices for single-family homes in the impact and control areas can be interpreted as
trending identically during the three analysis periods for the Kimball Court 40B development.
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Chart 5.1
Woburn Sales Prices Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The control area sample consists of all single-family homes in the City of Woburn
excluding those houses located within the impact area. This model contains 4,762
observations. The accuracy of the model is witnessed by the low standard errors of the
coefficients for the year sold dummy variables. When trying to understand this hedonic model
(and other models in this study) it is important not to fixate on the Adjusted R squared and
T statistics. These values are driven in part by the magnitude of the coefficients and the
number of independent variables. This model does the best job possible estimating the value
of the coefficients. Its success is better determined by the relationship of the coefficients to
the dependent variable and the size of the standard error; the lower the standard error the
greater the precision. Remember, the dependent variable is the recorded sales price for all
single-family houses in the control area sample. All the independent variables in the control
area model have reasonable coefficients that interact in an understandable manner with the
dependent variable. The output of the control area hedonic model is shown in Table 5.1.
Definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1919, yrsold1985-'86
The first variable in Table 5.1, "constant", is not actually a variable at all. Technically
speaking, the constant is the y intercept; it is the point where the fitted regression line
crosses the y axis. What is important to know about the constant is that the coefficient is
the base estimate for house value. The constant for this model is 11.195, which converts to
approximately $73,000.1 The coefficient of each independent variable is interpreted as the
percent change in price from an additional unit of an independent variable. In other words, an
independent variable's coefficient tells us how much value an attribute will add to, or detracts
from, the value of the house (the constant). To better understand this, let's use an example.
The true first independent variables included in the model are house size "intersf' and
lot size "lotsize". House size is usually the strongest predictor of sales price. The standardized2
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Dependent varia le equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients
variables Unstandardized IStandardized Std. Error t Significance
constant 11.195 - 0.031 364.970 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 6.560 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 10.680 0.000
bath1.5 0.081 8.41% 0.013 6.080 0.000
bath2 0.061 6.32% 0.014 4.500 0.000
bath>=2.5 0.160 17.35% 0.019 8.270 0.000
bed3 0.089 9.27% 0.014 6.170 0.000
bed>=4 0.095 9.96% 0.018 5.280 0.000
yrbltl920-'59 0.113 11.99% 0.013 8.520 0.000
yrbltl960-'79 0.199 22.01% 0.016 12.090 0.000
yrbIt1980-'89 0.212 23.57% 0.020 10.670 0.000
yrbit1990-'03 0.260 29.73% 0.021 12.580 0.000
yrsoldl983-'84 -0.434 -35.21% 0.031 -14.060 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.258 29.38% 0.026 9.800 0.000
yrsoldl989-'90 0.238 26.88% 0.027 8.660 0.000
yrsoldl991-'92 0.124 13.16% 0.026 4.720 0.000
yrsoldl993-'94 0.155 16.72% 0.025 6.080 0.000
yrsoldl995-'96 0.228 25.55% 0.025 9.040 0.000
yrsoldl997-'98 0.329 38.90% 0.025 13.160 0.000
yrsoldl999-'00 0.570 76.75% 0.025 22.790 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.831 129.65% 0.026 32.400 0.000
yrsold2003 1.008 173.92% 0.028 36.020 0.000
N 4762 Adjusted R- 0.5553 Std. Error of the 0.323874 Squared Estimate
"intersf' coefficient reveals that each additional square foot increases sales price by about
.01 %. The coefficient may seem small, but when multiplied by many square feet the effect is
quite large. The standardized coefficient for lot size is also very small, but again this affect is
per square foot. These coefficients are not used to price an entire house, rather to see how
a change on the margin affects price. The hedonic model estimates the "intersf' and "lotsize"
coefficients based on the house and lot sizes in the sample. The coefficients describe how
an addition to, or subtraction from, this average size changes the value of a house. We are
going to use the "intersf" independent variable to run through a numeric example. The average
house in the control area is 1,471 sf. Suppose we want to price a house that is 500 sf larger
(roughly one standard deviation) from the typical house: first, multiple 500 sf by the "intersf"
coefficient to get 4.3%; then, multiple the constant ($73,000, the base home value) by 4.3% to
get $3,161. The additional 500 sf of interior space add $3,161 of value.
The rest of the independent variables are entered into the model as dummies. Another
strong indicator of price is the number of bathrooms in a house. This characteristic is divided
into four categories (bins), one bathroom or less "bath<=1 ", one and a half bathrooms "bath1.5",
two bathrooms "bath2", and two and a half or more bathrooms "bath>=2.5". "Bath1" is omitted
from the model, so the coefficients for the remaining bathroom variables are in comparison
to a house with one bathroom. The coefficients for the "bath1.5" and "bath2" behave fairly
normally, increasing price by 8.41 % and 6.32% respectively compared to a house with only
one bathroom. The 17.35% standardized coefficient for "bath>=2.5" is not an uncommon
estimation in this type of hedonic modeling. The exceptionally large coefficient indicates that
"bath>=2.5" is correlated with other "quality" features. 3 This dummy variable is acting as a
proxy for exogenous factors not controlled for in the model.
The procedure for estimating the value of a dummy variable is similar to the procedure
we used to find the value of additional square feet. There are however subtle, but noteworthy,
differences in the process and interpretation. Remember that when dummy variables are
used, one of the variables must be omitted from the model. As a result, a dummy variable
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coefficient is interpreted as the percent change in price compared to the excluded variable.
Using "bathl.5" we will give another numeric example. The standardized coefficient for
"bathl.5" is 8.41%; multiple this by the constant to get $6,137. The presence of one and half
bathrooms adds $6,137 more value than if a house had only one bathroom.
Independent dummy variables for bedrooms are included next. Bedrooms are split
into three categories, with houses containing two or less bedrooms used as the base case.
"Bed3" and "bed>=4" have very similar positive coefficients: 9.3% and 10% respectively.
There is caveat for interpreting bedroom dummy variables. One would expect the presence
of more bedrooms to exhibit a greater-positive influence on sales price. However, remember
that hedonic models hold the size of the house constant. So an increase in bedrooms means
a decrease in other living space like the kitchen or family room. Often-times the coefficient
of the dummy variable with the most bedrooms is lower than (and sometimes negative) the
coefficient of the dummy variable representing fewer bedrooms. In this case, the bedroom
dummy variables have nearly identical coefficients, indicating that there is a preferred tradeoff
for bedrooms versus living space.
The age of the housing stock is also considered in this model. The influence of age is
captured by the year in which a house was built. The year built variable is divided into quintiles
that are adjusted to reflect building cycles. The dummy variable "yrbIt1919" representing the
oldest homes is omitted from the model. In general we expect newer houses to have a stronger
positive influence on sales price. This trend holds true, each successively newer category of
houses adds more value to the sales price than the previous. Deviations to this trend can
occur. Year built is often a proxy for house style. Often it is the case that specific house styles
are unique to different time periods. Sometimes a style of house built several decades (or
even one hundred years ago) is more desirable than the types of house built recently.
The final set of independent dummy variables included in the model is for year sold.
These coefficients are used to trace price movements over time. The year sold interval 1985-
'86 was omitted from the regression and serves as the model's base year. The coefficients of
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this set of independent variables are less intuitive to interpret when the omitted variable is not
the first one in the series. Assume the coefficient for "yrsold1985-'86" is 0; it does not influence
the dependent variable. The coefficients of the remaining year sold dummies are relative to
this base year coefficient of 0%. The coefficient of "yrsoldl983-'84", the previous year sold
interval, is -35.21 %. This means that houses in year interval 1983-'84 sold for 35% less than
houses in 1985-'86. The coefficient of "yrsoldl987-'88" is 29.38%, so houses in this year
interval sold for almost 30% more than houses in the omitted base year interval.
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
The Impact area contains 157 observations. The output of the impact area model is
give below in Table5.2. The standardized coefficient of "bathl.5" is 14.4%, a substantially
larger estimation than the other bathroom dummy variables. This indicates that the proxy
effect for "bath>=2.5" does not exist. There are fewer variables for structural attributes
because houses in the impact area are more homogeneous than houses in the control area,
and the independent variables in the model for structural attributes do good job describing the
typical house.
CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
65
Table 5.2
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
variables Unstandardized IStandardized S I
constant 11.344 - 0.117 97.270 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 2.200 0.029
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 2.530 0.012
bathl.5 0.135 14.43% 0.052 2.570 0.011
bath2 0.003 0.25% 0.053 0.050 0.962
bath>=2.5 0.057 5.89% 0.080 0.720 0.474
bed>=4 0.084 8.75% 0.046 1.810 0.072
yrbltl900-'46 0.016 1.62% 0.061 0.260 0.793
yrbltl947-'54 0.165 17.95% 0.062 2.640 0.009
yrbltl955-'90 0.146 15.69% 0.059 2.470 0.015
yrbltl991-'03 0.382 46.49% 0.069 5.550 0.000
yrsold1983-'84 -0.558 -42.74% 0.133 -4.190 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.084 8.76% 0.101 0.830 0.408
yrsold1989-'90 0.221 24.76% 0.097 2.270 0.025
yrsold1991-'92 0.109 11.55% 0.113 0.970 0.335
yrsold1993-'94 -0.044 -4.29% 0.103 -0.430 0.671
yrsold1995-'96 -0.111 -10.54% 0.097 -1.150 0.252
yrsold1997-'98 0.218 24.34% 0.087 2.510 0.013
yrsoldl999-'00 0.507 66.05% 0.092 5.530 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.784 119.08% 0.096 8.130 0.000
yrsold2003 0.930 153.44% 0.106 8.770 0.000
N 157 Adjusted R- 0.742 Std. Error of the 0.21462
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrblt<=1899, yrsold1985-'86
Housing Profile
Table 5.3 gives some descriptive statistics for the housing stock in both the control
area and impact area. The mean and standard deviations for each variable in the model are
provided. The mean of a dummy variable is its percentage of the whole variable set. Looking
at bathrooms, the mean for "bath1" is .38; 38% of the houses in the control sample have one
bathroom. The mean values of the independent variables are used in calculating the price
indexes. The hedonic equation is discussed in chapter 4. On average houses in the impact
area are slightly more expensive, larger and situated on bigger lots than houses in the control
area. Additional description statistics about each sample are provided in Appendix 5.2.
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Variable
Price
Intersf
Lotsize
Bathrooms
1
1.5
2
>=2.5
Bedrooms
<=2
3
<=3
>=4
Year Built
<=1919
1920-59
1960-79
1980-89
1990-03
<=1899
1990-46
1947-54
1955-90
1991-03
Bold IndependE
trol
Std. Dev.
86,583
486
5,889
0.61
0.48
0.42
0.43
0.36
0.78
0.35
0.49
0.45
40
0.40
0.49
0.29
0.30 -
- 0.39
- 0.39
- 0.41
0.40
- 0.40
.nt variables are base case (omitted)
BURLINGTON
Stone Brooke Farms 40B development is a large, dense project. The analysis period
begins in 1987 with the issuance of a comprehensive permit and concludes in 1989, the year
in which the development was fully occupied.
Impact Area
The Stone Brooke Farms impact area is basically a triangular shaped polygon bounded
by three major roads; Bedford Street to the North, Center Street to the East and Cambridge
Street to the West. Properties located within these three major roads and Birchcrest Street to
the South are considered direct abutters. The southern edge is loosely defined by Rita Avenue,
Ganley Drive and Heather Drive. These three roads are considered to be secondary-tier roads
in the impact area's contiguous road network. Traverse Lane and a few other properties to the
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Table 5.3
Std. Dev
433
6,592
0.62
0.48
0.43
0.44
0.33
0.78
0.47
0.47
54
Descri[Mve S1
south are included in the impact area even though they on the opposite side of Center Street.
They are included due to visual impact and because they are directly across from the main
entrance to Stone Brooke Farms. The boundary of the impact area was focused with the input
from Burlington's Planning Director.
It is seen from figures 5.5 and 5.6 that Stone Brooke Farms is clearly embedded in
a single-family neighborhood. The development sits below the grade of Center Street but is
uphill of residents to the south and west. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 shows the scale of the buildings
and how different the development is from the close neighbors.
Figure 5.5
Figure 5.7-5.8
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Figure 5.6
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Sales Price Indexes
In chart 5.2 the sales price indexes for the control area and impact area track very
closely in the analysis period and for most other years in this study. The control area matches
the Boston area market experience very well, with smooth transitions between cycles. The
impact area index experiences fluctuations beginning in 1994. This unsteadiness is most
likely due to randomness associated with higher standard errors of the year sold coefficients.
Despite the fluctuations, a persistent upward trend consistent with the control area index is
evident.
Over the duration of the study, the impact area had a Compound Annual
Growth Rate of 10.5% while the control area's CAGR was 15%. During the analysis period the
control area also witnessed a higher growth rate of 16% to the impact area's 12%. The rate of
growth during the analysis period relative to the annual growth for the entire study is greater
in the impact area. More information about the indexes values and growth rate is available in
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Appendix 5.2. The conclusion for Burlington's price indexes is the same as in Woburn: sale
prices for single-family homes in the impact and control areas can be interpreted as trending
identically during the analysis period for the Stone Brooke Farms 40B development.
Chart 5.2
Burlington Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The output of this model is seen below in Table5.4. The coefficients of all the
independent variables behave well.
Table 5.4
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
variables Unstandardized IStandardized I
constant
intersf
lotsize
bathl.5
bath2
bath>=2.5
bed3
bed>=4
yrbltl 955-'64
yrbltl 965-'78
yrbIt1979-'92
vrbit1 993-'03
11.054
0.000
0.000
0.082
0.057
0.100
0.047
0.084
0.092
0.192
0.265
0.173
0.01%
0.00%
8.59%
5.84%
10.49%
4.83%
8.73%
9.62%
21.12%
30.39%
18.92%
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.014
0.015
0.018
0.019
0.021
0.014
0.017
0.020
0.025
343.530
9.790
7.290
5.720
3.710
5.410
2.530
3.940
6.460
11.250
13.320
6.800
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Table 5.4 continued
yrsold1982-'83 -0.352 -29.70% 0.034 -10.390 0.000
yrsold1986-'87 0.371 44.90% 0.028 13.280 0.000
yrsold1988-'89 0.465 59.19% 0.027 16.950 0.000
yrsold1990-'91 0.384 46.87% 0.028 13.750 0.000
yrsold1992-'93 0.378 45.99% 0.027 14.200 0.000
yrsold1994-'95 0.434 54.35% 0.026 16.470 0.000
yrsold1996-'97 0.523 68.75% 0.026 19.840 0.000
yrsold1998-'99 0.713 104.010% 0.026 26.970 0.000
yrsold2000-'01 0.963 161.967% 0.027 35.630 0.000
yrsold2002-'03 1.181 225.91% 0.026 44.930 0.000
N 4174 Adjusted R- 0.6005 Std. Error of the 0.30739
Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1954, yrsoldl982-'84
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
The model for the impact area showed in Table5.5 returns some unexpected coefficients
for independent variables representing structural attributes. The first thing to notice is that
the "intersf" coefficient is negative. This negative, but small, relationship with the dependent
variable causes the coefficients of the remaining attribute variables to increase markedly. They
are in effect compensating, shouldering more of the responsibility for explaining house price.
Even though the coefficients for the structural attribute independent variables are for the most
part higher, the relationships with dependent variable make sense. A notable difference from
Woburn is "yrbitl 984-'03", which exhibits a slightly negative relationship relative to houses built
before 1956.
Table 5.5
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
variables Unstandardized IStandardized
constant 12.454 - 0.552 22.570 0.000
intersf 0.000 -0.02% 0.000 -1.220 0.227
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 -1.720 0.092
bath1.5 0.467 59.45% 0.215 2.170 0.035
bath2 0.245 27.79% 0.193 1.270 0.210
bath>=2.5 0.437 54.81% 0.256 1.700 0.095
bed>=4 0.265 30.38% 0.168 1.580 0.121
yrblt_1956-'58 0.188 20.66% 0.159 1.180 0.243
yrblt 1959-'60 0.288 33.42% 0.178 1.620 0.111
yrblt_1961-'83 0.338 40.20% 0.189 1.790 0.080
yrbltl984-'03 -0.028 -2.77% 0.179 -0.160 0.876
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Table 5.5 continued
yrsold1982-'83
yrsold1 986-'8T
yrsold1988-'89
yrsold1990-'91
yrsoldl992-'93
yrsoldl994-'95
yrsoldl996-'97
yrsoldl998-'99
yrsold2000-'01
vrsold2002-'03
N 70 Adjusted R- 0.2648 Std. Error of the 0.3495
1 1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrbit<=1955, yrsoldl982-'84
Housing Profile
Houses in the control area on average sell for almost $40,000 more than houses in the
impact area. The average house is also larger in the control area with an extra bedroom, but
the lot sizes in each sample are almost identical. Descriptive statistics for the control area and
impact area samples are detailed in Table5.6 and Appendix 5.3.
Table 5.6
Descriptive Statistics
Control
Std. Dev.
97,805
643
11,865T
30.66
0.43
0.45
0.42
0.43
0.70_
0.28
0.48
0.45
S21
0.38
0.50
S0.40
0.32
0.23
Variable
Price
Intersf
Lotsize
Bathrooms
1
1.5
2
>=2. 5
Bedrooms
<=2
3
<=3
>=4
Year Built
<=1954
1955-'64
1965-'78
1979-'92
1993-'03
<=1955
1956-'58
1959-'60
1961-'83
1984-'03
Bold Independ nt variables are base cas
Impact
Std. Dev
59,773
50.
2,337
0.59
0.35
0.43
0.49
0.43
0.59
0.38
0. 
15
0.40
0.43
0.42
0.37
0.38
e (omitted)
CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
72
-0.328
0.178
0.341
0.302
0.162
0.102
0.387
0.369
0.695
0.769
-27.97%
19.43%
40.70%
35.25%
17.54%
10.69%
47.32%
44.69%
100.290%
115.655%
0.246
0.214
0.210
0.260
0.184
0.203
0.227
0.202
0.265
0.320
-1.330
0.830
1.630
1.160
0.880
0.500
1.710
1.820
2.620
2.400
0.189
0.410
0.110
0.251
0.385
0.618
0.094
0.074
0.012
0.020
LEXINGTON
The Franklin School affordable housing development is the only case in this study
that did not require a comprehensive permit. It was introduced in 1986 with the approval of a
special permit. This development's placed-in-service date was 1988. The three years from the
permit issuance to the occupation define the analysis period.
Impact Area
The Franklin School impact area is shaped much like a long, thin rectangle. The long
sides are formed by Stedman Road and Allen Street on the east and Waltham Street on the
west. The Franklin School development is located on the east side of Stedman Road close
to the intersection of Allen Street. These two roads are the primary connectors throughout the
impact area. The northern portion of the impact area comprises the neighborhood defined
by the Hilltop Avenue cul-de-sac and Broadside Avenue. This neighborhood is connected to
primary and secondary roads that are part the impact area's contiguous street network. The
properties south of Brookside Avenue to the Pitcairn Place cul-de-sac are direct abutters of
the affordable housing development. The whole of Clematis Road is included as these newer
houses have clear views of the Franklin School. The southern boundary of the impact area
extends to the far edge of the large field.
The Franklin School impact area captured relatively few observations compared to
other impact areas in this study. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate the very low-density of the
surrounding neighborhood. The size and scale of the Franklin School are not drastically out of
context with the neighborhood, as seen in Woburn and Burlington. The project converted an
existing neighborhood school and the construction of barracks style buildings. The Franklin
School also abuts Clark Junior High School to the north.
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Figures 5.9-5.11
0 0.25
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Source: MassGIS Vector and Image Data
0.5 Miles
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Sales Price Indexes
Chart 5.3 reveals how closely the indexes for the control area and impact area track
for the duration of this study. In the years following the introduction of the Franklin School
development, houses in the impact area sold for more than houses in the control area.
Throughout the study and analysis period the impact area experienced greater compound
annual growth rates than the control area. For the study period as whole, the annual growth
rate was 18% for the impact area and 15.5% for the control. During the analysis period the
rates were 35.3% and 25.8% respectively. The differences between the two price trends are
extremely small. In conclusion, no effective differences in sales price were caused by the
introduction of the Franklin School affordable housing development.
Chart 5.3
Lexington Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The independent variables in this model generally conform to the expected relationship
with the dependent variable. Dummy variables "bath2.5" and "bath>=3" both appear to proxy
for exogenous quality features not included in the model. The coefficients of the set of dummy
variables for year built are different from what we have seen so far. Only the houses built
between 1962 and 1988 positively influence sales price more than house built before 1929,
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the three remaining dummy variable maintain a negative relationship with sales price. Table
5.7 provides the output of the control area hedonic model.
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
Table 5.7
Contro
ualsthe aturl lo of ric
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1929, yrsold1987-'88
The impact area model contains some independent variables with coefficients that
are also different. The dummy variable "bath2.5" seems to exhibit the proxy effect, yet
"bath>=3" does not. The entire set of bedroom dummy variables negatively effect sales price
compared to houses with two or fewer bedrooms. The set of year built dummy variables all
have coefficients with more normal relationships, like those in the Woburn example. The
majority of coefficients of the year sold dummy variables are negative. These strong negative
relationships are balanced by a high constant.
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Independent Coefficients i
variables Unstandardized IStandardized I Std. Error t Significance
constant 11.788 - 0.022 525.910 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 24.560 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 13.450 0.000
bath<=1.5 0.154 16.67% 0.014 10.790 0.000
bath2 0.146 15.71% 0.015 9.520 0.000
bath2.5 0.278 31.99% 0.016 17.680 0.000
bath>=3 0.320 37.76% 0.019 17.130 0.000
bed3 0.058 5.95% 0.015 3.810 0.000
bed4 0.082 8.59% 0.018 4.660 0.000
bed>=5 0.141 15.12% 0.023 6.160 0.000
yrbltl930-'49 -0.012 -1.15% 0.014 -0.850 0.395
yrbltl950-'61 -0.012 -1.20% 0.012 -1.000 0.317
yrbit1962-'88 0.087 9.06% 0.014 6.210 0.000
yrbltl989-'03 -0.164 -15.14% 0.018 -9.140 0.000
yrsoldl983-'84 -0.689 -49.78% 0.023 -29.530 0.000
yrsoldl985-'86 -0.237 -21.13% 0.023 -10.400 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.022 2.23% 0.019 1.170 0.243
yrsold1991-'92 -0.027 -2.70% 0.018 -1.520 0.129
yrsold1993-'94 0.049 5.00% 0.018 2.780 0.006
yrsold1995-'96 0.141 15.11% 0.018 8.030 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.280 32.25% 0.017 16.090 0.000
yrsold1999-'00 0.511 66.69% 0.018 28.800 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.761 113.98% 0.018 42.500 0.000
yrsold2003 0.896 145.05% 0.022 40.870 0.000
N 6257 Adjusted R- 0.6619 Std. Error of the 0.319961 Squared Estimate
Table 5.8
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t
variables Unstandardized IStandardized
constant 12.149 - 0.165 73.570 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 1.830 0.076
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 1.800 0.080
bath<=1.5 0.112 11.89% 0.167 0.670 0.505
bath2 0.083 8.68% 0.176 0.470 0.640
bath2.5 0.297 34.61% 0.172 1.730 0.093
bath>=3 0.058 6.00% 0.249 0.230 0.816
bed3 -0.161 -14.91% 0.170 -0.950 0.349
bed4 -0.001 -0.12% 0.209 -0.010 0.995
bed>=5 -0.233 -20.80% 0.248 -0.940 0.353
yrbltl930-'49 0.131 14.02% 0.110 1.200 0.239
yrbltl950-61 0.191 21.07% 0.140 1.370 0.180
yrbltl962-'88 0.240 27.10% 0.131 1.830 0.075
yrblt1989-'03 0.339 40.39% 0.163 2.090 0.044
yrsold1983-'84 -0.907 -59.62% 0.179 -5.050 0.000
yrsold1985-'86 -0.254 -22.43% 0.174 -1.460 0.153
yrsold1989-'90 -0.097 -9.20% 0.133 -0.720 0.474
yrsold1991-'92 -0.289 -25.10% 0.195 -1.480 0.147
yrsold1993-'94 -0.100 -9.56% 0.170 -0.590 0.559
yrsold1995-'96 -0.019 -1.88% 0.144 -0.130 0.896
yrsold1997-'98 0.173 18.94% 0.158 1.100 0.280
yrsold1999-'00 0.316 37.15% 0.126 2.510 0.016
yrsold2001-'02 0.558 74.66% 0.148 3.760 0.001
yrsold2003 0.914 149.48% 0.131 6.980 0.000
N 61 Adjusted R- 0.7924 Std. Error of the 0.233161 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bathi, bed<=2, yrblt<=1929, yrsoldl987-'88
Housing Profile
Houses in the impact area, on average, are larger, located on bigger lots and sell for
more. Houses in both the Lexington samples are the largest and most expensive of this study.
Table 5.9 and Appendix 5.4 provide descriptive statistics about the two samples.
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Table 5.9
LITTLETON
This study evaluates two 40B developments located in the town of Littleton. Each
development has an independent impact area. The two projects received comprehensive
permit approval in successive years. The analysis periods for the two impact areas overlap,
and in an effort to better isolate the influences of the two 40B developments a single control
areas is used. The control area includes all single-family homes in the town of Littleton minus
the homes in the two impact areas.
Impact Areas
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the extents of both impact areas. Pondside and Littleton
Green are located relatively close to one another, but not close enough to be considered part
of the same residential neighborhood. In addition to distance they are separated by Interstate
Highway 495. Both developments are surrounded be single-family residences: Littleton Green
is embedded in relatively dense, contiguous neighborhood and Pondside is in the middle of a
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looser, diffuse residential area.
The impact area surrounding the Littleton Green development is compact and shaped
like a square. The development is situated close to the center of the impact area and the
majority of houses in the area are abutters. The boundary is defined by King Street (Route
2A) to the north, Goldsmith Street on the east, Lochslea Street along the south and both Edsel
Road and Baldwin Hill Road on the west. All the properties in the impact area are part a tight
road network and have site lines to the 40B.
The Pondside 40B is also located on King Street, a few miles west of Littleton Green.
Pondside's impact area is more spread out and the surrounding land use pattern is dispersed.
There are few direct abutters, but the lay of the land combined with the orientation of the site
plan make the project very visible. All the houses on Mill Street and those contained by the
triangle of Mill Street, King Street and Interstate 495 are considered abutters. Homes on
Pleasant Street have a clear view of Pondside across mill pond, and as such are considered to
be impacted even though they are outside of the contiguous street network. The Wychwood
Drive neighborhood and the homes off of New Estate Drive are on the opposite side of the
busy King Street. These two streets, and their tributary roads, are included in the impact
area because they connect with King Street across from the only entrance to Pondside: so
neighbors are constantly confronted with the development. Figure 5.14 is the view from
Wychwood Drive.
Sales Price Indexes
The three sales price indexes in chart 5.4 all follow the same trend. The impact area
indexes deviate periodically from the control area but the movements are small. The control
area experienced the same market cycles as the Boston region; the transition from year
interval 1984-'85 to year interval 1986-'87 was a little steep but nonetheless consistent.
Littleton Green is an elderly rental 40B development. Generally speaking, housing for
the elderly is less offensive to a community, so it is not surprising that the Littleton Green index
tracks the control index almost identically.
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The Pondside 40B is a much larger and more noticeable multi-family rental
development, so it will be the focus of this analysis. The Pondside impact area and the
control area had CAGRs of 12% and 15% respectively over the course of twenty one years.
More information about compound annual growth rates and index values is in Appendix 5.5.
The Pondside impact area experienced a substantially greater annual growth rate during the
analysis period than the control area. During this short time the value of a typical house in the
Pondside impact area increased annually by over 38%, this is more than double the 16% rate
for the typical house in the control area. The value of a typical house in the impact area was
greater than the typical control area house from 1988 to 1992. This difference was greatest
in the analysis period. It took four years for values in the Pondside impact area to return to a
level consistent with the control area. We conclude that the three indexes track the same. The
substantive movement in the Pondside impact area index is in favor of this study's hypothesis
that 40B developments do not negatively impact single-family home prices.
Chart 5.4
Littleton Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The model performs well; all the coefficients have reasonable values and an
understandable relationship with the dependent variable.
Table 5.10
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice coefficients Std. Error t SignificanceInprice Unstandardized IStandardized
constant 11.375 - 0.042 273.740 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 11.020 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 3.480 0.001
bathl.5 0.041 4.14% 0.027 1.500 0.134
bath2 0.039 4.02% 0.026 1.530 0.126
bath>=2.5 0.192 21.20% 0.032 6.000 0.000
bed3 0.126 13.39% 0.022 5.590 0.000
bed>=4 0.171 18.59% 0.029 5.830 0.000
yrbitl943-'55 0.054 5.52% 0.024 2.220 0.026
yrbIt1956-'74 0.115 12.24% 0.026 4.510 0.000
yrbItl975-'91 0.157 17.01% 0.028 5.700 0.000
yrblt1992-'03 0.114 12.04% 0.030 3.780 0.000
yrsold1982-'83 -0.864 -57.85% 0.056 -15.530 0.000
yrsoldl984-'85 -0.505 -39.65% 0.047 -10.820 0.000
yrsoldl988-'89 -0.065 -6.33% 0.043 -1.530 0.126
yrsoldl990-'91 -0.070 -6.74% 0.043 -1.620 0.106
yrsoldl992-'93 -0.121 -11.41% 0.039 -3.100 0.002
yrsold1994-'95 -0.036 -3.53% 0.041 -0.890 0.376
yrsoldl996-'97 0.070 7.20% 0.039 1.800 0.071
yrsold1998-'99 0.227 25.49% 0.038 5.920 0.000
yrsold2000-'01 0.473 60.47% 0.039 12.210 0.000
yrsold2002-'03 0.702 101.77% 0.039 18.050 0.000
N 2031 Adjusted R- 0.6312 Std. Error of the 0.3485
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath<=1, bed<=2, yrbit<=1942, yrsold1986-'87
Hedonic Model: Pondside Impact Area
This model also performs well. The move from one bathroom to one and a half
bathrooms is clearly very important for adding value. The "bath>=2.5" dummy may be a proxy
for other quality features. Again we see with the year built dummy variables that the most
recently built houses have a negative relationship with sales price compared to the oldest
houses in the sample.
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Table 5.11
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
constant 11.433 - 0.204 55.940 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 0.900 0.369
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 1.980 0.051
bathl.5 0.315 37.04% 0.167 1.890 0.062
bath2 0.056 5.77% 0.126 0.450 0.657
bath>=2.5 0.169 18.44% 0.199 0.850 0.398
bed>=4 0.019 1.97% 0.116 0.170 0.867
yrbltl950-'55 0.013 1.27% 0.166 0.080 0.939
yrbltl956-'63 0.134 14.34% 0.158 0.850 0.399
yrbitl964-85 0.178 19.54% 0.152 1.170 0.244
yrbltl986-'03 -0.128 -12.02% 0.125 -1.030 0.307
yrsold1982-'83 -0.509 -39.87% 0.216 -2.350 0.021
yrsold1984-'85 -0.725 -51.56% 0.177 -4.090 0.000
yrsold1988-'89 0.254 28.92% 0.209 1.220 0.227
yrsold1990-'91 0.168 18.27% 0.182 0.920 0.358
yrsoldl992-'93 0.068 7.03% 0.180 0.380 0.707
yrsold1994-'95 0.015 1.49% 0.195 0.080 0.940
yrsold1996-'97 0.154 16.61% 0.170 0.900 0.369
yrsold1998-'99 0.240 27.06% 0.174 1.380 0.171
yrsold2000-'01 0.701 101.66% 0.191 3.680 0.000
yrsold2002-'03 0.748 111.23% 0.190 3.930 0.000
N 117 Adjusted R- 0.5268 Std. Error of the 0.39377
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrblt<=1949, yrsold1986-'87
Hedonic Model: Littleton Green Impact Area
So few independent variables are included in the model because the sample is small
and the houses are very similar. All things considered the model does a very good job
estimating the value of a typical house.
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Table 5.12
Dependent vanmable equals the natural log of price
CoefficientsInprice Unstandardized IStandardized Std. Error t Significance
constant 11.660 - 0.194 59.990 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 2.000 0.052
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 0.480 0.631
bath>2 -0.055 -5.36% 0.073 -0.750 0.456
bed3 -0.062 -5.99% 0.052 -1.200 0.239
yrsold1982-'83 -0.791 -54.68% 0.101 -7.830 0.000
yrsold1984-'85 -0.408 -33.53% 0.103 -3.970 0.000
yrsold1988-'89 -0.090 -8.61% 0.085 -1.050 0.298
yrsold1990-'91 -0.039 -3.84% 0.104 -0.380 0.709
yrsold1992-'93 -0.016 -1.54% 0.092 -0.170 0.867
yrsold1994-'95 0.050 5.14% 0.080 0.620 0.536
yrsold1996-'97 -0.033 -3.29% 0.087 -0.390 0.702
yrsold1998-'99 0.221 24.67% 0.079 2.800 0.008
yrsold2000-'01 0.422 52.49% 0.090 4.690 0.000
yrsold2002-'03 0.753 112.29% 0.084 8.980 0.000
N 57 Adjusted R- 0.8675 Std. Error of the 0.136791 Squared 5 Estimate
Omitted variables: bath<=1.5, bed<=2, yrsoldl986-'87
Housing Profile
The typical house in the Littleton Green impact sample area is smaller in both interior
square footage and lot size than houses in the other samples; and it is the least expensive.
The biggest-average house is found in the Pondside impact area built on a one acre lot.
Houses in the control area are the most expensive and have little more than an acre of lot size.
Table 5.13 gives some descriptive statistics, more are located in Appendix 5.5.
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Table 5.13
Control maPondside Ivrmbact LittletaonoGreen
Variable Std. Dev. Std. Dev Std. Dev
Price 118,143 94,639 71j68,013
Intersf 708 752 420
Lotsize 92,369 36,533 1,951
Bathrooms 0.68 0.68 0.54
1 - 0.47
<=1 0.47
<=1.5 -- 0.48
1.5 0.37 0.41
2 0.39 0.38
>=2 -0.48
>=2.5 0.47 0.46-
Bedrooms s.83 t.45 a42
<=2 0.40--
2 -- 0.42
3 0.50 -0.42
<=3 - 0.38 -
>=4 0.46 0.38-
Year Built 33 34-
<=1942 0.45 --
1943-'55 0.45--
1956-'74 0.42--
1975-'91 0.36--
1992-'03 0.24--
<=1949 - 0.39-
1950-'55 -0.37-
1956-'63 -0.44-
1964-'85 -0.30-
1986-'03 -0.46-
Bold Independent variables are base case (omitted)
GROUP: BURLINGTON, LEXINGTON, LITTLETON, WOBURN
This grouped analysis is presented to overcome statistical imprecision inherent with
smaller sample sizes. It is a way to check the results for the individual towns. The impact area
indexes of these four towns are generally accurate, displaying strong trends and few signs of
statistical randomness. Grouping the towns decreases the standard errors among independent
variables, which in turn yields indexes that capture the impact of 40B developments more
precisely. The sample of grouped towns does not have an impact area per se. The model is
estimating the cumulative effect of the impact areas in each town. The analysis period starts
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when the earliest comprehensive permit was issued (Kimball Court Phase I) and ends after
the last project was occupied (Kimball Court Phase 1l). Phase Ill of Kimball Court in Woburn is
excluded because it was constructed much later than developments in the other towns.
Sales Price Indexes
The indexes for both the control sample and the impact sample are very uniform, they
trend the same with very little deviation. The value of a typical house in the impact sample
is consistently less than the control sample. Changes do occur with the impact sample price
index in the analysis period, indicating that the introduction of a 40B development does
influence single-family property value. The influence is positive, as the value for a typical home
in the two samples is closest in the analysis period. A consistent separation between indexes
exists for all the years following the analysis period. This same amount of separation is also
present at the beginning of the analysis period, year interval 1985-'86. The value of a typical
home in the impact sample increases each of the next two time intervals until the difference
between indexes disappears in 1989-'90.
The control sample experience a higher compound annual growth rate over the duration
of the study, however the growth rate was higher in the impact sample during the analysis
period. The CAGR for the entire study period is 14.5% in the control sample and 13.9% in the
impact sample, these growth rates are very similar. During the analysis period the CAGR in
the control and impact samples are 18.9% and 19.9% respectively. More information about
sales price index values are in Appendix 5.6.
The indexes of the grouped analysis support the conclusions of the individual towns.
There are no effective differences between sales price indexes for the impact sample and
control sample, so it can be said that the introduction of a 40B multi-family rental development
does not negatively impact the value of near by single-family homes.
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Chart 5.5
Group - Burlington, Lexington, Littleton, Woburn
Sales Price Indexes
U) $500,000 _
0 $450,000
$400,000
$350,000
$300,000 --- Impact
r-- Control
e $150,000 -- o
O $100,000
e $50,000
i $0 $0 90 9 ) ) DC
.* CC) C J CC) C M C C) a) C)J C
a) M0 CC0
Year Sold
Hedonic Model: Control Sample and Impact Sample
Both models return understandable results. The bathroom independent variables
continue to be strong indicators of sales price. The coefficients of the year sold dummy
variables are easier to intuit as the first year in the series is omitted.
Table 5.14
Conro
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Errorv b t I Significance
variables Unstandardized IStandardized
constant
intersf
lotsize
bath 1.5
bath2
bath2.5
bath>=3
bed3
bed4
bed>=5
yrbltl 947-'55
yrbltl 956-74
yrblt1 975-'89
yrbltl 990-'03
10.839
0.000
0.000
0.196
0.151
0.413
0.481
0.080
0.111
0.144
0.050
0.025
0.008
-0.128
0.02%
0.00%
21.65%
16.28%
51.09%
61.69%
8.34%
11.69%
15.48%
5.17%
2.51%
0.80%
-12.02%
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.010
0.011
0.015
0.011
0.013
0.018
0.009
0.009
0.011
0.013
565.790
32.240
1.970
20.830
15.350
36.100
31.820
7.630
8.800
7.820
5.520
2.870
0.710
-10.080
0.000
0.000
0.049
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.480
0.000
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Table 5.14 continued
yrsold 1985-'86
yrsold1987-'88
yrsold 1989-'90
yrsold 1991-'92
yrsold 1993-'94
yrsold1995-'96
yrsoldl997-'98
yrsold 1999-'00
yrsold2001 -'02
yrsold2003
0.462
0.693
0.692
0.624
0.650
0.739
0.863
1.083
1.357
1.488
58.72%
100.07%
99.68%
86.67%
91.61%
109.46%
137.12%
195.45%
288.59%
342.86%
0.020
0.018
0.019
0.018
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.018
0.020
22.640
38.600
37.090
34.820
37.220
42.350
49.750
62.120
76.680
76.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
N 17323 Adjusted R- 0.532 Std. Error of the 0.40776
1 1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath<=1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1946, yrsoldl983-'84
Table 5.15
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error
variables Unstandardized Standardized or
constant 11.082 - 0.102 108.950 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 2.060 0.040
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 -0.570 0.572
bathl.5 0.223 24.99% 0.052 4.250 0.000
bath2 0.091 9.51% 0.050 1.820 0.070
bath>=2.5 0.338 40.22% 0.067 5.040 0.000
bed>=4 0.028 2.88% 0.048 0.590 0.558
yrbitl947-'55 0.064 6.65% 0.053 1.210 0.227
yrbit1956-'74 0.106 11.14% 0.049 2.170 0.030
yrbltl975-'89 0.136 14.53% 0.073 1.850 0.064
yrbltl990-'03 0.142 15.25% 0.062 2.290 0.023
yrsold1985-'86 0.193 21.25% 0.100 1.920 0.055
yrsold1987-'88 0.632 88.23% 0.090 7.030 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.725 106.55% 0.095 7.600 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.447 56.38% 0.095 4.700 0.000
yrsold1993-'94 0.485 62.41% 0.091 5.340 0.000
yrsold1995-'96 0.566 76.03% 0.094 6.030 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.655 92.56% 0.085 7.730 0.000
yrsold1999-'00 0.954 159.63% 0.091 10.530 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 1.243 246.75% 0.093 13.350 0.000
yrsold2003 1.428 317.12% 0.107 13.390 0.000
N 448 Adjusted R- 0.5041 Std. Error of the 0.36206
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath 1, bed<=3, yrblt<= 1946, yrsoldl 983-'84
Housing Profile
The average house for each sample is comparable in all structural attributes. This is
expected from a statistical view point because as observations increase the sample becomes
more representative of the population. The uniformity helps our analysis as the constant
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quality houses that are being priced in each index are in effect direct substitutes. Table 5.16
and Appendix 5.5 provide descriptive statistics for each sample.
Table 5.16
MANSFIELD
Mansfield is included in the second grouping of towns along with Norwood and
Randolph. The Mansfield Depot 40B development was constructed in two phases. The two
phases occurred in consecutive year intervals so the analysis period views development of
Mansfield Depot as a singular event lasting five years. The introduction of the analysis period
starts with the issuance of the comprehensive permit for phase I and concludes in the year
phase 11 was fully occupied.
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Impact Area
Mansfield Depot is located close to the Foxborough border just north of the thickly-
settled town center. The impact area is triangular shaped with two long sides formed by
Oakland Street on the west and route 106 on the south. The eastern border captures two
residential cul-de-sacs before connecting back with Mansfield Depot to the north. Figure 5.16
illustrates that the development is surrounded by forest. Because of the open space, there
are not many single-family abutters and no contiguous road network. The project footprint is
large and many of the buildings are visible from adjacent properties. Figure 5.18 shows the
size of a typical building in the development. A formal bike and walking path extends from the
south west corner of Mansfield Depot through the wood behind many houses to the playing
fields and elementary school south of route 106. The bike and walking path strengthens the
development's connection to its neighbors. The actual extent of the impact was established
after consulting the Director of Planning and building department officials.
Figures 5.16-5.18
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Figure 5.17
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Source: MassGIS Vector and Image Data
Sales Price Indexes
The indexes for the impact and control areas track very closely, in fact they are the most
consistent of this study for an individual town. The only difference between the two indexes
happened in year sold interval 1985-'86, when the value of a typical house in the control area
decreased drastically. There is no obvious reason for this precipitous drop and immediate
rebound.
The impact area experienced greater annual appreciation rates in the analysis period
and for the whole timeframe. Growth rates and index values can be found in Appendix 5.6.
It is concluded that the introduction of the Mansfield Depot did not negatively impact the
sales price of adjacent single-family homes.
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Chart 5.6
Mansfield Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
This model performs well, with understandable coefficients and low standard errors.
The only anomalous feature is the coefficient for "yrsoldl985-'86", this the year of the drop.
Table 5.17
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Dependent varia ble equals the natural log of price
__npriw____Unstandardized Stnndardized St.Ero tSignificanceInprice Coefficients IStd. Error Sincae
constant 11.054 - 0.032 343.530 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 9.790 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 7.290 0.000
bathl.5 0.082 8.59% 0.014 5.720 0.000
bath2 0.057 5.84% 0.015 3.710 0.000
bath>=2.5 0.100 10.49% 0.018 5.410 0.000
bed3 0.047 4.83% 0.019 2.530 0.012
bed>=4 0.084 8.73% 0.021 3.940 0.000
yrbltl955-'64 0.092 9.62% 0.014 6.460 0.000
yrbltl965-'78 0.192 21.12% 0.017 11.250 0.000
yrbltl979-'92 0.265 30.39% 0.020 13.320 0.000
yrbit1993-'03 0.173 18.92% 0.025 6.800 0.000
yrsoldl985-'86 -0.352 -29.70% 0.034 -10.390 0.000
yrsoldl987-'88 0.371 44.90% 0.028 13.280 0.000
yrsoldl989-'90 0.465 59.19% 0.027 16.950 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.384 46.87% 0.028 13.750 0.000
yrsoldl993-'94 0.378 45.99% 0.027 14.200 0.000
yrsoldl995-'96 0.434 54.35% 0.026 16.470 0.000
yrsoldl997-'98 0.523 68.75% 0.026 19.840 0.000
yrsoldl999-'00 0.713 104.01% 0.026 26.970 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.963 161.97% 0.027 35.630 0.000
yrsold2003 1.181 225.91% 0.026 44.930 0.000
N 4174 Adjusted R- 0.6005 Std. Error of the 0.30739Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrbit<=1954, yrsoldl983-'84
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
An interesting feature is that all the dummy variables included for bathrooms and
bedrooms are negative. This may be explained with descriptive statistics, houses in the impact
area are generally small and homogenous. As a group, these houses set the benchmark for
the neighborhood sub-market. There are not enough large houses in the small area to affect
the market.
Table 5.18
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t SignificanceUnstandardized IStandardized
constant 10.806 - 0.107 100.990 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 1.360 0.179
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 -2.190 0.031
bathl.5 -0.005 -0.53% 0.049 -0.110 0.915
bath>=2 -0.033 -3.29% 0.079 -0.420 0.674
bed>=4 -0.025 -2.48% 0.049 -0.510 0.608
yrblt_1920 0.029 2.96% 0.049 0.600 0.550
yrbit_1921-'70 0.031 3.17% 0.057 0.550 0.583
yrblt_1971-'03 0.433 54.23% 0.067 6.440 0.000
yrsold1985-'86 0.487 62.71% 0.095 5.150 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.772 116.35% 0.076 10.140 0.000
yrsoldl989-'90 0.835 130.59% 0.113 7.380 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.693 100.06% 0.072 9.630 0.000
yrsoldl993-'94 0.649 91.34% 0.077 8.430 0.000
yrsold1995-'96 0.741 109.70% 0.078 9.490 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.939 155.72% 0.072 12.970 0.000
yrsoldl999-'00 1.030 179.97% 0.080 12.810 0.000
yrsold2001 -'02 1.381 298.00% 0.073 18.930 0.000
yrsold2003 1.473 336.16% 0.104 14.190 0.000
N 108 Adjusted R- 0.8351 Std. Error of the 0.16665
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrbt<=1919, yrsold1983-'84
Housing Profile
Houses in the impact area are smaller across the board and sell for less than houses in
the control area. Table 5.19 and Appendix 5.6 provide descriptive statistics for the samples.
Table 5.19
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Table 5.19
NORWOOD
Impact Area
The impact area surrounding the Olde Derby Village 40B development is shaped like an
equilateral triangle. Olde Derby Village occupies the eastern point of the triangle. The impact
area is contained by three streets: Wilson on the north, Garden Parkway to the southwest and
Walpole Street to the southeast. Houses located on both sides of these boundary streets are
considered in the impact area. The area is not defined by an interconnected street network,
but all the single-family houses are near by and many are abutters.
Figure 5.19 depicts the relationship of Olde Derby Village to the surrounding area.
Walpole Street is a major thoroughfare that separates the impact area. The development
mediates between the adjacent commercial and industrial uses to the east and the isolated
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single-family district. Olde Derby Village is situated on a small hill, with building terraced up
the hill. The site elevation increases the development's visibility to residential neighbors.
Figure 5.21 is a photograph of the transition between the development and the residential
neighborhood. It shows that buildings in the development are quite a bit larger than adjacent
homes, and that neighbors are close.
Figures 5.19-5.21
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Source: MassGIS Vector and Image Data A
Sales Price Indexes
Chart 5.7 displays the sales price indexes for the impact and control areas. The
comparative indexes follow very similar price paths. The overall trend mirrors the market
experience of the Boston area for the same time period. The average house value for the
control and impact areas are nearly identical through time. The recession had a slightly
greater effect on home values in the impact area. Compound annual growth rates for the two
areas are comparable for the analysis period and entire study period. In both instances the
impact area outperformed the control area. Growth rates and index values are available in
Appendix 5.7. In sum, the are no effective differences between the impact area and control
area indexes, so we conclude that the introduction of the Olde Derby Village 40B development
did not negatively impact the sales price of residential homes.
Chart 5.7
Norwood Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
Coefficients of the independent variables are very smooth and well behaved.
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Table 5.20
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
Unstandardized |StandardizedIII
constant 11.232 - 0.028 395.600 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 15.140 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 5.730 0.000
bathl.5 0.047 4.81% 0.012 3.880 0.000
bath2 0.048 4.90% 0.014 3.320 0.001
bath>=2.5 0.074 7.66% 0.018 4.210 0.000
bed3 0.060 6.18% 0.013 4.580 0.000
bed>=4 0.094 9.86% 0.017 5.690 0.000
yrblt1924'49 0.120 12.79% 0.015 7.840 0.000
yrbIt1950_'54 0.120 12.75% 0.015 7.780 0.000
yrbIt1 955'62 0.192 21.11% 0.015 12.890 0.000
yrblt1963'03 0.300 34.97% 0.016 18.460 0.000
yrsoldl983-'84 -0.480 -38.14% 0.032 -15.030 0.000
yrsoldl987-'88 0.245 27.77% 0.026 9.570 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.263 30.09% 0.026 10.040 0.000
yrsoldl991-'92 0.164 17.88% 0.026 6.420 0.000
yrsold1993-'94 0.184 20.18% 0.025 7.410 0.000
yrsoldl995-'96 0.240 27.15% 0.025 9.500 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.327 38.66% 0.024 13.720 0.000
yrsold1999-'00 0.520 68.29% 0.024 21.470 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.795 121.45% 0.024 32.660 0.000
yrsold2003 0.963 161.86% 0.029 33.560 0.000
N 3593 Adjusted R- 0.6082 Std. Error of the 0.27808
1 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrbt<=1923, yrsoldl985-'86
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
The impact model also does a good job estimating coefficients. The dummy variables
for bathrooms and bedrooms contribute substantially to determining house value. The negative
coefficient of "yrsoldl991-'92" is responsible for the dip in the index during the recession.
Output of the impact area model is in table 5.21.
Housing Profile
The average house in both areas is similar. The typical control area house is larger
but located on a smaller lot. The number of bedrooms and bathrooms are the same, 3 and 2
respectively. Table 5.22 and Appendix 5.7 provide descriptive statistics.
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Table 5.21
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
Unstandardized Standardized
constant 11.107 - 0.129 86.220 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 2.610 0.011
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 1.910 0.059
bath1.5 0.288 33.33% 0.067 4.280 0.000
bath2 0.211 23.44% 0.080 2.630 0.010
bath>=2.5 0.359 43.13% 0.089 4.020 0.000
bed3 0.124 13.24% 0.072 1.720 0.089
bed>=4 0.152 16.39% 0.110 1.380 0.171
yrbltl960_'65 0.174 19.00% 0.043 4.000 0.000
yrbltl966_'03 0.097 10.14% 0.071 1.350 0.180
yrsoldl983-'84 -0.691 -49.90% 0.125 -5.520 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.246 27.92% 0.097 2.540 0.013
yrsoldl989-'90 0.167 18.13% 0.105 1.580 0.118
yrsold1991-'92 -0.030 -2.92% 0.101 -0.300 0.768
yrsold1993-'94 0.083 8.70% 0.096 0.870 0.388
yrsoldl995-'96 0.147 15.89% 0.099 1.490 0.140
yrsold1997-'98 0.287 33.30% 0.103 2.800 0.006
yrsoldl999-'00 0.595 81.30% 0.101 5.910 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.726 106.65% 0.100 7.290 0.000
yrsold2003 0.936 154.89% 0.107 8.780 0.000
N 106 Adjusted R- 0.8295 Std. Error of the 0.1762Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrbit<=1959, yrsoldl985-'86
Table 5.22
Control imac
Variable Std. Dev. Std. Dev
Price 85,087 86,544
Intersf 536 348
Lotsize 8,115 5,569
Bathrooms 0.59 0.46
1 0.45 0.33
1.5 0.48 0.50
2 0.39 0.42
>=2.5 00.38 0.34
Bedrooms 0.81 0.50
<=2 0.38 0.28
3 0.49 0.37
>=4 0.43 0.27
Year Built 27 24
<=1923 0.40
1924-'49 0.38 -
1950-'54 0.39-
1955-'62 0.43
1963-'03 0.40-
<=1 959 -0.48
1960-'65 -0.50
1966-'03 -0.32
Bold Independent Variables are base case (omnitted)
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RANDOLPH
Liberty Place is a large, dense, multi-family development situated in the heart of two
contiguous residential neighborhoods. The analysis period for Liberty Place examines the
year intervals 1987-'88 and 1989-'90.
Impact Area
The impact area encircles part of a contiguous residential district. The boundary
weaves through streets and is defined more by proximity than distinct features. In determining
the extent of the impact area we visited the site and met with town official in the Department
of Public Works and the Zoning Board of Appeals. Figure 5.22 reveals how Liberty Place
straddles two neighborhoods. Both neighborhoods are thickly settled and defined by block-like
street patterns. The two neighborhoods are knit together by the playing fields around Lyons
School.
The neighborhood to the west is connected to secondary roads and the playing fields.
The fields create site lines to the project and a conduit for residents of Liberty Place to enter the
neighborhood. Many of the homes in the eastern neighborhood are abutters of Liberty Place.
The development is located on a rise making it more visible to these residents.
Figure 5.22, 5.24
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Figure 5.23
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Source: MassGIS Vector and Image Data
Sales Price Indexes
The sales price indexes for the impact area and control area trend similarly with the
exception of year interval 1985-'86. In this year interval the impact area index drops drastically.
We have doubts to whether this drop is authentic and if so, whether it is attributable to the
Liberty Place 40B. Theoretically speaking, we would expect an efficient market to have this
type reaction to negative information. However we would also expect the recovery from the
shock to be gradual, occurring after many successive years. We investigated the data to see
if the sharp change could be explained. There are four observations for this year interval. Two
of the four observations are recorded sales price of $26,000; another is $50,000 and the last
$150,000. There is a good chance that the two low observations represent "non-arm's length"
transactions and thus are not accurate.4 We believe the estimated value of a typical house
in the impact area for year interval 1987-'88 is artificially low and not the result of information
about Liberty Place's comprehensive permit application. We feel this way for two reasons (1)
the index recovers too perfectly for such an imperfect system like a housing market; and (2)
there are erroneous observations in the sample. Let's suppose for just a moment that the drop
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is due to the introduction of the Liberty Place 40B, house values still returned to normal the
following year interval. This means there was a brief period of "panic" sales after which time
prices returned to a stabilized state once the initial threat was proved innocuous. In either
scenario the singular price deviation is discounted because the impact area index absolutely
matches the trend of the control area index. From this we conclude that the introduction of the
Liberty Place 40B development did not negatively
Chart 5.8
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
This model does very well, the coefficients of the independent variables relate to the
dependent variables how we expect them to. Dummy variable "bath>=2.5" appears to proxy
for features not controlled for in the model.
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Table 5.23
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
CoefficientsIIInprice Unstandardized IStndardized Std. Error t Significance
constant 11.142 - 0.024 455.100 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 11.690 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 3.950 0.000
bathl.5 0.077 7.96% 0.010 7.300 0.000
bath2 0.093 9.76% 0.012 7.510 0.000
bath>=2.5 0.155 16.79% 0.016 10.000 0.000
bed3 0.037 3.72% 0.012 3.100 0.002
bed>=4 0.026 2.59% 0.016 1.600 0.110
yrblt1950-'59 0.157 16.97% 0.011 14.710 0.000
yrblt1960-'69 0.225 25.21% 0.012 18.590 0.000
yrbltl970-'89 0.284 32.86% 0.014 20.970 0.000
yrbltl990-03 0.229 25.76% 0.019 11.990 0.000
yrsold1983-'84 -0.511 -40.03% 0.026 -19.820 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.251 28.48% 0.022 11.200 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.202 22.38% 0.023 8.900 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.080 8.36% 0.022 3.680 0.000
yrsold1993-'94 0.045 4.63% 0.020 2.220 0.027
yrsold1995-'96 0.030 3.08% 0.021 1.470 0.140
yrsold1997-'98 0.142 15.31% 0.020 7.140 0.000
yrsoldl999-'00 0.439 55.07% 0.020 21.520 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 0.717 104.88% 0.020 35.370 0.000
yrsold2003 0.923 151.71% 0.023 40.960 0.000
N 5839 Adjusted R- 0.5925 Std. Error of the 0.29753Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1949, yrsoldl985-'86
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
In the impact area model dummy variables "bath2" and "bath>=2.5" are almost certainly
proxies for other quality features. The coefficient for "bed>=4" is negative because eighty
percent of the houses in the sample have three or fewer bedrooms, and this minority attribute
does not have enough weight among the other houses in the sample to generate a positive
relationship sales price.
Housing Profile
The average house in both sample are nearly identical. The difference between interior
space is only seven square feet. Likewise lot size, bedrooms, and bathrooms all line up. The
fact that the value of the average house for the impact and control are is so close indicates that
the impact neighborhood is identical in quality to the rest of the town.
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Table 5.24
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
_________UnstandardizedIStandardized Std Erro
constant 11.551 - 0.107 100.990 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.00% 0.000 0.230 0.816
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 -0.040 0.972
bathl.5 -0.011 -1.12% 0.119 -0.090 0.925
bath2 0.217 24.26% 0.122 1.780 0.079
bath>=2.5 0.356 42.79% 0.132 2.700 0.008
bed>=4 -0.166 -15.31% 0.117 -1.410 0.160
yrbltl936-'65 0.210 23.37% 0.116 1.810 0.073
yrblt1966-'88 0.222 24.81% 0.117 1.900 0.060
yrbltl989-'03 0.206 22.86% 0.107 1.920 0.057
yrsold1983-'84 -0.466 -37.22% 0.290 -1.600 0.112
yrsold1985-'86 -1.122 -67.42% 0.216 -5.200 0.000
yrsoldl987-'88 0.021 2.14% 0.212 0.100 0.921
yrsold1991-'92 -0.135 -12.64% 0.153 -0.880 0.380
yrsold1993-'94 -0.134 -12.55% 0.128 -1.050 0.296
yrsold1995-'96 -0.208 -18.81% 0.123 -1.690 0.094
yrsold1997-'98 -0.101 -9.58% 0.132 -0.770 0.446
yrsold1999-'00 0.152 16.41% 0.128 1.190 0.237
yrsold2001-'02 0.451 56.93% 0.131 3.450 0.001
yrsold2003 0.671 95.62% 0.175 3.840 0.000
N 124 Adjusted R- 0.451 Std. Error of the 0.373461 Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrblt<=1935, yrsold1985-'86
Table 5.25
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GROUP: MANSFIELD, NORWOOD AND RANDOLPH
The analysis period for the second group of towns is defined by the same criteria of
the first group. In begins when the earliest 40B received its comprehensive permit, Norwood's
Olde Derby Village, and ends when the last development was occupied. Both Liberty Place
and Mansfield Depot were placed in service the same year.
Sales Price Indexes
The sales price indexes for the second grouped analysis are given in chart 5.8. The
indexes for the impact sample and control sample move nearly identically throughout time. One
small difference occurs in year interval 1985-'86, the impact sample index dips differentially
lower than the control sample index. This slight variation is likely due to the erroneous, low
value present in Randolph's impact sample, and as such the difference is again discounted.
The two samples have equivalent compound annual growth rates. Looking at the timeline of
the whole study, the impact sample grew annually by 14.7% to the control sample's 14.5%.
Annual growth rates during the analysis period are equally matched, the control sample
realized a 20.6% rate and the impact sample realized 20.1%. From this contributory analysis
we confirm the conclusions reached for the individual towns that the introduction of a multi-
family, rental 40B development into a residential neighborhood does not negatively impact the
value of single-family homes.
Chart 5.9
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The control model returns accurate estimates for independent variable coefficients.
Furthermore all the coefficients exhibit understandable relationships with dependent variable.
Table 5.26 gives the model's results.
Table 5.26
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. E rroUnstandardized Standardizedr
constant 10.588 - 0.019 546.410 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.02% 0.000 29.930 0.000
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 0.300 0.766
bathl.5 0.099 10.41% 0.008 12.680 0.000
bath2 0.090 9.41% 0.009 9.940 0.000
bath>=2.5 0.170 18.51% 0.011 15.480 0.000
bed3 0.041 4.20% 0.009 4.700 0.000
bed>=4 0.062 6.38% 0.011 5.670 0.000
yrbit1946-'59 0.130 13.92% 0.008 15.970 0.000
yrbit1960-'83 0.186 20.40% 0.008 21.850 0.000
yrbltl984-'92 0.216 24.14% 0.011 19.230 0.000
yrbltl993-'03 0.181 19.79% 0.013 14.410 0.000
yrsold1985-'86 0.513 67.10% 0.020 25.810 0.000
yrsold1987-'88 0.787 119.71% 0.018 42.800 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.749 111.57% 0.019 40.320 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.623 86.50% 0.018 34.570 0.000
yrsoldl993-'94 0.651 91.82% 0.018 37.120 0.000
yrsold1995-'96 0.664 94.23% 0.018 37.880 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.798 122.19% 0.017 46.410 0.000
yrsold1999-'00 1.040 182.88% 0.017 59.830 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 1.304 268.47% 0.017 74.700 0.000
yrsold2003 1.492 344.48% 0.019 77.550 0.000
N 14294 Adjusted R- 0.5594 Std. Error of the 0.335111 Squared S fEstimate
Omitted variables: bathi, bed<=2, yrblt<c=1 945, yrsoldl 983-'84
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
The impact model also performs well. The standard errors of the independent variables
are an improvement over the models for individual towns. Like we saw with the Mansfield and
Randolph impact models, the coefficients for the bedroom variables are negative.
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Table 5.27
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Inprice Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
___________Unstandardized IStandardized I
constant 10.602 - 0.126 84.280 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.01% 0.000 1.950 0.052
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 1.540 0.125
bathl.5 0.203 22.52% 0.045 4.550 0.000
bath>=2 0.213 23.73% 0.052 4.070 0.000
bed>=4 -0.031 -3.07% 0.052 -0.600 0.551
yrblt1920-'51 0.088 9.20% 0.056 1.580 0.116
yrbltl952-60 0.285 33.02% 0.057 4.980 0.000
yrbltl961-'77 0.341 40.60% 0.059 5.800 0.000
yrbltl978-'03 0.135 14.50% 0.063 2.140 0.033
yrsold1985-'86 0.258 29.44% 0.115 2.240 0.026
yrsold1987-'88 0.846 132.92% 0.099 8.570 0.000
yrsold1989-'90 0.732 107.95% 0.097 7.570 0.000
yrsold1991-'92 0.645 90.57% 0.096 6.700 0.000
yrsold1993-'94 0.661 93.71% 0.095 6.950 0.000
yrsoldl995-'96 0.626 87.07% 0.095 6.580 0.000
yrsold1997-'98 0.854 134.98% 0.095 8.960 0.000
yrsold1999-'00 1.014 175.74% 0.097 10.420 0.000
yrsold2001-'02 1.260 252.50% 0.094 13.360 0.000
yrsold2003 1.509 352.00% 0.108 14.000 0.000
N 337 Adjusted R- 0.5935 Std. Error of the 0.30611Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed<=3, yrblt<=1919, yrsoldl983-'84
Housing Profile
The average houses for each sample are structurally similar, as was the case with the
other grouped analysis. Houses in the impact sample almost exclusively have three bedrooms.
The average price for a typical house in the control sample is more than in the impact sample.
Descriptive statistics about the sample are in Table 5.28 and Appendix 5.10.
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Table 5.28
WILMINGTON
The Avalon Oaks 40B development is the most recent project examined in this study.
Additionally, it is the only case study not included in a grouped analysis because it was built
much later than the other 40B developments we review. It is a large, dense project with a lot of
attention paid to design and site context. Avalon Bay developed the project but they did not file
the comprehensive permit application nor did they shepherd the proposal through the approval
process. Avalon Bay took over the project before construction but after the comprehensive
permit was granted. The analysis period starts when Avalon Bay took control and ends in the
year the development was occupied.
Impact Area
Avalon Oaks is located in the north east quadrant of the municipality, away from
downtown. It is situated adjacent to an exit for Interstate Highway 93. The impact area is
primarily comprised of a contiguous and clearly define residential neighborhood to the west.
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Abutters to the east and single-family houses south of the elementary school are also included.
We finalized the impact area after discussions with town officials in the planning and building
departments.
Like the Kimball Court development in Woburn, Avalon Oaks is built directly in the
backyard of many abutters. Figure 5.27 is photograph taken for the side yard of an abutter
in the neighborhood to the east. The portion of Avalon Oaks that faces this neighborhood
is not blaringly-offensive like in Woburn. The scope of the development is out of proportion
with the surrounding land use pattern (see figure 5.25), but the site planning and context
sensitive design effectively mitigates the bulk and density. The development is split into two
sections. A northern portion clusters larger buildings close to 1-93 and away from residents.
The other section stretches smaller buildings along a curvilinear road parallel to the adjacent
neighborhood.
Figures 5.25, 5-27
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Figure 5.26
0 0.25 0.5 Miles
Source: MassGIS Vector and Image Data
Sales Price Indexes
Price indexes for the impact area and control area follow a similar trend. There is a
noticeable jump in the impact index in the beginning of the analysis period. We discount this
movement for the same reason sited in the Randolph case to explain the steep drop in its
impact index. The impact area index recovers too fast and too perfectly after the spike. It is
likely just statistical noise from the standard errors.
Annual growth rates for the two areas are also similar. The control witnessed slightly
stronger growth for the whole study and for the analysis period. The control area CAGR for
the study is 9.2%, and the impact area's CAGR is 8.6%; this is a very small difference. For
the analysis period annual growth rates are 6.8% and 10.5% for the impact area and control
area respectively. In sum, the differences between the two comparative indexes are small, and
they follow nearly identical price paths. We conclude that the introduction of the large, dense,
multi-family Avalon Oaks 40B development does did not negatively affect the sales price of
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single-family homes in the impact area.
Chart 5.10
Wilmington Sales Price Indexes
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Hedonic Model: Control Area
The control area model produces results similar to other models in this study. It is likely
that "bath>=2.5" dummy variable is a proxy for additional "quality" features. The bedroom
dummy variables have successively larger coefficients, suggesting that a greater number of
bedrooms is more important than extra living space. The model output is given in Table 5.29.
Table 5.29
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t Significancevariables Unstandardized IStandardized
constant
intersf
lotsize
bathl.5
bath2
bath>=2.5
bed3
bed>=4
yrbltl 950-'64
yrbltl 965-'84
yrbltl 985-'92
yrbitl 993-'03
11.409
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.039
0.185
0.081
0.121
0.145
0.230
0.234
0.138
0.01%
0.00%
0.91%
3.94%
20.29%
8.40%
12.82%
15.60%
25.81%
26.30%
14.82%
0.026
0.000
0.000
0.015
0.016
0.021
0.017
0.022
0.015
0.018
0.018
0.018
438.130
7.970
11.050
0.620
2.430
8.760
4.880
5.580
9.450
13.030
13.260
7.550
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.538
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Table 5.29 continued
yrsoldl989-'90
yrsoldl991-'92
yrsold 1993-'94
yrsold 1995-'96
yrsoldl997-'98
yrsold1999-'00
yrsold2001 -'02
yrsold2003
0.022
-0.091
-0.022
0.065
0.144
0.366
0.636
0.793
2.19%
-8.67%
-2.17%
6.76%
15.44%
44.17%
88.93%
121.01%
0.024
0.023
0.022
0.022
0.021
0.022
0.023
0.025
0.890
-4.020
-1.020
3.040
6.770
16.940
28.270
31.140
0.372
0.000
0.310
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
N 4431 Adjusted R- 0.5015 Std. Error of the 0.32431
1 Squared - Estimate
Omitted variables: bath 1, bed<=2, yrblt<=1 949, yrsold1987-'88
Hedonic Model: Impact Area
One surprising feature in the impact area model is the negative coefficient for dummy
variable "bath1.5". We have seen this negative relationship with the dependent variable a few
times before, even though it is not expected. The remaining independent variables relate well
to sales price. See Table 5.30 for complete model results.
Table 5.30
Dependent variable equals the natural log of price
Independent Coefficients Std. Error t Significance
variables Unstandardized IStandardized I I
constant 11.843 - 0.145 81.880 0.000
intersf 0.000 0.00% 0.000 0.440 0.662
lotsize 0.000 0.00% 0.000 1.400 0.168
bath1.5 -0.023 -2.29% 0.071 -0.320 0.747
bath>=2 0.086 9.01% 0.083 1.030 0.306
bed>=4 0.030 3.01% 0.076 0.390 0.697
yrbltl956_'64 0.052 5.35% 0.078 0.670 0.509
yrbltl965_'72 0.183 20.08% 0.082 2.220 0.030
yrbitl973_'03 0.211 23.48% 0.075 2.830 0.007
yrsold1989-'90 0.005 0.49% 0.111 0.040 0.965
yrsold1991-'92 -0.140 -13.10% 0.115 -1.220 0.229
yrsoldl993-'94 -0.165 -15.20% 0.131 -1.260 0.213
yrsold1995-'96 -0.006 -0.56% 0.109 -0.050 0.959
yrsold1997-'98 0.259 29.55% 0.127 2.040 0.046
yrsold1999-'00 0.192 21.15% 0.105 1.820 0.074
yrsold2001-'02 0.455 57.69% 0.124 3.680 0.001
yrsold2003 0.740 109.53% 0.127 5.800 0.000
N 70 Adjusted R- 0.6153 Std. Error of the 0.20459
Squared Estimate
Omitted variables: bath1, bed3, yrblt<=1955, yrsoldl987-'88
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Housing Profile
The average house in the impact area is larger, built on a bigger lot and sells for more
than the typical house in the control area. The number or bedrooms and bathrooms are very
comparable though. Descriptive statistics for the samples are in Table 5.31 and Appendix
5.11.
Table 5.31
Descriptive Statistics
Control
SStd. Dev.
89,119
S555
414,499
& i 0. 60
0.47-7
0.45
0.40
0.40
0.70
0.33
0.48 "
0.42
29
0.40
0.42
0.37
0.39
0.42
Variable
Price
Intersf
Lotsize
Bathrooms
1
1.5
2
>=2.5
Bedrooms
<=2
3
>=4
9ear Bult
<=1949
1950-'64
1965-'84
1985-'92
1993-'03
<=1 955
1956-'64
1965-'72
1973-'03
Bold independ are base case(
Impact
fr Std. Dev
17 80,090
701
8,972
0.59
0.46
0.49
0.47
0.50
0.42
0.42
34
0.45
0.41
0.41
0.46
omitted)
(Endnotes)
1 A natural log is converted to a continuous number by raising the base of the natural log
2.71828182845904 to the power the number. An example of this equation using the constant from the
control area model is 2.718etc.A(11.195); or in excel use the formula =EXP(11.195).
2 The coefficients of independent variables are standardized to be more accurate when the
dependent variable is in the functional form of a natural log. Standardizing is done by taking the
inverse of the natural log and converting it to a percentage. This is done in excel using the formula
=(EXP(coefficient)-1) *100
3 Pollakowski, 2004
4 These records were not removed during the data cleaning process, but this does not guarantee that
the observations are legitimate transactions. The filters we applied to the data were tolerant, erring on
the side of leaving more records in the sample.
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I
CHAPTER 6: QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY
The following chapter outlines the qualitative methodology used to answer the
question: "Do large-scale, high-density Chapter 40B multi-family rental developments
negatively impact nearby single-family property values in suburban Boston communities?"
We asked the question because of the widespread belief that one of the strongest motives
for resident opposition to 40B projects is the fear that homes values surrounding these multi-
family developments will decrease. With the qualitative analysis we planned to describe reasons
for why residents and municipalities oppose Chapter 40B projects and ascertain the level and
extent of community opposition to the proposed developments during the comprehensive
permitting process. We also wanted to see where, if at all, the concern for property values
falls in the list of reasons community residents and municipal officials had for opposing the
proposed 40B development.
To accomplish this objective, we intended to measure the local context of community
opposition over time beginning with the initial comprehensive permit application to the Board of
Appeals through the final granting of the permit using primary sources including ZBA meeting
minutes, permitting hearing records, ZBA decisions, and court documents. , instead we found
an ancillary story of an arbitrary process that pitted developers and towns against one another.
We use this story to narrate a much richer and nuanced story through the examination of why a
controversial political and institutional 40B process sometimes fails and sometimes succeeds.
We find that to some degree, 40B projects are doomed create community opposition. In
some ways, 40B developments are set up for contentiousness in that the statute in effect pits
developers against municipalities and vice versa.
The study evaluates the success and failures of the comprehensive permitting process
of proposed Chapter 40B developments by first separating the projects into three general
categories based on the comprehensive permitting process and the level of development
opposition. We then perform the following examination: (1) define the community context with
reference to particular community characteristics likely to influence development opposition
such as income, residential growth rate, average density, and housing costs; (2) study the
nature of proposed development, including characteristics such as project density, unit mix,
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and affordability breakdown; (3) give a narration of the each development's comprehensive
permitting process; and (4) formulate conclusions regarding the different opposition arguments,
connections between the development opposition and community context, and how some
systemic problems of the 40B permitting process played out.
Opposition Categories
Not all of the developments in the studied communities were opposed or highly
controversial; therefore the nine projects were first categorized into three groups: "Unopposed,"
"Contentious," and "Highly Contentious." The "Unopposed" category of opposition consists
of developments that had either little or no significant opposition during the comprehensive
permitting process, and the local Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) approved the project in a
timely manner. The "Contentious" category of opposition consists of projects that either had a
prolonged and controversial comprehensive permitting process, but were ultimately approved
by the ZBA, or were initially denied by the Board of Appeals, appealed to the Housing Appeals
Committee (HAC), and then settled in mediation between the developer and ZBA with HAC
oversight. Finally, the "Highly Contentious" category of opposition are developments that
were extremely controversial during the Board of Appeals comprehensive permitting process,
rejected by the local ZBA, then appealed to the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) by the
developer and ultimately settled one of three ways: (1) the HAC decision was appealed by the
municipality to the Superior Court; (2) the Superior Court decision was appealed again to the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals; or (3) the decision was appealed directly to the Supreme
Judicial Court.'
Table 6.1 shows the categorization of the eleven developments in the study. As can be
seen below, only two projects are in the "Unopposed" category. The "Contentious" and "Highly
Contentious" categories form the basis of the community opposition study with three and four
developments respectively.
Table 6.1 Opposition Categories
Unopposed Contentious Highly Contentious
Lexington, Franklin School Littleton, Pond Side at Littleton Burlington, Stone Brook Farms
Littleton, Littleton Green Mansfield, Mansfield Depot Norwood, Olde Derby Village
Randolph, Liberty Place Wilmington, Avalon Oaks
Woburn, Kimball Court Apts
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Opposition and Community Context
An assumption of this thesis is that one of the principal motivations for community
opposition to Chapter 40B is that homeowners believe multi-family rental comprehensive
permit projects will adversely impact their community and deflate the value of their homes.
According to Pendall's study of resident opposition to new housing development described
in Chapter 2, subsidized housing often provokes some of the strongest opposition from
neighbors, "Established residents may imagine menacing high-rises, crime, and squalor
when they hear the term affordable housing and generally fear that their property values will
fall if any subsidized housing is built nearby."2 [Emphasis in original] Furthermore, Pendall
comments that protest to new development "can reflect racial or class antagonism, ideological
commitment to homeownership, desire to protect neighborhood ambiance, and fear of
decreased home value."3
In short, there are numerous potential reasons why people oppose new development. To
better understand the motivations behind such protest, Pendall studied community opposition
by examining what factors are common to controversial projects. He also looked at community
characteristics such as income and residential growth rates and the level of controversy
generated by proposed developments. Pendall found that projects were much more likely to
generate community opposition if they were sited next to single family housing, consisted of
multi-family and/or affordable housing (despite the fact that few protests specifically referred
to affordable housing), were proposed in slowly growing communities, and finally that projects
in higher income communities generated fewer protest than those proposed in lower income
communities. This study, in part, examines the argument that community characteristics can
often help explain the level of opposition to new housing development in a given community.
Study Focus
Upon a careful examination of the permitting processes, we found a structure which
often pits developers and towns against one another. The 40B process can be conceptualized
in terms of three stages: "Stage 1-Introduction" - the developer introduces a project to the town;
"Stage 2-Debate" - the permitting process negotiations and bargaining between the developer
and municipality; "Stage 3-Resoultion" - final permit decision. This three stage process was
formulated with respect to the highly contentious developments. We examine the evolution
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of the 40B process from highly contentious, contentious, to unopposed developments to see
how the process can change over time as a result of bargaining, negotiation, and proactive
communities.
The study begins with the developments that fall in the "Highly Contentious" and
"Contentious" opposition categories. The examination of the comprehensive permitting process
relied on the following primary sources: comprehensive permit applications; correspondence
to the local zoning board of appeals from residents, local businesses, local boards, institutional
actors such as Fair Housing Commissions, School Committee representatives, and affordable
housing advocates with regard to the proposed developments; minutes of town and zoning
board meetings; ZBA decisions; HAC decisions and correspondence; Superior Court,
Massachusetts Appeals Court and finally Supreme Judicial Court decisions.
Secondary sources of local media coverage throughout the permitting approval, design,
development, and post-development periods are also examined. Anecdotal information
regarding the permitting process was also obtained through informal discussions with key
stakeholders such as local ZBA members and administrators, town planners, and other
municipal employees.
The study also examines community characteristics that are likely to influence
opposition to new housing development. These characteristics include median household
income, growth (or decline) in median income, population growth (or decline), ratios of renter-
and owner-occupied housing units, current median house values, growth in house values,
median rents, racial diversity, educational attainment, and the ratio of single family homes with
and without mortgages. The amount of development opposition is examined in relation to the
above community characteristics.
Conclusions are drawn as to why the permitting process and the final development plan
for the projects in the highly contentious category are fundamentally different from those in the
contentious category of opposition. These cases are used to describe what problems inherent
in the 40B statute contribute to the contentiousness of a 40B proposal. The controversial
case studies are also shown as examples of what not to do in a permitting process, for both
developers and municipalities. A highly contentious process causes both parties to be worse
off in the end with a long costly process and little incorporation of each other's wants and
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needs in the final product.
Franklin School and Littleton Green are the two projects in the "unopposed" category.
These developments were granted zoning override permits in a timely manner, and the analysis
of their permitting process takes a different approach. Instead of just examining the reasons
why residents and officials might have opposed the developments, we also examine why these
projects did not provoke significant opposition. These two projects have considerably different
characteristics from the developments in the other two opposition categories and it is just as
important to study why they were not contentious in addition to looking at some of the concerns
people did raise regarding the projects. For these projects, we give a brief description of the
community context, the development scenario, and some, if any, issues raised by the Board
of Appeals and community residents during the comprehensive permitting process. The
relationship between the level of community opposition and relevant characteristics of the
communities is also examined.
Finally, by using these two cases as examples of how the 40B process can work
to benefit both developers and municipalities, we are able to draw conclusions as to what
developers and towns can do to create a success process and therefore a successful
development incorporating the wants and needs of both parties.
(Endnotes)
I For an organizational chart showing the structure of the Massachusetts court system, please see the
Appendix 6.1.
2 Pendall, pg. 114.
3 Pendall, pg. 115.
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CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The following chapter describes the qualitative analysis of this thesis which was
initially undertaken to investigate the assumption that development opposition is motivated
by property devaluation. The presumption was that there would be specific references to
concerns regarding property values in the primary sources for the studied developments,
but the examination of primary source material found little evidence of opposition stemming
from property value concerns. One reason for this absence is the fact that the reasons for
opposition that have weight and bearing on the comprehensive permit decision do not allow
for property value concerns. Fear of property devaluation is not a tractable issue to use as
the basis for the denial of a comprehensive permit. A local board of appeals may only deny a
comprehensive permit is they can prove that the decision is "reasonable and consistent with
local needs," and demonstrate that the development will cause health, safety, environmental
effects that outweigh the need for low and moderate income housing.' Therefore, it is not
surprising that we did not find evidence in the primary sources of this fear even if it is tangible
to residents and motivates opposition.
What we did find upon a careful examination of the permitting processes was a
structure which often pits developers and towns against one another. The 40B process can
be conceptualized in terms of three stages: "Stage 1-Introduction" - the developer introduces
a project to the town; "Stage 2-Debate" - the permitting process negotiations and bargaining
between the developer and municipality; "Stage 3-Resoultion" - final permit decision. This
three stage process was formulated with respect to the highly contentious developments.
We found that highly contentious projects often occur when communities are reactive
towards new development and developers are able to come in and propose whatever project
they choose. Stage 2 takes place with virtually no bargaining between developers and towns
and an eventual permit denial from the town. This denial leads to a long, expensive stage
3, incentivizing developers to maximize project density to compensate for extra costs; and
leaving towns with little leverage once the court renders the final permit decision.
The contentious developments are evidence of how the three stage process has been
reframed over time. With the contentious projects, developers and towns began reframing
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how to proceed with the permitting process by learning that they could both have a better end
result if they negotiate and bargain during stage 2. The municipality ends up making the final
permit decision in stage 3 as opposed to the developer appealing the permit through the higher
stakes court system.
Finally, when towns are proactive and both the towns and developers make concerted
efforts to negotiate in good faith, the end result is often little development opposition and
projects which are less controversial and incorporate the needs and wants of both parties.
Proactive communities are able to completely re-frame the context in which the developments
receive comprehensive permits. They can accomplish this by creating an alternative model for
new development, instead of having the developer come into the town and propose a project
in stage 1; they can turn the tables and actively seek out appropriate sites, uses for the site,
and developers.
The first section of the chapter examines four highly contentious developments in
Burlington, Norwood, Wilmington, and Woburn. The developers and municipalities in these
four cases were strongly at odds and the permitting processes were long and very heated.
The second section examines three contentious developments in Littleton, Mansfield, and
Randolph. The analysis of these three projects takes into consideration the findings from in
the previous section and describes how the negotiation and mediation between the developers
and towns resulted in a relatively more amicable solution for both parties. Finally, the chapter
ends with two unopposed developments in Lexington and Littleton. Particular attention is paid
to what made these two projects different from the other case studies so that no significant
opposition was raised during the permitting process.
HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS DEVELOPMENTS
This section focuses on the highly contentious developments in the study defined as
projects that were extremely controversial during the Board ofAppeals comprehensive permitting
process, rejected by the local ZBA, then appealed to the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) by
the developer and ultimately settled one of three ways: (1) the HAC decision was appealed by
the municipality to the Superior Court; (2) the Superior Court decision was appealed again to
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals; or (3) the decision was appealed directly to the Supreme
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Judicial Court. The developments that make up this category of opposition are Stone Brook
Farms in Burlington, Olde Derby Village in Norwood, Avalon Oaks in Wilmington, and Kimball
Court Apartments in Woburn.
There is a great deal of similarity regarding the many stated reasons for the community
opposition of these four developments. Water shortages, sewer connections, project
density, and traffic were all common outcries by residents and municipal officials during the
comprehensive permitting process. However, quotes from hearings, letters, petitions, and local
newspaper articles often tell another story of opposition. They infer that much of the resident
opposition was with respect to the ostensible "impact of the development" on the community.
Development "impact" was used repeatedly during the permit hearings by residents and
municipal officials, in this section and the next section. However, impact is defined as the
effect of one thing on another; it is neither a positive nor negative statement. By just saying
that the development could impact their area, the users of the term are allowed to take the
easy way out instead of actually defining or clarifying their true concerns.
In addition to there being a number of commonly stated reasons for opposing the 40B
developments in this section, there was a great deal of antagonism between the developers
and the towns during the permitting hearings. It often seemed that the two parties were
set against one another from the beginning and the projects were doomed to be extremely
contentious from the start. In many instances, the towns felt that Chapter 40B was taking away
their power to control land use in their own community. All four projects experienced a short
stage 2 of the three stage process because very little bargaining or negotiation occurred and
the municipalities denied the comprehensive permits relatively quickly. In terms of stage 3,
the developers did not hesitate to pursue litigation, confidant that they would ultimately receive
permit approval from the HAC or the courts. In the end, this process left the towns with large-
scale, dense multi-family developments that they had little to no say in, and left the developers
with a tremendously costly and lengthy permitting process; in one case, contributing to the
developer's bankruptcy.
STONE BROOK FARMS, BURLINGTON
Stone Brook Farms in Burlington was one of the most contentious and strongly opposed
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Chapter 40B developments in the study. Ultimately permitted in 1987 under the name of
Pheasant Ridge, the Burlington Board of Appeals issued a denial of the comprehensive permit
in December of 1985. At the time, the ZBA stated that the developer did not have standing
to receive a comprehensive permit because he did not hold title to the property. Meanwhile,
two months earlier the town had ordered a taking of the property in an effort to stop the
development. The developer appealed the decision to the HAC. The HAC ruled in favor of the
developer and ordered the granting of a permit. Burlington then appealed the decision to the
Superior Court but the Supreme Judicial Court was granted direct appellate review, where the
comprehensive permit was decisively granted.
The town found numerous reasons to oppose the Stone Brook Farms development in
addition to the claim that the developer did not hold title to the property. The Board of Appeals
and town residents strongly objected to project because they felt that it would change the
character of the neighborhood and its development would go against the town's current land
use pattern. The town had previously imposed building and sewer connection moratoriums
in an effort to halt significant recent growth. However, the need for these moratoriums to stop
growth is somewhat perplexing in that Burlington actually lost population during the 1980s.
Both residents and the town also opposed the development on the grounds of density and
project size. Stone Brook Farms consists of over 200 units, a significant departure from the
much smaller, primarily single-family housing development the town was used to.
Finally, it is important to note that Stone Brook Farms was one of two comprehensive
permit projects proposed at the same time in Burlington, they were also the first 40B projects
proposed in the town. Burlington at the time was not a 40B-savvy town with the ability to really
know how to work the statute to their advantage.
Community Context
Burlington is a suburban industrial town located 13 miles northwest of Boston. For
most of its history, Burlington was an agricultural community, but the nature of the community
changed considerably after the construction of Route 128. The highway brought about
significant expansion of the town, including large residential and commercial retail development
booms. Today, Burlington is still a relatively low density community, with approximately 23,000
residents and a density 1.1 housing units per acre. It was one of the few towns in the state to
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experience population loss in recent years, with a nearly 2 percent drop in population between
1990 and 2000, and a 2.6 percent decrease since 1980. Burlington is more ethnically diverse
than many of Boston's suburbs with a population which was less than 87 percent white in 2000.
It is largely made up of homeowners with 80 percent of its housing units owner-occupied.
The town had a notably low vacancy rate in 2000, 1.8 percent, and currently is experiencing
relatively high house prices with the 2003 median house price of $360,000, a nearly 115
percent increase over the last decade. Rental housing in Burlington is also expensive; the
town's median gross rent in 2000 was $1,061 per month, the second highest in the study.2
Nature of Proposed Development
Completed in 1988, Stone Brook Farms consists of 203 units of all one and two bedroom
apartments, 51 (25 percent of total) of which are affordable to families earning at or less than
50 percent of the area median income. A minimum of 20 percent of the units are to remain
affordable in perpetuity. The $23 million project was developed by the Boston Land Company
and encompasses eight buildings surrounded on three sides by single-family housing. The
project site is very close to the center of town and less than a mile north of Interstate 95/128.
Stone Brook Farms' neighborhood and site context are shown in Figures 7.1 through 7.4.
Opposition Overview
Prior to the proposal for a comprehensive permit at the Stone Brook Farms site,
the original property owner appealed to the ZBA for permission to develop a single-family
subdivision on the property, the Board of Appeals rejected the proposal. A short time later, the
property owner executed a purchase and sale agreement with Boston Land Company and the
Pheasant Ridge comprehensive permit application was submitted to the ZBA.
While the application for a comprehensive permit for Stone Brook Farms/Pheasant
Ridge was not submitted until July of 1985, and the permit hearings did not occur until the
Summer and Fall of 1985, the Burlington ZBA received numerous letters in opposition to
the project from residents throughout the Winter and Spring of 1985 after the developer
announced information regarding the proposed development in February of 1985. One such
letter commented that "more housing in this area would not only be detrimental to the current
water and sewerage needs of the town but would also pose dangers in relation to access for
the fire and police departments." Another resident questioned: "What right has the State to
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Figures 7.1 - 7.4 Stone Brook Farms Aerial and Site Photographs
give a Builder the right to build in a Town without reviewing all the facts and stipulations?"
Additionally, people felt that Burlington residents were already suffering from problems
associated with new development: "Our Town is plagued with traffic constantly and the area
that is being considered is already a disaster area. Isn't it time that something is done to help
the residents in town!!" [Emphasis in original] Finally, people also protested the changing of
the town from a more rural quiet community into a fast-growing suburb of Boston: "The reason
that most of us moved to Burlington was because of its country serenity and beauty. This is
fast disappearing." It seems that people felt Burlington was not the community it once was,
the place they moved to, the place they would live, and people were upset with the prospect of
any more change.
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The Town Administrator, speaking for the Selectmen, wrote a memorandum to the
Board of Appeals regarding the Pheasant Ridge proposal in August of 1985. The memo
address a number of issues with the proposed development including major concerns about
drainage plans, sewer problems, an inadequate traffic analysis submitted by the development
team, and in light of recent water shortages, questioned the ability of the town to provide
necessary water for the town in general and the proposed development in particular.
The Planning Board also commented about the project to the ZBA in August. The
Planning Board voted unanimously to recommend that the Board of Appeals deny the
comprehensive permit for a number of stated reasons. Some of the reasons were that
the Planning Board felt the selected site is inappropriate and unacceptable, the proposed
"development will dramatically change the most important recreational open space in
Burlington," and that multi-family development on the site "is a major departure from the
overall land use pattern that the Town has used for more than 20 years." The Planning Board
vehemently opposed the proposed development and concluded their memorandum with the
following statement:
Landscape screening and buffering are inadequate to protect existing adjacent homes.
Parking lot areas would be located adjacent to existing homes and the area available
for landscaping will be inadequate for screening of car lights at night. Because of the
topography of the proposed site, the proposed development will have a major visual
impact on the adjacent homes. The apartment buildings will be visible from adjacent
homes because of the rising hillside on which the buildings will be placed. The proposed
development will change the character and amenity of the adjacent residential area.3
In a letter from the Board of Health to the ZBA regarding Pheasant Ridge on September
25, 1985, the Board stated that they had also voted unanimously to recommend the denial of
the comprehensive permit on the basis of a multitude of concerns with respect to the potentially
damaging impact of the development. The Board noted the growing water demand in the town
and fears of potential water shortages stating it was their duty to ensure not only a safe, but
an adequate supply of drinking water for town residents. They also wrote about concerns
stemming from recent growth in the community which has "transformed Burlington from a rural
community into a significantly development community." In light of this, the Board of Health
raised the fact that building and sewer connection moratoriums had recently been enacted,4
"it is quite reasonable that Burlington pause in order to correct some serious growth problems.
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The approval [of the comprehensive permit], at this time, would certainly go against the 'good
sense' and purpose of Burlington's moratorium."
Additionally, the Board of Health letter highlighted discussions the Board undertook
while debating the issuance of the comprehensive permit for Pheasant Ridge. Of particular
relevance, was the length to which the Board of Health saw the need to comment on issues
not necessary in line with their raison d'6tre:
The Board also discussed several other issues concerning this proposed development
which we decided to bring to your attention. One concern is the proposed location of
this complex. Because this parcel of land is in close proximity to the center of town and
town offices, as well as social and recreational facilities, it would appear that this land
would better serve the town as a recreation and/or social area. Unfortunately, due to
rapid appreciation of real estate and the need to acquire land to protect public wells, the
town's ability to purchase such parcels of land has been severely limited.
The above comment is somewhat confusing in that it would like to purchase the property,
but cannot because of the rapid appreciation of property values in the town. However, rapid
appreciation of real estate also means that the town is getting more expensive, inadvertently
implying that there is likely a need for affordable housing. Moreover, the quote also discusses
how close the development site is to the center of town, social, and recreational facilities, and
therefore the site should be a recreation or social area. However, the site's central location
could also imply that additional housing would suit this neighborhood and the residents of the
development would be conveniently located to necessary services.
In October of 1985, while the comprehensive permit was being debated with the Board
of Appeals, the town issued an Order of Taking of the Pheasant Ridge site. The town stated
the taking was for the purpose of parks, recreation, and the construction of moderate income
housing and appropriated $1,130,000 to pay for the land.
The Board of Appeals issued their decision on the Pheasant Ridge application for a
comprehensive permit on December 20, 1985. The ZBA found that the development team
"failed to convince this Board that a comprehensive permit should be issued." They cited
the Board of Selectmen, Sewer and Water Commission, Planning Board, Board of Health,
Conservation Commission, Public Works Department, Historian, Town Administrator, Fire
Department, Police Department, Planning Administrator, Town Engineer, Building Inspector,
and Environmental Engineer as all opposing the project. Additionally, they stated the applicant
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had no standing regarding the property because they did not hold title to the land. The
ZBA made further comments regarding their perceived inadequacy of the Pheasant Ridge
comprehensive permit application. They did not believe that the application provided sufficient
data as to the number of low and moderate income housing units located in the town.
The Board of Appeals felt that the site could only support approximately 20 single-family
homes under current zoning (single-family residential), compared to the 203 multi-family rental
units requested by developer. The ZBA actually proposed in the decision that the development
switch to single-family homeownership with a portion of affordable units. Additionally, the
Board recalculated the amount of housing the site could support if it were to be re-zoned for
apartment use; their conclusion was that the site could hold no more than 84 units. According
to the ZBA, during the hearing process they asked the developer to substantially reduce the
proposed number of units, but the applicant was not willing to reduce the units to less than
200.
The ZBA decision also reiterated a number of additional concerns the town had
regarding the proposed development. Worry about the ability of the Burlington's ability to
support the water, sewage, and other municipal demands of the development were at the
forefront. As was previously stated, the town had issued a moratorium on sewer connections
in December of 1984, as did the neighboring town of Woburn. The Mayor of Woburn actually
came to the Pheasant Ridge hearings "to stress the severity of the public health impact upon
Woburn of the addition of any sewage into the overburdened systems." In response to these
assertions, the Board stated: "For reasons of municipal sewerage capacity alone, this Board
must therefore deny the application."
Using almost identical language as the Planning Board had in their correspondence,
the Board of Appeals concluded that the site is inappropriate for multi-family housing because
it is such an "intense use" significantly and this outweighed the local and regional need for
low- and moderate-income housing. The ZBA felt that this project was too large and located
in the wrong part of town; it conflicted with the nearby single-family area, and was a radical
departure from the town's land use pattern. They also commented that the developer was
not willing to reduce the size of the development or alter the Pheasant Ridge plan to be more
complementary to the surrounding uses. They found "that the proposed development will have
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a major visual impact on the adjacent homes which will change the character and amenity of
the adjacent residential area." Again, using virtually identical language as the Planning Board,
the Board of Appeals was sure that the Pheasant Ridge development would have an adverse
impact on the surrounding neighborhood.
The HAC decided in favor of granting the comprehensive permit for the Pheasant
Ridge development. The Burlington ZBA appealed the HAC decision to the Superior Court.
The case began a hearing with the Superior Court in October of 1985; however, the Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) granted a request for direct appellate review and bypassed the standard
appeals process.
The SJC issued their decision in April 1987 after hearing arguments the prior January.
The SJC affirmed the HAC's judgment that the town's effort to take the property was in bad
faith and was to be voided. The SJC also declared that the comprehensive permit was
constructively granted by the HAC and still stands.
The opposition to the project started on day one: "The plaintiffs' announcement of the
proposed development in February, 1985, had produced immediate, substantial, town-wide
opposition." Following the announcement of the project, the Board of Appeals held hearings on
the comprehensive permit application throughout the summer and fall despite the developer's
attempts at concluding the proceedings in August. However, the board delayed the decision at
the same time the town selectmen were adopting the order of taking. When the ZBA rejected
the comprehensive permit, they relied on the taking as one of the many reasons for denial of
the permit.
One of the primary issues debated by the SJC was the lawfulness of the town's taking
of the property in light of Boston Land Company's assertion that the taking was made in bad
faith. The SJC affirmed that the:
motion judge was correct in declaring that the purported taking of the plaintiffs' property
was unlawful and void. In reaching this conclusion we hold that a municipal land
taking, proper on its face, may be invalid because it was undertaken in bad faith...
Clearly, taking land solely to block G.L.c. 40B, § 21, low or moderate income housing
would be improper. To have taken the site involved in this case to prevent the impact
of the proposed development on the water, sewer, traffic, and other problems of the
town would not have action in good faith. The town was not barring other residential
development on these grounds. There was another larger development for which a
comprehensive permit was sought at about the same time, and the town did not try to
take that property.
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The only valid justification, in the circumstances, for the taking would be that the town
truly intended that the land should be used for the purposes for which it was taken.
The record is clear that in recent years the town had studied its needs for parks and
recreation and that neither the Center Street site nor any parcel in the general vicinity
of that site had been considered for acquisition for park or recreational uses. There is
no indication in the record that before the plaintiffs' proposal was announced any town
board was seeking to provide low and moderate income housing on or near the site.
According to the SJC, the town never debated taking the property until the development
proposal for Pheasant Ridge was announced. The town had no prior interest in the site
or its neighborhood. This implies bad faith on the part of the town in their effort to take the
property.
Additionally, according to the developer, "at least two selectmen made statements
to the effect that they would take any action necessary to stop the development, that all the
selectmen acquiesced in those statements and efforts to block the development." The town
was using the taking as an excuse to stop the development from happening and many of the
other reasons for opposition were likely just more excuses to block the project.
Also, similar to the Kimball Court Apartments permitting process in Woburn described
later in this section, the Burlington ZBA was also accused of stalling the decision on the
comprehensive permit for Pheasant Ridge. The Chapter 40B regulations have stringent
time limits with respect to how long the ZBA has to publicize and hold hearings on a permit
application (within 30 days of receipt of application) as well as how long they have to make a
decision (within 40 days of final hearing) or else the application will be deemed to have been
allowed.
In a Boston Globe article on the SJC's decision on the Pheasant Ridge comprehensive
permit, it was understood that the decision would have a major impact on other pending
Chapter 40B cases as well as the climate for developing affordable housing across the state.
The article remarks that the court ruling is "expected to adversely affect all Massachusetts
communities trying to block construction of affordable housing."5 According to the article, the
SJC ruled that the attempted taking by the town was strictly an attempt to stop the Pheasant
Ridge development. According to the developer's attorney, the SJC ruling was an important
victory for affordable housing. Previously, the courts tended to side with towns when it came
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to eminent domain takings for public purposes. However, "in this case, the Supreme Judicial
Court decided that the taking was to stop something else from going on. The depositions
and affidavits, including statements by the selectmen, showed that the taking was to stop
the affordable housing project."6 The SJC determined that taking land to prevent affordable
housing development was not going to be allowed by the courts in Massachusetts.
The week following to SJC decision, there was an editorial in The Boston Globe
regarding the ruling. The editorial discussed the importance of the SJC decision, observing that
Burlington's defeat offered a lesson for communities eager to fight Chapter 40B developments
in that they were not likely to find a court sympathetic to their side. The editorial commented
on resident concerns regarding the development: "Opposition surfaced quickly, prompted by
legitimate concerns - sewerage problems and density worries - and a good deal of pigheaded
provincialism."7 The Globe felt that resident opposition was colored by their inward focus
and either inability or lack of desire to recognize the larger need for affordable housing in the
community and region. The editorial was also critical of the town's methods for dealing with
the project when it discussed the town's decision to take the site by eminent domain instead of
negotiating with the developer to find a better solution for the project's density and site plan. It
was almost ridiculous that after the SJC decision the Selectmen issued a statement that they
"will invite discussions with the developer to reach a mutually acceptable conclusion to this
dispute."8 However, this attempt was too little to late, the developer's attorney was adamant
that construction would begin as soon as possible. As a result of their stubbornness and
refusal to cooperate at an earlier point in time, something the developer was initially willing to
do, "Burlington guaranteed that this development would be built in a way it did not want."9
Opposition Conclusions
The end result of the comprehensive permitting process for the vehemently opposed
Stone Brook Farms was a two-year expensive and heated legal battle between the Boston
Land Company and Burlington. By issuing an order of taking, which the courts decided was in
bad faith, Burlington guaranteed that it would have no control over the process, be completely
at the mercy of the developer, and ended up with a project that they were entirely against.
As evidenced by the above discussion, there were numerous types and reasons for
opposition to the Pheasant Ridge development in Burlington from local municipal officials and
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town residents through letters, speaking at public meetings, and even legal action. The great
lengths to which Burlington went in order to stop Stone Brook Farms from moving forward
exceeds the community protest in all of the other studied cases. The order of taking, where
Burlington attempted to purchase the parcel of land on which Boston Land Company had
already executed a purchase and sale agreement, was almost outrageous. The HAC and SJC
viewed the taking as an effort of bad faith on the part of Burlington. It is obvious by comments
made in the ZBA, HAC, and SJC decisions, that the town used the taking solely as an effort
to halt the development. They were desperate and took any actions necessary to stop Stone
Brook Farms from happening.
One of most common reasons for opposition was the impact of the development on
the character of the neighborhood. According to resident opposition, the town was changing
quickly as a result of suburban development, and they were upset at the prospect of further
change. Furthermore, despite the fact that property values were not specifically cited as a
concern because of the development, it has been shown that property values and community
character are intimately connected. When one buys a home, they are not just buying the
housing; they are also buying into the community. The value of the home is directly tied to
the value of the community. Therefore, if it is perceived that the community is changing in a
negative way, it is likely that property values could be adversely impacted.
Additional reasons for opposition were the impact of the development on the town's
already overburdened sewer and water systems, the fact that the development would change
the already established land use pattern and plan for the site, and the proposed density of the
development. In terms of density, the development, with a density of nearly 14 units per acre
was more than ten times higher than the town average density in 2000 of 1.1 units per acre.
The opposition in relation to other community characteristics is also important to
consider. Residents are more likely to oppose developments in slow-growing communities,
when the development is proposed in single-family neighborhoods and on a site where
previous development scenarios were proposed and denied. Stone Brook Farms conforms
to all these situations - it is surrounded on three sides by single-family homes, Burlington's
population was actually shrinking at the time, and another development had been proposed by
the site owner and denied by the ZBA prior to the Pheasant Ridge proposal.
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OLDE DERBY VILLAGE, NORWOOD
The Olde Derby Village development was also one of the most highly contested projects
in the study. Originally permitted by the HAC in 1974 after a 1971 denial from the Norwood
Board of Appeals, and then appealed to the state Superior Court where the comprehensive
permit was finally granted in 1975. However, this was not the end of the process, Olde Derby
Village was still held up for ten more years because of further debates between the developer
and the town regarding such controversies as the project's density, the proposed site plan, and
buffering between the development and the surrounding neighborhood.
It is important to note that Olde Derby Village was proposed just two years after the
Chapter 40B statute was enacted. Similar to Burlington, it is likely that this was if not the
first, one of the first 40B developments Norwood had seen. By holding up the project for
more than a decade, Norwood was able to gain some 40B knowledge and savvy and halt the
development for as long as possible. Despite the fact that the final comprehensive permit
decision came from the Superior Court, Norwood was still able to really negotiate for a more
amenable project including a significant reduction in the size and scope of the project, a very
different result compared to Burlington. However, considering Norwood's primary goal was to
just keep Olde Derby Village from being developed, the town succeeded only in prolonging the
inevitable.
Again, similar to Burlington, much of the opposition to the project was an effort to
just stop the project from happening. Even when the final agreement between the town and
developer was reached, to quote the Selectman Chairman, the agreement was described
as "the best we can do ... we're not jumping up and down for joy."10 Norwood's State
Representative seconded this with the comment that the negotiation's first goal was to stop the
project altogether, so although final agreed upon project was a substantial improvement, "for
the neighbors it's still a bitter pill to swallow."" However, it is important to note that Norwood
was able to negotiate for a more amenable project as opposed to the Burlington situation
where, after the SJC made its decision, the developer was able to move much more quickly
through the development process without any incorporation of the town's wishes.
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Community Context
The Town of Norwood, 14 miles south of Boston, is an economically diverse community
consisting of manufacturing, suburban-residential, and retail trade centers. With a population
of nearly 30,000 residents, it has one of the highest densities in the study with 1.78 housing
units per acre. While much of suburban Boston is growing rapidly, Norwood is one of the
few towns in the metropolitan area to experience a decline in population; from 1980 to 2000,
the population decreased by 3.8 percent. Additionally, it has a comparatively low fraction
of affordable housing, 5.4 percent of the total housing stock, the lowest percentages of the
communities in the study.
The town has the highest ratio of renter-occupied housing in the study, 43 percent of
the total housing stock. Interestingly, Norwood also has the largest percentage of homeowners
without a mortgage in the study, 36 percent. Norwood's 2003 median single-family house
price was $348,500. While this is close to the median of the studied communities, Norwood's
house prices rose by only 111 percent in the last decade, the slowest growth rate in the study.
The 2000 median gross rent in Norwood was $895, also close to the median of the studied
communities. 12
Nature of Proposed Development
Olde Derby Village, previously referred to as Countryside Village and Wilson Street,
consists of 139 units, 35 of which (25 percent) are affordable. The project was completed in
1986 and financed through MassHousing's State Housing Assistance for Rental Production
(SHARP) Program, a program that provides permanent financing to reduce the cost of interest
payments and rental subsidies in exchange for a set aside of no less than 25 percent of all
units for participants of state and federal rental assistance programs. The development is
made up of six buildings and is centrally located within Norwood, close to amenities such as
schools, churches, playgrounds, and the public library. The project is relatively dense with
15.4 units per acre on a nine acre site.
The final site plan was the product of negotiations between Wilson Street Associates
and the officials of the Town of Norwood, including a reduction of scope of the project pertaining
to the number of proposed buildings and units. Figures 7.5 through 7.8 show the neighborhood
and site context for Olde Derby Village.
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Figures 7.5 - 7.8 Olde Derby Village Aerial and Site Photographs
Olde Derby Village
Opposition Overview
The Olde Derby Village developer, Wilson Street Trust, originally filed an application
with the Norwood ZBA for a comprehensive permit to construct 150 units of mixed income
housing. The ZBA denied the application in November of 1971. In their decision, the Board
claimed a number of concerns regarding the proposed development including there was not
proper ownership of the site, the developer was not a financially viable, properly organized
entity, the submitted plans were inaccurate, vague, and not sufficiently complete to enable the
Board of Appeals to make a valid judgment, the proposed development would cause health
and safety hazards, and adversely impact the local school system.
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The HAC decision regarding the comprehensive permit for Olde Derby Village was filed
on February 13, 1974. The decision addressed virtually every issue raised by the Norwood ZBA
in their denial of the permit. One claim the Board of Appeals made was that the applicant did
not have proper ownership of property and therefore no standing to apply for comprehensive
permit, however, in fact, the developer had completed an option to purchase under a purchase
and sale agreement. The ZBA also claimed that the applicant was not a properly organized
entity, financially viable, and had no experience, which were all incorrect and ignored that
the applicant was a longstanding reputable development entity that had organized a single
purpose entity for the purposes of developing the proposed project.
The HAC decision also weighed the ZBA's denial on the basis of consistency with local
needs. The HAC found that the denial was not consistent with local needs. Norwood had not
met the 10 percent affordable housing stock requirement; at the time there was nearly 10,000
housing units in the town and only 233 were defined as affordable. Additionally, the Norwood
Housing Authority had approximately 375 households on their waiting list. To quote the
housing authority in a letter to Wilson Street Trust: "It is apparent that we have an immediate
need for additional rental units, and that an emergency exists in that respect. It would be of
benefit to the residents of this town, if you could provide 25% of your proposed new housing
development to alleviate this problem." Obviously, this letter was in support of the proposed
development and contradicted the Board of Appeals decision.
The Norwood ZBA also claimed to deny the permit for Olde Derby Village on the
basis that it would create health or safety hazards, particularly resulting from traffic and a
controversial drainage ditch. However, according to the HAC, health and safety factors must
be weighed in relation to the local and regional need for affordable housing. Additionally, the
HAC found that neither the traffic or drainage ditch would pose serious or irremediable health
and safety risks.
The board also "argued vigorously" that the Norwood school system would be
significantly adversely affected by the development and in that would risk the health and
safety of the town. However, the HAC refuted the argument: "Apart from the fact, conceded
in the Appellee's brief, that Norwood does not face a collapse of its school system, we would
still be faced with Norwood's obligation, under the law, to provide schooling for all its eligible
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children... We rule, therefore, that the impact on the school system is not a ground, under the
statute, to support a denial of a comprehensive permit as 'consistent with local needs."
The ZBA also attempted to deny the comprehensive permit for Olde Derby Village
based on their requirements for "Group Housing Restrictions." However, according to the
HAC decision, "this is precisely the type of local restriction at which Chapter 774 is directed.
Compliance with such a requirement would effectively kill this development." The project was
designed by a reputable, well-respected architectural firm and was approved by MHFA, and
"represents what Chapter 774 envisions in fulfilling housing need while providing the best in
land use planning and aesthetic site design."
There were many additional issues raised by the town as support for their denial of
the comprehensive permit. One was the Planning Board's claim that the plan did not adhere
to subdivision regulations such as road width, sidewalks, and granite curbing. However, the
proposed project was not a subdivision so the argument is totally irrelevant. Another issue
was the submitted plans and specifications were not detailed enough, but detailed plans
are not required during the comprehensive permitting phase and the ZBA is supposed to
make their decision based on preliminary plans. Yet another controversy was the common
concern regarding the town's water supply. According to the Board of Appeals, "The proposed
construction will aggravate a serious water problem now existing at the proposed building site
such that is may endanger the health and safety of the occupants of the proposed housing and
the residents of the Town of Norwood." However, this claim of a reduced water supply harming
the health and safety of Norwood residents was proved erroneous in numerous studies and
testimony presented to the HAC.
The HAC's findings, in short, were that "the decision of the Board of Appeals of the
Town of Norwood was unreasonable and not consistent with local needs" and directed the
immediate issuance of a comprehensive permit to Wilson Street Trust. However, the SJC did
impose twelve conditions to the comprehensive permit including that the construction of the
project was to comply with Norwood's building code and that the town had to approve detailed
construction plans and specifications. It is important to note here that these two conditions are
what allowed the town to hold up construction for ten more years.
The Town of Norwood appealed the HAC decision to the state Superior Court. The
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Superior Court issued a judgment on July 22, 1975 affirming the decision of the HAC on the
application of Wilson Street Trust for the issuance of the comprehensive permit.
The development was completely stalled for the next nine years. However, in the
Summer and Fall of 1984 a new effort seemed to be made to get the development moving
forward. In August of 1984 the developer wrote a letter to the Norwood building inspector
requesting the issuance of the building permit stating that the Board of Appeals had approved
and signed off on the final plans and specifications.
Norwood officials refused to issue a building permit and requested certification from
the HAC that the most current plans and concept for the project "are the same as which was
approved in their decision dated February 13, 1974" claiming that the decision the HAC made
in 1974 was based on a different set of plans and that the "nature of the project (as well as the
specific plans) has shifted from the original concept." Norwood officials felt that if the concept
was substantially different from the 1974 plans, it could possibly warrant a new review and new
a comprehensive permit altogether. The Town Counsel even went so far as to threaten legal
action: "In my opinion, the Norwood Board of Appeals is entitled to protection from any defect
in this regard through a certification by the Housing Appeals Committee. In my opinion, the
Board is entitled to this to the point of litigation." The town also felt that they should not have
to rely on a decision made over ten years and the fact that project had not been developed the
comprehensive permit should be nullified. The town counsel argued: "In my opinion, the right
to rely upon the decision made 10 years and 7 months ago has been waived by failure of the
Wilson Street Trust to insist upon its rights." However, it seems that Wilson Street Trust had
in fact gone to the Norwood ZBA throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s to get approval
on the site plans to no avail. In November 1984, the HAC did certify that the comprehensive
permit was still in effect and that the "decision has not been amended, modified or terminated
and it continues in full force and effect." The ZBA had to carry out of the issuance of the permit
within 30 days.
On December 11, 1984, the Norwood Board of Appeals finally granted a comprehensive
permit to the Wilson Street Trust. The permit is for the construction of 139 units of subsidized
low and moderate income housing subject to two conditions: (1) the final plans had to be
approved by the Building Inspector for the issuance of a building permit, and (2) a permanent
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conservation buffer strip was required on the plans.
A Patriot Ledger article discussed the final agreement between Wilson Street Trust and
the Town of Norwood. However, it was not an agreement that really satisfied the town, the
Selectman Chairman "described the agreement as 'the best we can do ... we're not jumping
up and down for joy."13 The State Representative, also involved in the process, was also not
altogether pleased with the end result: "If this compromise is architecturally feasible, the net
result will be a substantial improvement for the neighbors. But for the neighbors it's still a bitter
pill to swallow. This will put a sugar coating on it... During the negotiations we had two basic
goals: to either stop the project altogether, or to somehow create a large buffer area around
the apartment buildings."14 The desire to buffer the development is important, if the town was
going to have to accede to the development, at least they did not want to have to see it from
the street and their backyards. What is also important about these quotes is that the issues
raised by the State Representative are somewhat different from those raised throughout
the permitting process from the initial denial by the ZBA, again with the HAC, and the SJC.
The earlier opposition claims were issues of school impact, water supply, traffic, and on-site
drainage. The above comments are similar to comments made by Burlington Selectman
during the Pheasant Ridge permitting process in that they were trying to come up with any
excuse just to stop the development from happening.
Opposition Conclusions
Despite a need for over 1,000 low and moderate income housing units at the time Olde
Derby Village was proposed, the project faced vehement opposition. Norwood was able to
hold up the process for more than 13 years primarily because although the comprehensive
permit was granted and confirmed by the HAC and then the Superior Court, they were still
able to control the development through the comprehensive permit's requirement that the
project was to comply with Norwood's building code and that the town was to approve detailed
construction plans and specifications. The permit was written by the HAC in 1974, in Chapter
40B's infancy. It is logical to conclude that not only was the town not very 40B-savvy, but the
HAC and Superior Court were likely not very savvy at this point in time as well. The HAC and
Superior Court's allowance of Norwood to stall the development for over a decade without any
intervention points to some significant problems with the 40B process.
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The opposition to Olde Derby Village in Norwood was varied but similar to those raised
in Burlington with Pheasant Ridge. There were numerous reasons for opposing Olde Derby
Village cited in the Superior Court documents regarding health and safety hazards, traffic,
drainage, school impact, and water supply issues as cited by the Board of Appeals, School
Committee, Planning Board, and the Board of Health. However, the Patriot Ledger article
seems to address what town residents really cared about, first and foremost, stopping the
project from happening and they were grasping at every possible option for complaint to just
get rid of the project.
In terms of the relationship of the development opposition to the characteristics of
Norwood, as in Burlington, the Norwood experienced a population loss during the 1980s of
3.4 percent, and development opposition is often more likely in slow growing communities.
Additionally, Olde Derby Village has a density of 15.4 units per acre, more than eight times
higher than Norwood's average density of 1.8 units per acre.
AVALON OAKS, WILMINGTON
Avalon Oaks in Wilmington was also a highly contested project during its first iteration
in the late 1980s. The site was initially proposed for the Wilmington Arboretum development
in 1987, but the town denied the comprehensive permit, and the decision was appealed to
the HAC. The HAC ordered the granting of the permit, but Wilmington appealed the decision
first to the Superior Court and then to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The comprehensive
permit was decisively granted by the Appellate Court in September of 1995.
However, during the eight year court battle with Wilmington, the original developer
of the property, Wilmington Arboretum Associates, went bankrupt and was forced to transfer
the rights to develop the site to its mortgagee in 1992. The mortgagee oversaw the appeals
process through to the Appellate Court decision in 1995. In 1996 through 1997, Avalon Bay
Communities purchased the site and requested a transfer of the same comprehensive permit.
The Wilmington Board of Appeals granted the transfer but held all of the requirements and
conditions of the initial permit the same, including an identical number of housing units and
affordability requirements.
It is interesting that the Avalon Oaks project was not nearly as controversial as the
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initial proposal for Wilmington Arboretum. According to Wilmington's director of planning
and conservation, one of the reasons for this was that the new developer "sat down with the
town and redesigned the project... They're three-story buildings, but very interesting from an
architectural perspective."1 Because of this change in building type, according to the director,
the project became an "an entirely different animal from what people typically imagine when
they think of affordable housing."16 Not only was Wilmington able to at lease contribute to the
design (if not the overall density) of the project, the project itself evolved from what residents
perceived as a large affordable housing development to a well-designed market rate project
with a percentage of affordable housing.
Community Context
The Town of Wilmington is a suburban industrial town 15 miles north of Boston. The
town's population grew by more than 21 percent between 1990 and 2000, and currently has
approximately 21,000 residents. However, despite this population growth; Wilmington's density
is only 0.65 housing units per acre, relatively low in comparison to the other communities in
the study. The town's housing stock is primarily owner-occupied, more than 90 percent and
the highest rate of homeownership in the study, and in 2000, the town had one of the lowest
vacancy rates in the study group, 1.8 percent. Finally, Wilmington is also one of the least
diverse communities in the study with only 4 percent of its residents identified as non-white in
the 2000 census. The median single-family house price in 2003 in Wilmington was $344,000,
an over 120 percent rise from 1993. The town 2000 median gross rent was $948, relatively
high in comparison to the other studied communities.17
Nature of Proposed Development
Completed in 1999, Avalon Oaks is a 204 unit development of garden style apartments
with 41 affordable housing units. Consisting of primarily two and three bedroom units, the
$23.5 million development is dispersed over eight three-story walk-up buildings. With 20
percent of the units defined as affordable to households earning at or below 50 percent of
the AMI, Avalon Oaks has the lowest percentage of affordable units in the study. The project
includes a community center, an outdoor swimming pool, and a small playground. The site
abuts a wooded conservation area, single-family homes, and Wilmington Intermediate School.
It is also located just a few hundred yards from an entrance to Interstate 93. Avalon Oaks'
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Figures 7.9 - 7.12 Avalon Oaks Aerial and Site Photographs
neighborhood and site context are exhibited in Figures 7.9 through 7.12.
Opposition Overview
In August of 1986, the Wilmington Arboretum Apartments project was proposed to the
ZBA as a 204-unit multi-family rental development. The development plan included MHFA
financing and 20 percent of the units would be affordable. The plan was not well-received with
either the ZBA or the Wilmington residents and caused a great deal of outcry. In an effort to
assuage the town, the developer then submitted an alternative development scenario in May
of 1987 with a homeownership plan of 192 condominium units, 25 percent of which would be
affordable.
The Wilmington Board of Appeals issued a decision to deny the comprehensive permit
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for Wilmington Arboretum Apartments on August 18, 1987. The ZBA issued their decision
based on the initial 204 unit rental proposal as opposed to the alternative condominium plan
that had been proposed three months prior. The Board found that although the town had a
long public housing waiting list, there was a need for low and moderate income housing in
Wilmington, and there were no provisions for multi-family development in the town, they had to
deny the comprehensive permit.
Of all the Board of Appeals denial decisions examined by the study, this was perhaps
the most interesting and contradictory, at one point seeming as if they are going to grant the
permit, and then ultimately issuing a denial. The Wilmington ZBA went to great lengths to
describe the purposes and impacts of the Chapter 40B legislation. The decision states:
The underlying premise of Chapter 774 [now Chapter 40B] is that the legislature
has ultimate control over local zoning... Furthermore, the legislature has obviously
determined that the suburbs must share some of the burden of providing low income
housing, and the statute defines that share... The assumption must be that the
suburbs one way or another, prohibit such housing. So this procedure, whether wisely
conceived or not - was adopted in c. 774 of calling for a comprehensive permit which
will cut across the established practice of getting separate permits... and will allow the
construction of apartments in areas where the zoning does otherwise not permit them.
... This Board must obey the law... If the Town will not make provision for low income
housing, then the legislature will has said it is to be done by means of the procedures
established in c. 774. This legislation obviously flies in the face of the popular vote.
So the number of people in Town who are opposed is not directly relevant. This Board
cannot simply say no permit will be issued because more people are against it than are
for it. 18
These two quotes from the ZBA decision imply that Wilmington was set against the project
from the beginning just in that the legislation is meant to supercede local zoning autonomy
and assure that suburbs share the burden of providing affordable housing. Whether or not
the ZBA, the town, and "the popular vote" are against 40B developments does not make a
difference, the ZBA cannot deny the permit based on that criteria.
While there are no transcripts or meeting minutes from the permitting hearings, the
decision makes references to resident opposition to the proposed development: "This Board
was forcefully impressed with the intensity of the feelings of the many speakers. The provisions
of c. 774 have caused us to concern ourselves with the health and safety of the occupants,
and the townspeople." This quote implies that at the hearings intense opposition to Wilmington
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Arboretum Apartments was heard regarding purported negative health and safety impacts of
the development on the town.
Towards the end of the decision, the ZBA lists over 30 conditions that the comprehensive
permit would have to abide by, but then concludes with the following statement: "If, however,
the applicant is able to satisfy the stated conditions cited for denial the application would be
granted." In reading the decision, it is almost as if the ZBA had intended to grant the permit
and then at the last minute decided against it. Bizarrely, one of the conditions proposed by
the Board of Appeals was that at least 25 percent had to be affordable for moderate income
home purchasers, already part of the alternative plan. This is one of only two mentions of the
homeownership development scenario in the decision.
The Boston Globe ran a story about Chapter 40B shortly after the ZBA decision and
referenced the Wilmington project opposition. The article mentions that a 1,600 signature
petition was circulated around the town in order to fight two proposed developments using 40B
zoning relief. The fight was not about elitism and snobbery though, according to one resident
who moved to Wilmington to find some privacy: "'I'm not a snob' ... She said the project is 'too
dense ... but density is not considered a proper reason for denying a permit under Chapter
774 [now Chapter 40B]... Abutters have no say."' 19 However, the role abutters play in the
decision making process is confusing; one developer complained that abutters were using
comprehensive permit hearings "to badger local officials who then believe 'they have to give
100 percent approval from every single person in town." 20 But, according to towns, the real
issue is that developers are trying to turn suburban communities, made up of primarily low
density large single-family housing, into urban neighborhoods: "Wilmington town manager
Reginald S. Stapczynski argued that developers 'are trying to urbanize our suburbs, take an
area that is all residential homes and put in all apartments and condos where there aren't any.
That's where the rub is." 21
Immediately after the Wilmington ZBA decision to deny the comprehensive permit
for Wilmington Arboretum, the developer filed an appeal with the HAC on the grounds that
the ZBA's decision was "unreasonable, not consistent with local needs, without foundation in
fact, imposed uneconomic conditions and on the grounds that the proposed development was
in fact reasonable and consistent with local needs and in accordance with" Chapter 40B. 22
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Adjudicatory hearings regarding the appeal were held over much of 1988 and 1989.
In June of 1990, the HAC overrode the Wilmington ZBA decision and granted a
comprehensive permit to the Wilmington Arboretum project for the construction of a 204-unit
development with affordability restrictions on 20 percent of the units. The HAC found that neither
the town nor the ZBA presented any contrary evidence on the issue of local and regional need.
In fact, a planning firm hired by the town in 1988 to examine the town's development regulations
and their impact on housing affordability, found that the zoning by-laws unreasonably restricted
the supply of housing in Wilmington, residential development in the town was restricted to
single-family housing on large lots, local regulations added unreasonably to residential
development costs, the minimum lot size and frontage requirements were unusually high, and
that the town actually discourages the development of affordable housing.
Other issues raised by Wilmington during the appeals process were that the proposed
development did not conform to the town's Master Plan, the density was much too great,
the proposed access roads were not suitable, and the purported negative impact of the
development on the sewer system, traffic congestion, and fire safety.
During the HAC hearing process, Wilmington filed a motion to dismiss appeal on
three alleged grounds: (1) the developer failed to give adequate notice; (2) the proposed
development was changed from rental to ownership and in design and layout than what was
presented for the purpose of site approval; and (3) the Board of Water and Sewer refused to
give permission for the development to be connected to existing infrastructure. However, the
HAC ruled that "each of these grounds is without merit."
The HAC ultimately ruled that the decision of the Wilmington Board of Appeals was
unreasonable and not consistent with local needs. However, the HAC did not just give the
developer carte blanche; they placed numerous conditions on the comprehensive permit with
respect to such items as building height, parking, and rear and side yard dimensions. The
town appealed the HAC decision to the SJC.
In September of 1992, while the comprehensive permit was held up in an appeals
process, Wilmington Arboretum Apartments Associates, the project developer, the property
mortgagee foreclosed on the mortgage and took title of the property. Together, Wilmington
Arboretum Associates and the mortgagor requested a transfer of the comprehensive permit
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which the HAC granted. The transfer was contingent on the restrictions established by the
comprehensive permit, i.e. that the site would still be developed as affordable housing and
follow all the conditions placed on the development's plan and unit count. Wilmington opposed
the transfer of the permit and appealed the HAC's decision.
In December of 1993, in two separate decisions, the Superior Court upheld the HAC
decisions which granted the comprehensive permit to Wilmington Arboretum Apartments
and allowed the permit transfer from the original developer to the new entity established by
property mortgagor. The Wilmington ZBA and Town of Wilmington together filed an appeal of
both Superior Court decisions to the Appellate Court of Massachusetts. The Appeals Court
affirmed the previous judgments by the Superior Court and the HAC in September 1995.
According to the Appellate Court, "Wilmington has raised several issues on appeal, none of
which we find have any merit." The Court ruled that the comprehensive permit still stood and
accepted the transfer of the permit.
In August of 1997, Avalon Bay Communities (Avalon) began communication with the
Wilmington Board of Appeals in an attempt to obtain another transfer of the comprehensive
permit from the entity established by the property mortgagor to Avalon in order to develop the
property. Prior to this, Avalon began the steps required to acquire an develop the property from
the mortgagor. Avalon determined that the changes made to the proposed project, henceforth
"Avalon Oaks," were "insubstantial" enough as to not require a new set of public hearings.
The building heights, number of units (204), building type (garden style apartments), tenure
(rental), and financing all adhered to the original comprehensive permit conditions.
The Wilmington ZBA approved the transfer of the comprehensive permit to Avalon on
December 2, 1997, more than eleven years after the initial permit application for the site. In
exchange for the comprehensive permit transfer, Avalon had to adhere to all of the original
requirements set forth by the permit as well as take responsibility for installing all sewer and
water infrastructure extensions at their own cost. They also worked with town officials in
redesigning the buildings and site layout.
Opposition Conclusions
There was a significant need for affordable housing in Wilmington at the time of the
initial permitting process; only 2.8 percent of Wilmington's housing stock was affordable, in
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contrast to 27.8 percent of the town's households earning less than 60 percent of the area
median income. But this need did not outweigh resident's desire to stop the project.
As discussed above, Wilmington contested the comprehensive permit for Wilmington
Arboretum for many reasons but primarily density, sewer and water issues, health and safety
concerns, and the project's lack of conformity with the town's Master Plan. Additionally, a good
deal of the original opposition to the Wilmington Arboretum comprehensive permit focused on
complaints of urbanization of the town. Residents were also concerned about the urbanization
and the "densification" of their town. In terms of the non-conformity with Wilmington's Master
Plan, the opposition arguments were very similar to those voiced in Burlington with respect to
Stone Brook Farms.
In terms of the relationship of the development opposition to the characteristics of
Wilmington, the town has a relatively large percentage of homeowners with a mortgage, 77
percent, the second highest rate in the studied communities. Accordingly, it can be inferred
that this large majority of homeowners would be averse to any risk to their home values and
more likely to oppose the development. Moreover, more than 90 percent of the housing
units in Wilmington are owner-occupied making this group of leveraged homeowners an
overwhelming majority of town residents. Also, as in Burlington and Norwood, the rate of
growth in Wilmington was very slow, which is often related to higher rates of development
opposition. Additionally, in terms of the density argument, the plans for both Avalon Oaks and
Wilmington Arboretum have the same density, 9.1 units per acre, 14 times higher than the
town's average of 0.65 units per acre.
It is interesting that the Avalon Oaks project was not nearly as controversial as
Wilmington Arboretum. According to Wilmington's director of planning and conservation, one
of the reasons for this was that Avalon worked with the town to redesign the project, changed
the building types, and really seemed to spin the project as a market-rate development with a
percentage of affordable units as opposed to a typical multi-family rental housing project.
KIMBALL COURT APARTMENTS 1, 11 & lli, WOBURN
The Kimball Court Apartments project in Woburn also had significant opposition
throughout the early years of the development process. The project has evolved into a three
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phase development, garnering less and less controversy throughout time. Kimball Court's
first phase was not developed until the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the HAC and
Superior Court's decision to grant the comprehensive permit in May of 1985. The second and
third phases of the project however did not face any significant opposition and were approved
in a timely manner by the Woburn Board of Appeals in 1989 and 1999 respectively.
Community Context
Located 10 miles north of Boston at the intersection of Interstates 93 and 128, the
City of Woburn is a suburban industrial city. Unfortunately, Woburn became known to many
by the book A Civil Action which highlighted the history of the leather tanneries and their
purported contamination of drinking water causing a leukemia cluster in the city. While the
town experienced a steady population increase over the past two hundred years, Woburn's
growth has been tempered in recent years; the city's population of 37,000 remained relatively
stable from 1980 to 2000, growing by less than two percent.
Woburn is the densest community in the study with 1.9 housing units per acre. It also
has one of the highest rates of renter-occupied housing, 39 percent of the overall housing
stock. In addition to Woburn having the lowest median income of the studied communities,
nearly $55,000, it also has one of the lowest percentages of affordable housing, making up
only 5.7 percent of the city's total housing stock. The median single-family house price in
Woburn in 2003 was $331,000, an increase of 130 percent from 1993. Woburn's median gross
rent in 2000 was $881, close to the median of the studied communities.
Nature of Proposed Development
Kimball Court Apartments directly abuts the Town of Burlington, a small commercial/
light industrial area, and a single-family residential neighborhood. Kimball Court Apartments,
Phase I consists of 184 units, 46 of which are affordable (25 percent), dispersed over two seven
story buildings. This phase, financed through MassHousing's SHARP program, was completed
1988. The second phase of Kimball Courts has 167 units, 34 of which are affordable. Phase II
was complete in 1990 and was also financed through the SHARP program. The development's
third phase, completed in 2002, consists of 174 units, 39 of which are affordable. This phase
was the first development to be financed under MassHousing's Expanding Rental Affordability
Program, which requires at least 20 percent of the units to be affordable to families earning 80
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Figures 7.13 - 7.16 KImball Court Apts Aerial and Site Photographs
percent or less of the area median income without direct subsidies.
Kimball Court Apartments, Phases I through l1l, developed for approximately $67
million, now consists of 525 housing units, 127 of which are affordable (24 percent) dispersed
over six seven-story buildings. Consisting of almost all one and two bedroom apartments, 278
and 230 units respectively, Kimball Court is not a necessarily family friendly development, but
does have a community center and a small playground. The complete development has a
density 19.34 units per acre, by far the densest development in the study.
The Boston Business Journal lists Kimball Court as the 6th largest apartment complex
in Massachusetts. Kimball Court is not finished though; in the Fall of 2002 the Town of
Burlington approved an additional 250 apartments on an adjacent parcel, which will raise the
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total development size to 775 units when completed.24 Figures 7.13 through 7.16 show the
neighborhood and site context for Kimball Court.
Opposition Overview
Kimball Court's developer, Joseph Mullins, properly filed a complete application for a
comprehensive permit on October 6, 1983. After receiving the complete permit application,
the Woburn ZBA attempted to extend the requisite amount time in which they had to hold
a public meeting (30 days), but the developer's attorney denied this request. According to
the Chapter 40B statute, Woburn went against the mandate to convene a hearing within 30
days. Moreover, the Woburn Board of Appeals failed to appropriately advertise for the public
hearings. Possibly in light of their wrongdoing, there was only one public meeting regarding
the development on November 4, 1983. Additionally, the board also failed to advertise for a
December 3rd meeting at which they deliberated and voted on the permit. The ZBA issued a
denial of the comprehensive permit on December 14, 1983.
The board based its decision to deny the permit based on its inconsistency with local
needs and that the proposed development "would have an adverse effect on the health and
safety, not the occupants of the proposed housing but the residents in general."25 Additional
concerns cited by the ZBA were drainage, flooding, inadequate water pressure, and that the
access road to the site was unsafe. In short, the board believed that the development would
have a "deleterious effect" on the health and safety of town residents.
In October of 1984, the Superior Court decided in favor of granting the permit to Kimball
Court for a number of reasons, but primarily because the Woburn Board of Appeals failed to
act within the statutory time period. According to a previous court decision, the Chapter 40B
was enacted "to provide expeditious relief from exclusionary local zoning by-laws and practices
which might inhibit construction of low and moderate income housing in the Commonwealth's
cities and towns."26 [Author's emphasis] Additionally, the Superior Court found that proper
notice was not given for the public hearing; the notices were late and were not posted in the
appropriate locations.
The court described at length the reason for taking the statutory requirements of proper
notice and timely hearings. Proper notice is designed to promote the general welfare of the
community and give citizens the chance to voice questions, concerns, or support for projects.
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The ruling states that the decision they made regarding the granting of the permit to Kimball
Court was not based on a technicality of the statute, "but a legislative and jurisdictional policy
that citizens in the town are entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard and that this
policy will be strictly enforced." It is an important policy and not to be taken lightly.
On May 24, 1985, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the decision of the
Superior Court and in doing so ordered the issuance of the comprehensive permit for Kimball
Court Apartments.
The second and third phases of Kimball Court Apartments were both approved by the
Woburn Board of Appeals, in 1989 and 1999 respectively, without significant opposition.
Opposition Conclusions
Woburn's opposition to the initial phase of Kimball Court Apartments primarily resulted
from concerns over the health and safety of the potential residents of the development, as well
as town residents in general.
Additionally, some interesting observations can be made with respect to the relationship
between development opposition and community context. Kimball Court's density is 19.3 units
per acre, by far the densest development in the study, and more than ten times higher than
Woburn's average of 1.9 units per acre and likely the cause of some resident opposition.
Kimball Court also abuts a single-family neighborhood, as does Stone Brook Farms, Olde
Derby Village, and Avalon Oaks, also likely to incite opposition by abutting homeowners.
Additionally, Woburn has a comparatively low median income, the lowest of the studied
communities, which is often related to development protest. Also in line with previous findings
of slow growth communities being more likely to oppose development, Woburn saw negative
growth in the 1980s with a two percent decline in its population.
CONTENTIOUS DEVELOPMENTS
This section focuses on the relatively contentious developments in the study which
are defined as projects that either had a prolonged and contentious comprehensive permitting
process but were ultimately approved by the local Board of Appeals, or were initially denied by
the ZBA, appealed to the HAC, and then settled in mediation between the developer and the
Board of Appeals with some HAC oversight. The developments described in this section are
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Pondside in Littleton, Mansfield Depot in Mansfield, and Liberty Place in Randolph.
There is a great deal of similarity regarding the many stated reasons for the community
opposition of these three projects. Typical complaints of new development consisting of
drainage, flooding, development density, sewer connections, and traffic were all common
outcries by residents and municipal officials during the comprehensive permitting process.
However, the protesters of the following developments were not quite as desperate to stop the
development as they were in the previous section of highly contentious developments. Many
of the residents and municipal officials speaking at public hearings and writing letters regarding
the projects described in this section were not supportive of the projects, but they also did not
give the impression that the proposed development was going to ravage the town by creating
major infrastructure problems, overcrowd the schools, or overburden the town's water supply
as was common in the previous section.
In addition the similarities for opposing the three developments in this section, there
was also a great deal of animosity between the developers and municipal officials during the
permitting hearings, especially in Littleton and Randolph. The towns felt that they had lost
control over development in their community, that the Chapter 40B statute took away their
power to control land use decisions, the reason for having a local zoning board in the first
place. As with the projects described in the previous section, the developers were often not
afraid to threaten the towns with litigation and potential loss of state funding, confidant that they
would ultimately receive permit approval from the HAC or the courts.
However, because these three projects ultimately received their comprehensive
permits from the local ZBAs, as opposed to the courts, the towns were able to have some level
of control regarding the design and density of the projects. Although this resulted in a longer
stage 2, with negotiations regarding permit conditions, stage 3, the resolution stage, resulted
in a significantly more amicable solution for both the developers and municipalities. Randolph
arranged a reduction in the density and permanently affordable units at Liberty Place;
Mansfield persuaded the developer to partially fund infrastructure costs, contribute to the local
school system, and increase the affordability ratio of the Mansfield Depot project; and Littleton
negotiated a greater percentage of affordable units at Pondside. In return, the developers
were able to have their projects approved and permitted in a significantly shorter time frame as
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compared to the previous section, won more support from the towns, and saved themselves
an extremely costly legal process. These are very different results from the projects in the
previous section.
PONDSIDE AT LITTLETON, LITTLETON
Pondside at Littleton was permitted and developed in the same general timeframe as
Littleton Green (described in the next section); however, the two projects are very different and
caused much different reactions among the Littleton Board of Appeals and town residents.
Pondside, located approximately one mile west of Littleton Green, and proposed just a
few months after Littleton Green, did not receive a comprehensive permit nearly as easily.
Pondside's permit application was originally denied by the ZBA, but ultimately granted after
mediation sessions overseen by the HAC in April of 1987.
The comprehensive permit hearings set off some interesting interchanges between
the developer and town. The hearings showed that 40B projects are not permitted in a
vacuum and that towns have many issues to weigh in making permit decisions. Pondside
was proposed right after the town had approved three other comprehensive permits, one of
which was Littleton Green, and the town was feeling inundated with permit applications. The
ZBA also stressed repeatedly that multi-family development was not allowed in the town for
a reason, it was not what Littleton residents wanted. Additionally, the town seemed to be
extremely distressed over their loss of control with respect to development in the town as a
result of Chapter 40B. The ZBA repeatedly referred to how the statute overrode their authority
and rendered them helpless in dealing with developers applying for comprehensive permits.
Moreover, somewhat threateningly, it was raised by the developer at one of the hearings that
towns not in compliance with 40B risk losing some state funds. There was also an interesting
debate between the developer and town regarding the town's desire for Pondside to have a
greater percentage of affordable units. However, it seemed that one of the reasons the town
wanted more affordable housing was because they were relatively close to reaching Chapter
40B's 10 percent goal making them immune to anymore zoning overrides.
Community Context
Located 26 miles northwest of Boston, Littleton is a largely rural town on the outer
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fringe of the Boston metropolitan area. The town is still largely agricultural in character with a
both the smallest population (8,000 residents) and lowest density (0.28 housing units per acre)
of the communities in the study. Notably, Littleton has experienced significant economic and
population growth recently, with a 16 percent increase in population and a 39 percent increase
in median income between 1990 and 2000. Littleton has the highest percentage of affordable
housing in the studied communities, approximately 8 percent of the town's total housing stock.
However, this figure is somewhat misleading in that 8 percent of the town's housing stock
comprises only 240 units and Littleton's total housing stock is slightly more than 3,000 units.
The cost of living in Littleton is changing drastically; the median single-family house price in
2003 was $360,000, a 147 percent increase over the last decade, the largest percentage
increase in the study. Littleton's median gross rent in 2000 was $680, the lowest in the study.
It is interesting that the town's house prices are relatively high while the cost of renting in
Littleton is comparatively low.27
Nature of Proposed Development
The $10 million Pondside at Littleton project is a significantly larger development than
Littleton Green, examined in the following section. The project consists of 90 housing units, 32
of which are affordable (35 percent of total) and was financed through MassHousing's SHARP
program. SHARP requires 25 percent of the development to be affordable, but through the
course of negotiations between the developer, the Littleton Board of Appeals, and mediation
with the Housing Appeals Committee, the development's affordability fraction was raised to 35
percent. Pondside at Littleton abuts a single-family residential neighborhood surrounding Mill
Pond, and is located right off the Littleton exit on Interstate 495. Figures 7.17 through 7.20
present the neighborhood and site context for the development.
Opposition Overview
The Pondside at Littleton project, proposed under the name Littleton Apartments,
received a comprehensive permit from the Littleton Board of Appeals after an initial denial and
then mediation with the Housing Appeals Committee. The entire permitting process occurred
over a nine month period and was relatively contentious with considerable opposition from
both zoning board members and Littleton residents.
The first ZBA hearing on the Pondside project occurred in August of 1986, slightly
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Figures 7.17 - 7.20 Pondside Aerial and Site Photographs
more than three months after the decision regarding Littleton Green's comprehensive permit
was made. The proposal was for 90 multi-family rental housing units abutting Mill Pond to be
financed through the SHARP program. Twenty-five percent of the units would be affordable
for 15 years, the minimum term mandated by the financing restrictions. The development
would include six two-story buildings, a pool, tennis courts, and a water treatment facility. The
developer, State Street Development, announced that "this is to be a market rate project of
townhouses and apartments" and that "the character of Littleton has been put into the design
and determination of what materials to use for construction." At the time of the hearing, only
116 housing units in Littleton qualified as affordable housing and the town needed a total of 223
to reach the ten percent goal and a letter from the housing authority was read stating the need
for additional affordable housing in the town.
At the hearing, the Planning Board, strongly opposing the development, commented
that "the Board of Appeals has granted such permits in the past and a project which only has
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twenty percent subsidized units is greatly lacking and is not a legitimate override of the zoning
and therefore the Planning Board is against this project." Also at the hearing, another speaker
in opposition to Pondside "agreed with the Planning Board's stand and that this project seems
like a high price to have shoved down the Town's throat and seems to be a way around the
zoning." The developer's attorney responded that "the state statute is being used because
such projects are not allowed in Littleton." Without a zoning override, Pondside could never
be developed in Littleton because there was no allowance for multi-family housing in any part
of the town.
The next hearing on Pondside was in September of 1986. Someone speaking for the
housing authority came to the hearing in order to state that the Littleton Housing Authority
was in support of the project, but preferred that the development would be financed under the
TELLER program as opposed to the SHARP program. When active, the TELLER program
was administered by housing authorities as opposed to state housing finance agencies (like
SHARP) and allowed the local housing authority significant more control over the project.
However, one ZBA member stated "that this proposal is against what the people of
Littleton have said that they want in their town." Another ZBA member commented that "the
Board has accepted that it must take these projects but the townspeople have consistently
indicated that they don't want multi-family units in Littleton!" [Emphasis in original] The board
member added that he didn't think the town "would swallow seventy-five percent not subsidized"
housing. In other words, it did not seem right to only get 25 percent affordable units for the
price of a relatively large development for a town the size of Littleton; board members felt that
if the town is going to approve such a large development, they should at least be getting more
needed affordable housing.
Also discussed at the hearing were debates regarding the merits of TELLER versus
SHARP funding for the development, the length of affordability restrictions, and what the board
perceived as the inevitability of approval of the comprehensive permit because Littleton had
yet to meet the statutory minimum of affordable housing units.
The ZBA issued their decision on October 2, 1986 after two hearings on the petition
for the comprehensive permit. They found that although there remains a deficit in terms of the
numerical standards for low and moderate income housing in Littleton and that the Zoning By-
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Law has no provision for multi-family housing as a permitted use, the development proposal for
90 units with 20 to 25 percent affordable was too small a proportion of the total number of units
proposed. They felt that to have 75 percent of the development market rate apartments was "a
flagrant circumvention of Littleton's Zoning By-Law... The Zoning By-Law is not permissive of
multi-family housing and the Town has consistently refused to alter it." The board commented
further that "the proposal as presented, with particular reference to the market rate units, is not
in accordance with the express will of the Town or in the best interests of the Town of Littleton."
The decision also discussed that the ZBA had received three applications for comprehensive
permits and granted all three permits in the previous two years. They felt that Littleton needed
some relief from more new development. The Board voted unanimously to deny the petition
for a comprehensive permit.
Pondside's developer notified the Housing Appeals Committee of the decision four
days after the permit denial. The HAC held a meeting the following week, attended by
representatives of the Littleton Board of Appeals and the development team, and "informally
suggested ... that the parties meet in recognition of the statutory requirements and attempt
to reach an agreement." Over the following six months, the developer, HAC representatives,
and ZBA members worked together to settle some of the issues pertaining to the denial of the
comprehensive permit.
As a result of this mediation, the Littleton ZBA oversaw a second round of hearings
regarding the Pondside comprehensive permit in March and April of 1987. At the March
hearing, the town counsel "advised that the Board of Appeals' denial of a comprehensive
permit would not be upheld in court and the process would be costly, time consuming, and
a lost cause." In recognition of another rejection of the comprehensive permit being a lost
cause, the Board made a motion to rescind the previous denial and reconsider the petition.
The developer gave a list of conditions to which they would agree including that no less than 20
percent of the housing units would be set aside for low and moderate income housing during
the period required by the project's financing. Additionally, the development team, none too
subtly, pointed out at the hearing "that towns which do not comply [with Chapter 40B] suffer
from withholding of state funds." At the close of the hearing, the ZBA chairman and petitioners
decided to work out the comprehensive permit details and present them at the next Board of
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Appeals meeting in April.
At the April hearing, it was announced that the developer's attorney, after consultation
with board chairman, had prepared a draft decision defining terms of comprehensive permit.
The Board voted to adopt the comprehensive permit as it was written by the development team
with no alterations. They made a motion to inform the HAC that the town and the developers
agreed on the permit, the prior vote was rescinded and a new decision was issued.
The decision noted the history of the permit hearings and subsequent meetings
between the development team, the HAC, and the Board of Appeals. The decision found that
there is a local need for low and moderate income housing in Littleton, and that the granting
of the "Comprehensive Permit is consistent with local needs... and the project will contribute
to Littleton's satisfactions of its low and moderate income housing obligations." The decision
was approved by a board vote of four to one. The decision stated that at least 20 percent of
the apartments would be affordable, but by the time the project received final funding approval
from MassHousing, the ratio of affordable units had been increased to 35 percent.
Opposition Conclusions
The Littleton ZBA and local residents found numerous reasons to oppose the Pondside
development, but most of the opposition seemed to be a result of the loss of control of the
town over local zoning. Over the previous two years, Littleton had been subject to three
comprehensive permit applications and granted all three. It appeared that one of the deciding
factors in the Board of Appeals' denial of the permit was just because the town felt they
deserved a moratorium on new development and comprehensive permits.
The town also felt that if the Board of Appeals was going to have to permit multi-family
development, at least the developers could provide more affordable units to alleviate the
growing need for low and moderate income housing units in the town. However, the town's
desire for a larger percentage of affordable units in the development was not completely
virtuous, they also recognized that Littleton was close to reaching the ten percent goal of
the statute, which when reached, released the town of its obligation to grant comprehensive
permits to non-conforming development projects.
There is also a relatively strong relationship between the opposition to Pondside and
the characteristics of Littleton. The density of the project is 9 units per acre, significantly higher
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than the town's average density of 0.3 units per acre, which is by far the lowest average density
in the study. As described above, Littleton is still a relatively small agricultural community
and a fairly dense project like Pondside is very different from most of the housing in the town.
Moreover, at 90 units, the project alone contributed to a more than three percent increase in
the town's total housing stock.
THE VILLAGE AT MANSFIELD DEPOT, MANSFIELD
The Village at Mansfield Depot in Mansfield falls into the second opposition category
of contentious developments. The first phase of the development was significantly
more contentious than the project's second phase. Similar to Pondside at Littleton, the
comprehensive permit for the Phase I was initially denied by the Mansfield Board of Appeals,
but ultimately approved after the developer appealed the decision and the permit was settled
in mediation sessions overseen by the HAC. After that contentious process, Phase I of
Mansfield Depot was approved by the ZBA with some protest from municipal officials but not
as much by abutters as was incurred by Phase 1. In fact, one abutter who opposed the first
phase of the project came out in support of the second.
It is important to note that Mansfield was really able to leverage its control of the
permitting process to negotiate with the Mansfield Depot developer. The ZBA created
numerous conditions when granting the comprehensive permits for both phases of Mansfield
Depot including funds for infrastructure costs, the local school system, traffic and park
improvements, and increasing the affordability ratio of the development.
The opposition residents and municipal officials had with respect to Mansfield Deport
was relatively typical of concerns of new development, a compilation of "usual suspects"
arguments without reference to many issues with affordable housing in general or Chapter
40B in particular. They wrote letters and spoke at hearings raising concerns regarding sewers,
road, drainage, traffic, and school impact.
Another feature of the opposition to Mansfield Depot of note was the nature of the
concerns regarding property value impact. The impact of the development on the surrounding
properties was not raised with respect to the single-family home abutters but the devaluation of
the industrial area in which Mansfield Depot is located. Local businesses were concerned that
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the development would hinder the success of the industrial zone and limit their ability to perform
industrial and manufacturing functions if the neighborhood became largely residential.
Community Context
The Town of Mansfield, 26 miles south of Boston, is a relatively small, rural community
with a population of roughly 22,000 residents. Mansfield's economy consists primarily of
agricultural and manufacturing firms, and the town has attempted to zone significant portions
of land for industrial use with varying degrees of success. Despite its perceived small size,
Mansfield grew substantially from 1980 to 2000 with a population increase of over 66 percent,
by far the highest growth rate of the studied communities. Additionally, the median income
increased by nearly 40 percent from 1990 to 2000. However, even with its incredibly large
increase in population, Mansfield is still one of the least dense communities in the study, with an
average density of 0.62 housing units per acre. Most of the housing units are owner-occupied,
but the town does have a substantial portion of rental housing, more than 28 percent of the
total housing stock. Mansfield's median single-family house price in 2003 was $350,000, close
to a 140 percent increase over the last ten years. The town's median gross rent in 2000 was
$761, the lowest in the study. Similar to Littleton, Mansfield's house prices are relatively high
while the cost of renting in the town is comparatively low .28
Nature of Proposed Development
Located in an area originally zoned industrial and surrounded by industrial uses on three
sides, the $20 million development consists of a total of 245 units of mixed-income multifamily
rental housing, nearly 30 percent of which is affordable. Phase I of Mansfield Depot, permitted
in October of 1986, includes 150 units, 25 percent of which are affordable to residents earning
less than 80 percent of the area median income (AMI). Permitted in December of 1987, Phase
II includes 95 units with 35 percent of the units affordable. The units in both phases have a
comparatively large number of family-sized units with 63 three and four bedroom apartments.
Mansfield Depot consists of primarily two and three story buildings and provides a number of
services for residents including on-site child care, an exercise room, club house, sauna, and
playground. Both phases were financed by MassHousing's SHARP Program. 29 The entire
development was completed in July of 1989. Mansfield Depot's neighborhood and site context
are shown in Figures 7.21 through 7.23.
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Figures 7.21 - 7.23 Mansfield Depot Aerial and Site Photographs
Opposition Overview
Village at Mansfield Depot I
Originally filed in April 1986, the comprehensive permit for Mansfield Depot I was
denied by the Mansfield Zoning Board of Appeals after three hearings, and then settled in
mediation after the developer appealed to the HAC.
According to the comprehensive permit application, filed in April of 1986, the project
site was vacant and partly forested and surrounded by an apartment complex, "moderately-
priced single-family homes," a manufacturing facility, and some commercial buildings. In terms
of housing need, at the time Mansfield had "experienced rapid growth during the past several
years, with a projected population increase of 30 percent during the 1980's."
A ZBA hearing regarding the proposed comprehensive permit was held on May 22,
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1986. At the hearing, correspondence was read from the planning board, fire department,
the Industrial Development Commission, and the Mansfield Housing Authority. The Housing
Authority offered "complete support" for the project citing the need for low-cost rental housing
"in a town that is experiencing a great deal of growth" and at the time had 300 applicants on
MHA waiting list. The planning board, on the other hand, was not as supportive of the project;
in their memorandum to the ZBA they noted a number of concerns regarding the proposed
development, including drainage, site lighting, means of access, sidewalks, and safety
concerns regarding residential development in an industrial zone. The Industrial Development
Commission commented that they did not oppose the project, "however, it is not the best use
of our industrial land." [Emphasis in original] In addition, the planning director, "abutters and
interested residents" made comments at the hearing, although the meeting minutes do not
elaborate on what specific comments they made. At the end of the meeting, the hearing on the
project was continued until June to allow for further comments from residents and municipal
officials and ZBA deliberations.
At the June 3, 1896 hearing, letters were read from the town manager, the Board of
Selectmen, and abutters. The Board of Selectmen's memorandum to the Board of Appeals
requested a traffic study for the site and was very concerned about the impact of resident car
trips on the already congested streets in the neighborhood. One abutter letter from a business
owner was very concerned about the impact of residences on the surrounding businesses:
"residences will, inevitably, have an adverse effect on the possibility of other business
development in the area and could also decrease the value of our property as industrial land."
The town manager's letter recommended that the ZBA approve the project application if a
number of conditions are met including construction of a fence along the perimeter of the
project "to keep unplanned shortcutting by pedestrians through adjoining properties," provision
of a buffer, proper drainage, and pedestrian walkways. Comments at the hearing from abutters
and residents regarding water problems in the area "as well as other concerns" were also
noted in the meeting minutes. The hearing on the project was continued again until July.
The only notes in the meeting minutes from the July 1, 1986 hearing regarding
Mansfield Depot were that a motion to deny the comprehensive permit was made, four of the
board members voted in favor to deny the permit with one member opposed.
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The Board of Appeals' denial of the comprehensive permit was filed in July of 1986.
According to the decision, the permit was denied for a number of reasons, including that the
"applicant did not present a convincing case that the Town of Mansfield hampers the construction
of low or moderate income housing." Additionally, since the project site was located in an
industrial zoned area, the "Board felt that this was not the best use of the industrial land and
the project may be incompatible with industrial uses." Concerns regarding deflated property
values in the surrounding industrial area were also specially raised in the ZBA decision: "This
concern was also voiced by industrial abutters who are concerned it may depreciate industrial
land values and limit the further development of the Ryan and Elliot Industrial Park." Additional
concerns regarding whether or not the developer had properly searched for property in multi-
family residential zones, traffic, drainage, flooding, access roads, accessibility, and proximity
to amenities and services were also raised.
One abutter claimed to have received little information regarding the project up to this
point and was very distressed about the project. The abutter, who owned a business on a
nearby site, wrote a letter to the ZBA in October of 1986 protesting the project commenting that
"Naturally, one of my biggest concerns is for the value and viability of my business property."
[Author's emphasis]
After an appeal to the HAC, the ZBA and the developer reached a settlement agreement
in October of 1986 with a number of conditions, including construction of a secondary access,
fencing, suitable drainage, sidewalks, and a school bus shelter.
Village at Mansfield Depot Il
The comprehensive permit application for the Village at Mansfield Depot II was
filed with the ZBA in September of 1986. Prior to the first ZBA hearing on the project, the
development received support from the Mansfield Housing Authority. Also before the first
hearing, the planning board voted unanimously to send a negative recommendation to the
ZBA with respect to the project. Their letter addressed concerns regarding traffic, length of the
roadways, amount of parking proposed, water and sewer lines, pedestrian circulation, number
of stories of buildings, setbacks, entrances from main road, and commented that the "density
is too thick for a site of this size."
The October 6, 1987 hearing was uneventful, letters regarding the project were read
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into the record and the hearing was continued until October 2 0th to finish the presentation,
answer questions, and allow abutter comments.
The hearing on October 20, 1987 elicited no comments from any abutters, but of note, a
letter was entered into the record from an abutter who was opposed to the first phase, but was
now writing in support of Phase I stating that the "developer of the complex has been a good
neighbor, and we are working together to maximize the positive aspects of this development
and to minimize any negative effects. If I can in some way assist some people who are less
advantaged in this town and in this region through this letter, then I will be most pleased."
The third and final hearing regarding the project was on November 17, 1987.
Discussions at this hearing revolved around money commitments from the developer to the
town for road, drainage, and sewer work, development financing, rental fees, particulars of the
SHARP program, projected child population of the development, sidewalks to be constructed,
and again drainage concerns. At the end of the meeting, the ZBA unanimously approved the
comprehensive permit.
The Mansfield Board of Appeals decision, dated December 16, 1987, granted approval
to the project, but subject to 15 conditions including construction of sidewalks, fence separating
the development site from surrounding properties, traffic control lines, emergency access road,
provision of funds for traffic and park improvements, and a $25,000 contribution to the school
department to support the high school's athletic programs. The decision also made clear that
the development must contain 33 low- and moderate-income units (35 percent of the total
development) for families, and that those units were to remain affordable in perpetuity.
Opposition Conclusions
Both residents and municipal officials were in opposition to the Mansfield Depot project
when it was first proposed in the spring of 1986. The development opposition was mainly
centered on the proposed change of the property's zoning from industrial to residential use.
Questions of whether or not residential development was appropriate on a site surrounded on
three sides by light industry were heard multiple times during the permitting process. Also,
concerns by local business owners of a devaluation of their property were raised. Although
these concerns might seem strange, it seems that town officials and business owners thought
that if the area became a residential neighborhood as opposed to an industrial zone, what the
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property was originally zoned for, it would be more difficult for the town to attract industrial and
manufacturing uses to the area. Additionally, it could be argued that the businesses would be
restricted in their practices because of their impact on the neighborhood residents and this
would hinder their potential for selling the remaining parcels. The industrial park was intended
to be a major economic development engine for Mansfield, but this did not come to fruition as
planners and municipal officials had hoped, and the industrial park never really took off. Much
of the industrial zone still has yet to be developed today.30
The second phase of the development, while less controversial than the first, still
had some opposition as well. This opposition consisted of more common issues of density,
drainage, flooding, access roads, fencing, and sidewalks.
Interestingly, in a reverse from many residents and ZBA members, the Mansfield
Planning Board opposed the second phase of Mansfield Depot mainly because of traffic,
density, and water and sewer capacity, but was in full support of development's first phase.
In terms of the density argument however, the planning board's argument is somewhat
understandable. The site density after the second phase rose to more than 16.6 units per
acre, an enormous increase when compared to Mansfield's average density of only 0.6 units
per acre.
LIBERTY PLACE, RANDOLPH
The comprehensive permit for the Liberty Place development was ultimately approved
by the Randolph Zoning Board of Appeals in July of 1987, but not without an extensive and
often controversial four month public hearing process. Throughout the permitting process,
residents, ZBA members, and other municipal officials strongly opposed the proposed
development for many reasons, with property value concerns among the long list. However,
in the end, the town did approve the comprehensive permit in a relatively short time frame and
was able to negotiate with the developer for a 12 percent decrease in project size, maintenance
of affordable units in perpetuity, and major changes in the site plan including reducing the
number of buildings, increasing setbacks, and incorporating more green space.
The minutes from the Randolph Board of Appeals hearings transcribed the most heated
arguments examined in the study. The developer and town officials had numerous intense
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clashes during the permit hearings, with accusations of dishonesty, poor practice, intentional
misrepresentations, and stalling; there we even arguments between ZBA board members.
Additionally, some of the concerns voiced during the hearings raise a real question
regarding whether or not the Liberty Place site was really appropriate for multi-family housing.
According to some town officials, a large percentage of the site was in a flood control hazard
area. Concern regarding the environmental impact of the development with particular
reference to flooding and drainage issues on the site were voiced. However, it is difficult to
decipher whether or not this was a valid argument or just an excuse to halt the development
process. It would seem that the site was a good location for multi-family development, it is next
to a school and surrounded by open space and a residential neighborhood.
A petition signed by over 450 local residents was submitted to the Board of Appeals.
According to the petition, they were concerned about the impact of the development to their
area. Additional concerns referred to this type of housing causing "property to go right down,"
and that the development could easily turn into a big public housing project. One resident put
everything he had into his house when the area was a one family housing zone and he did not
want to be looking out on a project. Another said that projects such as these were why people
left the city and moved to places like Randolph. These residents clearly did not want Liberty
Place to be built in their community were not hedging around the issues.
Community Context
The Town of Randolph is an economically and ethnically diverse community located 15
miles south of Boston. The town has a population of 31,000 and is the most ethnically diverse
community in the study with a population that is approximately 62 percent white, with 23
percent and 11 percent of residents African American and Asian respectively. The population
is relatively well-educated, but has the lowest rates of high school and bachelors degrees in
the study, 87 percent and 27 percent respectively.
In addition to being the most diverse of the studied communities, Randolph is also one
of the densest communities in the study with nearly 1.8 housing units per acre. The housing
stock is largely owner-occupied with only 28 percent rental-occupied housing units. The town
also has a relatively small percentage of affordable housing, 5.7 percent of the total housing
stock.
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Randolph's median single-family house price in 2003, the lowest in the study group,
was $278,000, a 122 percent increase over the last decade and even more overwhelming, a
105 percent increase in the last five years - the highest percent increase in the study. The
town's 2000 median gross rent was $863. This is interesting in that the costs of renting in
Randolph are relatively high while single-family houses are comparatively low."
Nature of Proposed Development
Liberty Place is a $10 million development consisting of 107 multi-family rental units,
27 of which are affordable (25 percent) to households earning 50 percent of the area median
income (AMI). The project consists of three and four story buildings spread over the site
surrounded by a significant amount of open space. Liberty Place abuts a local elementary
Figures 7.24 - 7.27 Liberty Place Aerial and Site Photographs
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school and a single-family residential neighborhood. The development received financing
through the Tax-Exempt Local Loans to Encourage Rental Housing (TELLER) Program which
allows local housing authorities the option of issuing tax-exempt bonds to finance privately-
owned, mixed income rental housing. Liberty Place was completed in 1989. Figures 7.24
through 7.27 illustrate the neighborhood and site context for the development.
Opposition Overview
The Liberty Place comprehensive permitting process began in April 1987 with a
proposal to build 121 units of housing with "25 percent available to low income people" on an
11.7 acre site with an "open site plan." At the time, the development team already had one
development under construction and owned another two projects in Randolph.
At the April 9, 1987 hearing a number of issues regarding the development were raised.
The Conservation Commission wanted the project relocated to another spot because they felt
that this location "would not be in the best interest of the Town of Randolph." According to the
Conservation Commission, approximately one-third of the site was in a flood hazard area.
Concerns were also raised by a member of the Randolph School Committee who
stated that they did not see the development as having a significant impact on the local
schools. However, the School Committee member did comment on the need for low income
housing in Randolph and the town's attitude towards this type of development: "Speaking
about the concern about people that do no have access to low income housing. The Town has
a reputation of being a closed town. There is little to no low to moderate income housing. We
have not really done our part. This is the chance to change that reputation and open up our
town to other people that need help." Only one other person spoke at the meeting in support
of the development.
Significant opposition to Liberty Place was voiced during the meeting. There were a
wide range of complaints, including concerns about the already low amount of Town water,
traffic, water runoff, drainage, lack of sidewalks on the site plan, close proximity of wetlands to
the site, the buildings being too close in the event of a fire, school overcrowding. Residents
had additional protests regarding who could afford the market rate rents, commenting that the
market rents the developer was planning on charging were significantly higher than anything
else in Town.
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Many of the comments residents made at the meeting started with one complaint and
evolved into something else. One resident commented: "Fifteen years ago I built my house
in a one family zone. I put everything I had into it. I don't feel we should have to look out
onto a project. We are in a valley. With that much drainage, it will be flooded." Some people
mentioned a concern about deflation of property values outright, another resident commented:
"most of the houses in the area are single-family homes. People come and go so quickly, the
property goes right down... people will come and go." [Author's emphasis] At the conclusion
of the hearing, the ZBA requested numerous studies regarding environmental impact, water
impact, school impact, traffic, water pressure, and drainage.
The May 21, 1987 meeting was an extremely contentious meeting, more so than the
April meeting. The developer opened the session announcing they responded to a number of
concerns raised at the previous hearing and reduced the project density from 121 to 116 units,
they also decreased the number of buildings, added sidewalks and more parking spaces,
increased distance between buildings, and moved buildings further back from wetlands
buffer.
There were a great deal of complaints from both the ZBA and the development team
regarding a lack of professional behavior, late submission of plans and documents, and
inconsistent facts and figures regarding unit counts, acreage, and the emergency access road
to the site. ZBA members found fault with nearly every document submitted by the developer
because of slight errors, seemingly attempting to throw up road blocks at every turn.
At the June 11, 1987 meeting, again highly controversial, a petition was submitted with
452 signatures by residents "concerned about impact to their area." [Author's emphasis] In
the interim between the current and previous hearings, the development team had attempted
to meet with the appropriate Town officials, often to no avail. More complaints were raised
regarding the same set of issues discusses previously, close proximity of the development to
wetlands, emergency access road issues, traffic, density, lack of usable open space.
Regarding density and the reason people left "the city" to move to a place like Randolph,
one resident commented: "The density should be revised because of the lack of usable open
space. This is from my own experience from living in a housing project. People move out here
to get away from those crowded conditions. It has become a big public housing project with a
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couple of trees on the edge." He turned the conversation beginning with an issue of density to
envisioning the proposed Liberty Place, with only 25 percent of the units affordable, as "a big
public housing project."
Again at this meeting as at the hearing in May, the Board commented on small factual
and typing errors in submitted documents and wanted additional impact studies. When the
Board requested new submissions of virtually all project documents with minor changes, the
development team objected. The developer's attorney repeatedly attempted to request a final
decision on the comprehensive permit right then, stating: "We have presented all the relevant
information. We have answered the major issues. Other boards have had the time to give
any input. I think it would be appropriate for the Board to close the hearing and to act." The
attorney was called out of order and the hearing was unanimously continued until July.
The day after this hearing, there was an article in The Patriot Ledger entitled "Developer
accuses board of stalling." The article quotes the developer's attorney regarding the delay:
"It's obviously a runaround. I think it's become clear they want to delay it."33 In discussing the
issues raised by residents opposed to the proposed Liberty Place development, the author cites
traffic, adequate roadways for emergency vehicles, and "health and safety problems posed by
the long, dead end road that provides the only means of access to the development."34 The
article also refers to a 450 resident petition opposing the project because of its purported
impact on the neighborhood.
The July 16, 1987 hearing was the final hearing for the Liberty Place comprehensive
permit. This was another long hearing consisting of heated arguments and even insults
between Board members. The Randolph ZBA voted to approve the Liberty Place permit subject
to 35 conditions with a close vote of three to two. The conditions included limiting number of
housing units to 107 (the final number of units developed), assurance of the development of
a swimming pool and clubhouse, outlining of parking space dimensions, and a stipulation that
the town shall have first option to purchase the affordable units when the MHFA mortgage is
paid off to keep them affordable in perpetuity.
Opposition Conclusions
As was described above, although the Randolph Board of Appeals granted the
comprehensive permit for Liberty Place without HAC or court intervention, the project was
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still highly controversial and faced significant opposition from both the town officials and local
residents throughout the permitting process.
Complaints with respect to density, access roads, and purported property, neighborhood,
and environmental impacts were all common during the ZBA hearings. As with Mansfield
Deport, there was also a great deal of concern regarding the appropriateness of the site.
The site was purported to be in a flood hazard area, and dire flooding, run-off, and drainage
concerns were all raised in meetings. However, the site is in a residential neighborhood and
next to an elementary school (similar to Franklin School Apartments in Lexington, described
in the next section), what sounds like an ideal place for multi-family housing. Also, because
the project received financing through MassHousing, it had to receive environmental impact
waivers, and if the site was truly going to cause significant environmental damage, it would not
have been approved by its financers. Other concerns and complaints raised at the hearings,
such as the buildings being fire hazards because they were too close together, small factual
and typing errors on plans, detailed discussions on what activities would be held at the
clubhouse, and a heated debate about the project's access road through the school grounds
seemed to be people grasping at straws to find any reason to stall or halt the project.
A petition with vague wording regarding residents' concern regarding the development's
impact on the neighborhood, and people speaking out against Liberty Place as if it was a big
public housing project and development such as this were part of the reason why they moved
out of the "city" also played a large role in the opposition to Liberty Place.
Another interesting opposition argument was raised by some residents and board
members regarding the market rate portion of Liberty Place. According to some ZBA members,
the market rate rents that were proposed for the development were going to be higher than
the average rents in the town. They felt that the market rate portion of the development was
not intended for Randolph residents and inappropriate for the town. This argument seems to
imply that people felt if the project was not going to benefit town residents, than there is little
reason to permit it.
The history of the site and community characteristics play an important part in
development opposition. At Liberty Place, the same developer previously had another
proposal for the site for duplex size house lots, but the project was not approved because road
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length was a violation. Additionally, Liberty Place's density is 9.15 units per acre much higher
than Randolph's average density of 1.78 units per acre, and density was a common reason for
opposition during the hearings. Finally, Randolph has one of the lowest median incomes in the
studied communities, yet in all the comprehensive permit hearings, there was little mention of
a need for affordable housing in the town. Even today, Randolph has one of the lowest rates
of affordable housing in the study; only 5.7 percent of the town's housing stock.
UNOPPOSED DEVELOPMENTS
As with comprehensive permit projects in general, not all of the developments in the
study were strongly opposed by residents and municipalities. This section describes two
developments with little to no opposition during the permitting process and the local Board
of Appeals approved the projects in a timely manner. These two projects, Franklin School
Apartments in Lexington and Littleton Green in Littleton, were approved without significant
opposition and are seen by their communities as successful projects serving local affordable
housing needs. However, as will be shown below, these two projects were clearly different
from the other developments in the study.
Franklin School is very much a model project in terms of the forward-thinking approach
of the town of Lexington. The town surveyed residents, selected an appropriate site for
affordable housing, sought development proposals, and had residents vote on the project
at town meeting. It seems that the role Lexington played in supporting the development
of Franklin School Apartments and catering to the concerns residents had with respect to
affordable housing prior to issuing a request for development proposals on the site had a
positive effect. Additionally, by locating the development in a former school building they knew
the project would be restricted to small and more palatable scale for nearby residents. By
pre-empting many of the possible problems that the development could have raised, the town
was able to approve the project without incident. Finally, the Franklin School developer made
concerted efforts to incorporate neighborhood input into the site plan, open space access, and
architectural scheme of the project.
Unlike Lexington, Littleton was not proactive with Littleton Green, but many of the
concerns and stereotypes raised as opposition to traditional affordable housing are not
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applicable to elderly housing development. Elderly projects are much easier to find approval
as they serve a "deserving" population and by their nature do not raise concerns regarding
the impact of the development on potentially crowded school systems and traffic congestion.
Additionally, just by the very fact that the project is so small, with only 24 units, likely made it
significantly more acceptable for nearby residents.
Finally, proactive communities such as Lexington are able to completely reframe the
context in which the developments receive comprehensive permits. They accomplish this by
creating an alternative model for new development, instead of having the developer come
into the town and propose a project in stage 1. Municipalities can establish a whole new 40B
process where towns actively seek out appropriate sites, uses for the site, and developers.
This new process can create developments with less opposition, permit them more quickly,
and help alleviate the severe housing crunch in the state.
FRANKLIN SCHOOL APARTMENTS, LEXINGTON
Franklin School Apartments is a converted 1930 brick school building with four additional
townhouse buildings in Lexington. Comprised of 38 units of low and moderate income housing,
the project was permitted in October 1986 by the Lexington Board of Selectmen, acting as the
Special Permit Granting Authority under the Lexington Zoning By-Law and the Regulations
of Chapter 40A, the state Zoning Act. The development was completed at the end of 1988.
While not a Chapter 40B project because it was an adaptive reuse of a former school building,
the project is an affordable multi-family rental housing development embedded in a single-
family residential neighborhood and was not contested by the Town of Lexington. The town
sponsored the Franklin School Conversion Committee to find an appropriate use for the site.
The committee determined that there was a critical need for more affordable rental housing in
Lexington at that the Franklin School site was an ideal location for this type of housing.
In some ways, comparing Franklin School Apartments to the other developments in
the study is trying to compare apples to oranges. However, it is useful to examine successful,
supported projects in comparison to highly opposed developments to see what works and
what does not from the standpoint of garnering public support and good will. Three particular
characteristics of Franklin School contributed to the project's lack of significant opposition.
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First, Franklin School was an existing building and the developer mainly changed the land use
of the site. Some new buildings were constructed to the side and behind the school building,
but overall the site looked the same as before and the project did not contribute to significant
change in the site's character. Second, Lexington went to great lengths to respond to concerns
and opinions identified in the housing needs survey and shaped their advocacy and support for
the project through the context of the survey findings. The town sought to fulfill its obligation
to provide much needed affordable housing for young families, a declining population in the
town, one of the reasons Franklin School had to close in the first place. Finally, the project
is comparatively very small; at just 38 units it has significantly less units than the rest of the
developments in the study. In fact, Littleton Green, with only 24 units, is the only project in the
study smaller than Franklin School.
Community Context
With a 2000 median income of nearly $97,000, Lexington has not only the highest
median income in the study by over $20,000; it is also one of the most affluent communities in
the state. Located only 11 miles northwest of Boston and home to 30,000 residents, Lexington
has been able to maintain a relatively low density of less than 1.1 housing units per acre. A
largely single-family residential community, Lexington's housing stock is 83 percent owner-
occupied and only 2 percent vacant according to the 2000 census. Roughly 33 percent of the
owner-occupied housing in the town does not have a mortgage, the second highest percentage
of un-levered homes in the study. Lexington's single-family house prices have increased by
over 140 percent in the last ten years, with a median sales price of $615,000 for a single-family
home in 2003, the highest price in the studied communities by $130,000. The cost of renting
in Lexington is also expensive; in 2000 the town's median gross rent was $1,288, by far the
highest median rent in the study.35
Nature of Proposed Development
While not officially a Chapter 40B development, the Franklin School Apartments in
Lexington did receive a "Special Permit" to override the existing zoning of the site which
was occupied by a former school. The school was closed because of a major decline in the
number of children in Lexington, in the mid-1 980s only about one-third of the households in
the town were families with children. According to a committee responsible for overseeing
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the conversion of the school to a new use, this small fraction of families with children was
due partly to declining birth rates, and also the rising cost of housing which had priced young
families out of Lexington.
Developed by the Greater Boston Community Development Corporation, now known
as The Community Builders, the nearly $3 million project consists of 38 units of housing, 10 are
affordable to "low-income tenants," defined as persons who are eligible to participate and/or
receive rental assistance vouchers, and 28 "moderate income units," for households whose
gross income does not exceed 120 percent of the area median income. Franklin School
Apartments' unit mix is evenly distributed among one-, two-, and three-bedroom apartments
serving families with children as well as individuals.
The neighborhood surrounding Franklin School consists of a junior high school, 140
acres of conservation land, a small farm, and relatively large lot single-family homes. The
development is just 0.5 miles north of Route 2. Franklin School's neighborhood and site
context are shown in Figures 7.28 and 7.29.
Figures 7.28, 7.29 Franklin School Apts Aerial and Site Photographs
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Opposition Overview
Lexington's Planning Board's Advisory Committee on Housing Needs performed a
Housing Opinion Survey in 1984 to determine town residents' feelings with respect to affordable
housing. The overwhelming majority of respondents believed that the town should play an
active role in providing affordable housing, and that the town should use their resources such
as land or surplus municipal buildings for affordable housing. However, when density entered
the scenario, respondents were not as supportive. Less than half of the respondents would
support a "well-designed proposal" that had a density of six to nine units per acre, a quarter
of the respondents said no outright. There were also a large number of maybe responses,
which "perhaps indicates a wait and see attitude towards specific proposals as they come in"
according to the study report. Some of the concerns regarding apartments and condominiums
were density, the appearance of the buildings, impact on traffic, and concentration in one
location. Notably, although given as an option in the survey, the proximity and transition to
nearby single-family houses was not identified by respondents as a serious concern. This
led the committee to infer that "one is led to believe that higher densities are acceptable if
they occur as a result of conversion of municipal buildings, or are to provide for the elderly.
New construction of multi-family rental apartments is not as acceptable, nor are two-family
houses."
In the Fall of 1984, the Franklin School Conversion Committee reviewed a number of
development scenario proposals including: educational/cultural/religious projects, proposals
for congregate housing, condominiums, and rental housing. One of the rental proposals
was from the Greater Boston Community Development Corporation which, according to the
committee, offered the town the greatest degree of involvement in the provision of housing for
both low and moderate income residents.
The Conversion Committee's first choice for re-use of the school building was a
conversion to family housing. They felt that the school was a particularly good place for
family housing for a number of reasons. First, a large number of Town Meeting members
view favorably the use of converted school buildings for housing for middle and low/moderate
income people. (The housing survey results indicated that the use of school buildings and
tax-title lots were the two most favored ways of providing such housing). Second, the location
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for family housing is "excellent," the site is in a very low density neighborhood, where there
are no other publicly assisted housing units. It abuts 140 acres of conservation land, a junior
high school, has ample recreation space, and good access to public transit and employment.
Finally, "the structure itself is attractive and would make attractive housing at moderate density.
Since the building cannot be significantly altered or enlarged, the number of housing units
that could be accommodated would be limited, and could not overwhelm either the site or the
neighborhood." In other words, the project would be relatively small in scale and not contribute
to a major change in the character of the neighborhood. The committee also strongly
recommended mixed-income rental as opposed to ownership housing because of the town's
very low percentage of rental housing. The committee's recommendation concludes with
the following comment regarding the real need for this project to be developed as affordable
housing and it being the perfect time to make the development happen:
The Franklin School site is an excellent opportunity to act on our stated housing policy.
The creation of affordable housing doesn't just happen. It must be made to happen by
seizing appropriate opportunities as they arise. Missed opportunities cannot be made
up for elsewhere, since we are rapidly running out of appropriate locations. One must
always ask the questions, if not here, where? And if not now, when?
In November 1984, the Planning Board's Advisory Committee on Housing Needs wrote
a letter to the Selectmen in support of the development of Franklin School site for affordable
housing. They deemed the site "an excellent one for affordable family housing." They also
noted that this adaptive reuse project would likely garner a great deal more support than
new construction of rental units, which would likely pose more problems for town residents.
The Housing Needs Committee recommended the Greater Boston Community Development
(GBCD) proposal for the site, stating that it "will meet the needs of a wider range of families. It
is, after all, families with children that have the hardest time finding housing in Lexington."
Lexington residents voted to approve the sale of the Franklin School property to GBCD
at the Annual Town Meeting in May of 1985. More than two-thirds of the meeting attendees
voted in favor of the sale, a victory for going forward with the sale, but not an overwhelming
endorsement by town residents for the proposed project.
In October 1985, the Planning Board recommended granting of the special permit to the
Town Selectman for the Franklin School project. They noted that over the past five years, only
CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
176
24 subsidized family housing units had been built in Lexington and there is a real need for more
affordable rental housing in the town. The board also reiterated the conversion committee's
comments that the site is an ideal location for mixed-income rental housing. Additionally,
the Planning Board took care to note that the project would not be adding affordable units
to a neighborhood that already had low-income housing: "this location is well removed from
any other publicly supported housing and would contribute to a greater dispersion of publicly
supported housing units in the town."
At the Town Selectmen's Meeting on October 23, 1985, the Selectmen reviewed the
recommendations and concerns townspeople had regarding the Franklin School project. As
was previously stated, the Planning Board unanimously recommended the granting of the
special permit. The Board of Health, and Building, Engineering, and Planning Departments,
however, did have a number of concerns, including rodent control, asbestos and lead paint in
the school building, height of the townhouse buildings, parking provisions, drainage, sewer
connections, utility connections for the rear part of the site, and trash disposal. Although many
of these issues are assuredly valid, explicit mentions of rodent and trash concerns seem to be
specifically motivated by the project's affordability component.
Also noted at the hearing was that changes to the site plan, architectural scheme,
and access to the recreation area and conservation land had been made in response to
neighborhood input. Abutters did have additional concerns regarding the project and at the
hearing spoke about issues such as the landscaping, site lighting, screening between the site
and surrounding homes, building facades, driveway entrances, on-street parking, methods of
trash disposal, and traffic.
The decision regarding the special permit for the Franklin School project was finalized
at the October Selectmen's meeting. The decision notes that the town had already voted
and approved the sale of the property to the developer, there will be incidental changes to
the fagade of school building, and the new construction will be located substantially within
the footprint of the structures to be demolished. The Selectmen found that the "Proposed
Conversion will construe a suitable development and will not result in substantial detriment to
the neighborhood." Additionally, they commented that the conversion of the school building
"will be a practical residential development, compatible with the neighborhood, and will create
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in the neighborhood economically priced and a variety of housing." The special permit
would serve the public welfare of the town and is "in harmony with the general purpose and
intent of the Zoning By-Law." The Board unanimously granted the permit with 12 conditions
including detailed landscaping plans with "visual screening" between the development and the
surrounding area, trash storage and parking provisions, and faQade materials.
Opposition Conclusions
While the Franklin School project did not face overt opposition, it was not without
any conflict. Lexington residents and municipal officials did have a number of concerns with
respect to the development. Many of these concerns were similar to those voiced during
the permitting process of the other studied projects, including drainage, sewer connections,
traffic, and parking. However, there were some issues raised in Lexington that were new to
hear such as a fear of rodent problems and worry over trash disposal. These seem to be
motivated by traditional misconceptions and stereotypes of affordable housing. It would be
hard to believe that residents would have similar concerns if the development consisted of
luxury condominiums or elderly housing. However, the opposition in no halted or delayed the
granting of the special permit for Franklin School Apartments.
Interestingly, the Franklin School development density is approximately 11.7 units
per acre, more than ten times the town average of 1.07 units per acre, and the proposed
density in the housing needs survey which received significant negative feedback from survey
respondents. One would think there would have been some resident opposition with respect
to density, but that was not found in any of the research.
Lexington was able to be proactive in seeking an appropriate site and scale of project
for affordable multi-family housing likely stemming whatever opposition to development that
might have been raised with other 40B projects. Additionally, the Franklin School developer
made significant changes to the development's site plan, design, and access in response to
community input.
LITTLETON GREEN, LITTLETON
It is also interesting to examine the lack of community opposition for the Littleton Green
development in light of the town's opposition to Pondside at Littleton, just a mile down the
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road from Littleton Green. There are some significant characteristics of Pondside and Littleton
Green that likely led the town to oppose one and not the other. Although Littleton Green is a
100 percent affordable development, it also provides a needed, sympathetic service for the
town - elderly affordable housing. Finally, with only 24 units of housing, Littleton Green is by
far the smallest development in the study, and 66 units less than the size of Pondside. Littleton
Green received its comprehensive permit in 1986 after three short ZBA hearings.
For a number of reasons, Littleton Green was also not a contentious development
compared to the other projects in the study. Like Franklin School, it is somewhat akin to
comparing apples and oranges to evaluate this relatively benign 24 unit elderly housing
project in contrast to a 200-unit multi-family development with six or seven four-story buildings.
Additionally, the fact that the project serves elderly housing needs makes it significantly more
sympathetic to town residents and officials, it serves a specific uncontroversial target group and
that particular group is not likely to generate added costs to the town with respect to increased
traffic and school impact concerns. Furthermore, the Littleton Green comprehensive permit
application came to the ZBA shortly before Pondside and two other 40B proposals, Littleton
had yet to face numerous permit requests and deal with concerns and plans for long term
growth and development priorities for the town.
Nature of Proposed Development36
Littleton Green is a 24 unit, 100 percent affordable elderly housing development. The
project was granted a comprehensive permit in May of 1986 after three Board of Appeals
hearings at which some questions and concerns regarding the development were raised, but
not enough to halt or stall the development process. The project received financing through the
Rural Housing Service Section 515 program, the principal funding program for rural multifamily
housing serving low income persons. Littleton Green consists of three buildings with eight one
bedroom units per building. The neighborhood surrounding the project is made up of primarily
single-family homes. Figures 7.30 through 7.32 show the neighborhood and site context for
Littleton Green.
Opposition Overview
There was no substantive resident or town opposition to the Littleton Green development
likely due to the project's small scale and elderly focus. However, a number of concerns were
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Figures 7.30 - 7.32 Littleton Green Aerial and Site Photographs
raised during the comprehensive permitting process regarding primarily the environmental
impact of the development on the surrounding community. Additionally, despite the project's
lack of controversy, it still took over six months from the initial application submission to get
final approval from the Board of Appeals.
The first hearing on Littleton Green occurred in January of 1986. Attempting to
appease residents and board members with the idea that the development would not be
straight affordable housing, the developer touted the project as housing for "moderate income
senior citizens" and that "the project is to have more flexibility in regard to eligibility than low
income housing per se does." Additionally, the developer had conducted a survey "which
had one hundred responses from elderly and the results were that there is an interest for this
type of housing for Littleton, which still does not have the state mandated minimum number
of [affordable] units." Hearing attendees did raise some concerns regarding Littleton Green
which included water and drainage on the site and sidewalk connections. Additionally, the
Littleton Housing Authority commented that they were not in a position to either endorse or
oppose the project. The hearing ended with the ZBA requesting the opinion of other town
boards prior to the next meeting.
CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
180
IMM F- -, - - - - - - . - - -- - - - ---- I I
The second Littleton Green hearing occurred in February 1986. At the hearing, a
letter from the Planning Board commented that they would like the project to conform to the
town's site plan review. In addition, one planning board member came to the hearing and
spoke about concerns in regard to the screening between the development and surrounding
neighborhood and problems with the driveway. Littleton's Council on Aging wrote a letter
of support to the project's concept but stated that they were unable "to take a stand on this
project at this time." However, the council did express the need for moderate income housing
in Littleton. A representative of the Littleton Housing Authority curiously said that "the Authority
does not approve of Guschov's [the developer] methods, but it approves of such housing," and
concluded that "basically the Authority is in favor of the project." More concerns were raised
about sidewalks, the driveway exit, and flooding problems in the surrounding neighborhood.
ZBA members also discussed extending affordability to 40 years as a condition of the
comprehensive permit as opposed to the 15 years required by the proposed financing for the
development.
The third and final hearing on Littleton Green occurred in March 1986. After a
discussion of adding future parking spaces and integrating requirements from the Board of
Health, the Board of Appeals granted the comprehensive permit unanimously "incorporating
the regulations and restrictions as discussed."
The comprehensive permit, dated May 5, 1986, found that the "Petitioner's proposed
project, if developed in accordance with the aforementioned and other conditions hereafter
recited, will comply with the requirements of Chapter 40B. It will meet the concerns of the
appropriate municipal officials with respect to health and safety, site and building design and
open space. It will also alleviate the local and regional need for low [and] moderate income
housing in the Town of Littleton." They unanimously granted the permit for 24 units at proposed
site with 11 conditions, including evidence of compliance with financing requirements, final site
plan approval, and provisions for more future parking spaces. Interestingly, omitted from the
conditions was a provision for increasing the affordability term from 15 years to 40 years as
was discussed at the February hearing.
Opposition Conclusions
As was the case with the Franklin School project and other less controversial 40B
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developments, by granting the comprehensive permit without outside intervention, Littleton
was able to really negotiate to incorporate their wants and needs into the development plan
for Littleton Green. They guaranteed themselves final site plan approval and development
oversight. If the permit had been denied and the developer appealed the decision to the HAC,
Littleton would have lost some of its leverage in the development process as well as put the
town and developer on opposing sides.
While the residents and municipal officials of Littleton did not strongly contest the
comprehensive permit for Littleton Green, especially as compared to the opposition to
Pondside at Littleton as discussed in the previous section, a number of concerns regarding the
project were raised during the permit hearing process. Some of these concerns were about
pre-existing problems with flooding in the neighborhood and the potential for the project's
drainage plan to exacerbate the situation, whether or not enough parking was provided in
the site plan and prescriptions for additional parking in the future, and the length of time the
development's units would remain affordable. Interestingly, questions and concerns regarding
the term of affordability were raised during the Pondside permit hearings as well.
There is also a somewhat contradictory relationship between the lack of opposition
to Littleton Green and the community's characteristics. The density of the project is 10 units
per acre, significantly higher than the town's average density of 0.3 units per acre, and also
higher than the density of Pondside. However, this was never raised as an issue in any of the
comprehensive permit hearing minutes. Additionally, with a slow growth rate, highly-leveraged
owner-occupied housing stock, and an almost entirely white population, one would think this
community would be highly likely to oppose all 40B development, but this was not the case.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
This thesis asks and answers an important question in the heated debate concerning
M.G.L.c. 40B, the state's Comprehensive Permit Law: "Do large-scale, high-density Chapter
40B multi-family rental developments negatively impact nearby single-family property values
in suburban Boston communities?" We ask the question because of the widespread belief
that one of the strongest motives for resident opposition to 40B projects is the fear that homes
values surrounding these multi-family developments will decrease.
To answer this question, we performed quantitative and qualitative studies of the
relationship between nine large-scale, high-density, multi-family rental 40B developments and
single-family house value in eight communities throughout suburban Boston. We first used
hedonic price modeling to determine the impact the 40B developments had on surrounding
single-family house prices; we then performed a qualitative analysis of the resident opposition
and comprehensive permitting process for these nine projects.
The result of the empirical analysis for all nine cases confirms our hypothesis that large,
dense, rental multi-family 40B developments do not negatively impact the sales price of nearby
single-family homes. The sales price indexes for the impact areas trend essentially identically
with the price indexes of the control areas before, during, and after the introduction of a 40B
development. Our findings are transferable to towns with similar characteristics to our case
towns such as size, location, demographics, market experience, and development pattern.
Our case selection criteria identified some of the worst case scenarios of a multi-family
intrusion into a single-family neighborhood. As such, the 40B projects we evaluate have the
greatest likelihood for negatively impacting adjacent residences. We designed a research
strategy of rigorous statistical methodology to test our hypothesis. The findings are further
strengthened by our careful treatment in identifying the impact areas.
So why is it that these worst case scenarios do not negatively impact property value?
When each 40B project was built, it represented the top of the market. Even though the
developments are out of scale, style, and context with the surrounding neighborhood, they
are generally high quality housing products. MassHousing provides site approval for all
comprehensive permits and financed seven of our case studies. They have a history of
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underwriting and supporting some of the best housing developments built in the Commonwealth.
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that nearly three-quarters of the housing units in our
case studies are market rate. These are not just affordable housing developments; they are
market rate multi-family housing with some affordable units. Finally, with restricted housing
supply in the Massachusetts housing market, it is altogether possible that a home's location in
a particular community is more important than its neighborhood.
The reasons for opposition that have weight and bearing on the comprehensive permit
decision do not allow for property value concerns. Fear of property devaluation is not a tractable
issue to use as the basis for the denial of a comprehensive permit. A local board of appeals
may only deny a comprehensive permit if they can prove that the decision is reasonable,
consistent with local needs, and the development will cause health, safety, environmental
effects that outweigh the need for low and moderate income housing. Therefore, it is not
surprising that we did not find evidence in the primary sources of this fear even if it is tangible
to residents and motivates opposition.
However, we did discover an interesting and important story. The comprehensive
permitting process often creates a contentious climate, particularly when towns have not
adequately planned for new development. The 40B process can be conceptualized in terms of
three stages: Stage 1 - introduction of development; Stage 2 - comprehensive permit debate;
Stage 3 - final permit decision. The three stage process was formulated with respect to the
highly contentious developments. With the highly contentious developments, developers
and towns were often set against one another from the beginning. Stage 2 occurred with
towns frequently feeling that 40B was taking away their power to control land use. With
these developments, developers did not hesitate to pursue litigation in the event of a permit
denial, setting up a highly contentious stage 3. This process left the towns with large-scale,
dense multi-family developments in which they had little say, and left the developers with a
controversial, costly, and lengthy process.
Between the highly contentious and contentious projects there was a significant shift
in the three stage paradigm where the emphasis was placed on negotiation and bargaining in
stage 2 rather than contention, stand-off, and an expensive, drawn-out stage 3. The contentious
projects ultimately received their comprehensive permits from the local ZBAs, as opposed to
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the courts, and the towns were able to leverage their control over the permitting process to
negotiate for such things as a more amenable project design, density, and affordability ratio. In
return, the developers were able to have their projects approved and permitted in a significantly
shorter time frame.
Finally, with the unopposed developments, by granting the comprehensive permit
without outside intervention, the towns were able to really negotiate to incorporate their wants
and needs into the development plans. They guaranteed themselves final site plan approval
and development oversight. The municipalities were able to reframe the context in which the
developments received the comprehensive permit, altering stage 1 and creating a whole new
paradigm. If the comprehensive permits had been denied and the developers appealed the
decisions to the HAC, the towns would have lost their leveraging power and put the two parties
on opposing sides. This new paradigm establishes an alternative 40B process where towns
actively seek out appropriate sites, uses for the site, and developers. This new process can
lead to the creation of developments with less opposition, permit them more quickly, and help
alleviate the severe housing crunch in the state.
Chapter 2 discusses how exclusionary zoning, politically autonomy, and the rise of
homeownership have contributed to creating a climate where multi-family housing development
in the suburbs is increasing difficult. The motivation for keeping this type of development out
is the belief that these projects will diminish or reduce property values. As was stated in
the literature review, one of the primary motivations for exclusionary zoning regulations is
to avoid the negative effects of poverty and the fears that affordable housing could cause
neighborhood decline. Suburbanites control for this fear by banning multi-family housing and
only permitting large lot single-family homes. Furthermore, the suburbs used their increased
political autonomy and clout as a means of protecting property values. In the strong home
rule state of Massachusetts, where there is often rabid protest of Chapter 40B development, it
could be argued that there is also a commonly held, but often not explicitly stated, assumption
of the negative impact of 40B developments on surrounding property values.
The thesis results are timely today, given extraordinary increases in home values that
have occurred. With recent very high single-family home price appreciation rates, the view
of a home as an investment good has become much more prevalent and many people now
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
187
see their home as a major contribution to their retirement fund. The notion that a 40B multi-
family development could negatively impact this nest egg most likely contributes to residents'
concerns and protests regarding new development. This study dismisses the misplaced fear of
property devaluation. Chapter 40B developments do not reduce the sales price a single-family
houses, so the investment returns of a homeowner's largest portfolio asset is not threatened.
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APPENDIX 4.1: WARREN GROUP INFORMATION
The Warren Group
http://rers.thewarrengroup.com/sor/help/aboutourdata.asp
Data Sources
The Warren Group's real estate sales database is comprised of public records from
government sources. Sales and mortgage transactions with a consideration of $1000.00
or more are collected weekly from Registries of Deeds in Massachusetts and Town Clerks'
offices in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Property ownership records are acquired from
municipal assessor's offices in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Sales and
mortgages are collected then enhanced with property characteristics.
Database Description
We integrate the information from these sources and enhance it during processing to
produce a comprehensive property database that has Massachusetts sales since 1/1/87,
Connecticut sales since 1/1/87, and Rhode Island sales since 7/1/87. Property ownership
records are available for a majority of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island
communities. Standardized formats for names, addresses, property use codes, and property
characteristics are applied across all three states
Deeds and Mortgages
For sales and mortgage transactions, we collect:
-property address (if available)
-buyer and seller names
-purchase price ($1000.00 or more)
-mortgage lender and amount ($1000.00 or more)
-filing date & deed reference
-mortgage type, term, & interest rate for Connecticut
Assessor Records
Property characteristics taken from assessor files vary by town and depend greatly on the
amount of detail available in the source files. Massachusetts and Rhode Island use Legal
and Detail files. Connecticut uses Grand List and Detail files.
1. Legal files contain the property address, owner names and mailing addresses, property
use, map ID, lot size, and assessed values. We calculate property taxes by applying the tax
rate to the total assessed value and do not consider any type of exemption in the calculation
of the taxes.
2. Grand List files contain the property address, owner names and mailing addresses,
property use category, map ID, and assessed values. We calculate property taxes by
applying the tax rate to the total assessed value and do not consider any type of exemption
in the calculation of the taxes.
3. Detail files contain the same ownership and value data as above plus room counts,
living area, and building style. In some communities there are additional details about heat,
fuel, roof and basement types, roof material and exterior cover types, and amenities such
as parking type, porch type, presence of air conditioning and swimming pools, etc. See
Geographic Coverage for the type of file we have in your towns.
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Addresses
Street names are standardized using the U.S. Post Office standards. All directionals such as
"North," "South," "East," and "West" are abbreviated by their first letter whether the directional
precedes the street name, as in North Main St (N Main St), or follows the name as in Blue
Hill West (Blue Hill W).
Condo unit numbers defy standardization. Sometimes the unit, building, and floor numbers
are found in both the street number and unit number. Carefully examine these data when
trying to locate a specific condo unit.
Condo units are typically listed by street address as opposed to the condominium complex's
name. If the public record indicates a condo name instead of street address, then the condo
name will be used in the 'street name' field.
Data Processing
Every week we match the sales and mortgage data to the property records based on
property address and names of the seller and owner. If, for some reason, we are not certain
that the two records are the same parcel, then we will not match that sale or mortgage
to that property record. As a result, some sales or mortgages will not have any property
characteristic information. This happens most often when lots are combined and subdivided
for construction and when property addresses are not clear on the deed.
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APPENDIX 5.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Inprice natural log of prive
Intersf interior square feet
lotsize lot size
bath<=1 houses with one or less bathrooms
bath 1 houses with one bathroom
bath<=1.5 houses with one and a half or less bathrooms
bath1.5 houses with one and a half bathrooms
bath2 houses with two bathrooms
bath>=2 houses with two or more bathrooms
bath2.5 houses with two and a half bathrooms
bath>=2.5 houses with two and a half or more bathrooms
bath>=3 houses with three or more bathrooms
bed<=2 houses with two or less bedrooms
bed2 houses with two bedrooms
bed<=3 houses with three or less bedrooms
bed3 houses with three bedrooms
bed4 houses with four bedrooms
>=4 houses with four or more bedrooms
>=5 houses with five or more bedrooms
yrblt<=1 946 houses built in 1946or older
yrblt<=" " houses built in this year or older
yrbltl 947-'55 houses built between 1947 and 1955
yrblt" " houses built between this timeframe
yrsold1983-'84 houses that sold in years 1983 and 1984
yrsold"" houses that sold in this time interval
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APPENDIX 5.2: WOBURN
Price Index Matrix - Woburn
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1983-'84 79,470 -77,623 -
1991-'92 154,820 -10.6% 135,587 -10.8%
1993-'94 132,839 -14.2% 139,849 3.1%
1995-'96 124,172 -6.5% 150,432 7.6%
1997-'98 172,573 39.0% 166,427 10.6%
2003 351,765 15.7% 328,197 193%
CAGR 14.5% 14.0%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (pnce=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+...), source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate, (Current
Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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Impact Control
APPENDIX 5.3: BURLINGTON
Impact Control
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1982-'83 91,009 - 76,206 -
1984-'85 126,351 38.8% 110,228 44. 6%
1990-'91 170,884 -3.9% 159,202 -7.7%
1992-'93 148,514 -13.1% 158,249 -0.6%
1994-'95 139,860 -5.8% 167,307 5.7%
1996-'97 186,135 33.1% 182,916 9.3%
1998-'99 182,820 -1.8% 221,139 20.9%
2000-'01 253,069 38.4% 283,962 28.4%
2002-'03 272,483 7.7% 353,277 24.4%
CAGR 10.5% 15.0%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for price
indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate, (Current
Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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APPENDIX 5.4: LEXINGTON
Prc Ine Mari - into
Impact IControl
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1983-'84 130,97
1989-'90
1991-'92
1993-'94
1995-'96
1997-'98
1999-'00
2001-'02
2003
294,490
242,923
293,337
318,243
385,776
444,822
566,471
809155
-9.2%
-17.5%
20.8%
8.5%
21.2%
15.3%
27.3%
42.8%
1 919 -
277,303
263,924
284,808
312,257
358,731
452,156
580,435
664,730
CAGR 18.0% 15.5%
2.2%
-4.8%
7.9%
9.6%
14.9%
26.0%
28.4%
14.5%
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* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate,
(Current Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
APPENDIX 5.5: LITTLETON
Impact - Pond Side Impact - Littleton Green Control
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1982-'83 87,893 -67,421 -68,563 -
135,950 -8.6%
1990-'91 172,864 -8.3% 143,048 5.2% 151,702 -0.4%
1992-93 156,435 -9.5% 146,461 2.4% 144,099 -5.0%
1994-95 148,333 -5.2% 156,406 6.8% 156,925 8.9%
1996-'97 170,432 14.9% 143,859 -8.0% 174,376 11.1%
1998-'99 185,718 9.0% 185,460 28.9% 204,121 17.1%
2000-'01 294,741 58.7% 226,850 22.3% 261,035 27.9%
2002-'03 308,740 4.7% 315,797 39.2% 328,206 25.7%
CAGR 12.1% 15.1% 15.3%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*@a)+(b*pb)+..., source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate,
(Current Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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APPENDIX 5.6: GROUPED ANALYSIS I
Price Index Matrix-Group: Burlington, Lexington, Littleton, Woburn
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1983-'84 91,297 -97,919 -
191'92 142,769 -24.3% 182,785 -6.5%
193'94 148,277 3.9% 187,620 2.6%
1995-'96 160,714 8.4% 205,104 9.3%
1997-'98 175,800 9.4% 232,186 13.2%
1999-'00 237,035 34.8% 289,304 24.6%
2001-'02 316,570 33.6% 380,505 31.5%
2003 380,817 20.3% 433,646 14.0%
CAGR 13.9% 14.5%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*a)+(b*b)+..., source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate,
(Current Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
APPENDICES
196
Control
Impact
APPENDIX 5.7: MANSFIELD
Price Index Matrix - Mansfield
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR* *
1989-'90 139,277 6.6% 190,328 9.9%
1991-'92 120,835 -1.%175,599 -7%
1993-'94 115,569 -4.4% 174,548 -0.6%
1995-96 126,660 9.6% 184,539 5.7%
1997-'98 154,456 21.9% 201,756 9.3%
1999-'00 169,102 9.5% 243,916 20.9%
2001-02 240,393 42.2% 313,210 28.4%
2003 263,445 9.6% 389,663 24.4%
CAGR 14.3% 11.3%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate,
(Current Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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Impact Control
APPENDIX 5.8: NORWOOD
Price Index Matrix - Norwood
Impact Control
1989-90 162,556 -7.7%
1991-'92 133,583 -17.8% 155,408 -9.4%
1993-'94 149,580 12.0% 158,448 2.0%
1995-'96 159,468 6.6% 167,635 5.8%
1997-'98 183,428 15.0% 182,806 9.1%
1999-'00 249,488 36.0% 221,869 21.4%
2001-02 284,363 14.0% 291,958 31.6%
2003 350,746 23.3% 345,234 18.2%
CAGR 15.1% 14.0%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for price
indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate, (Current
Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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APPENDIX 5.9: RANDOLPH
Impact Control
Price*
66,517
110,913
120,188
116,053
114,328
127,892
171,997
227,233
279,181
% Change APCAGR**
-AR 10/ 1
-12.6%
0.1%
-7.2%
11.4%
28.7%
34.8%
24.7%
% Change APCAGR**
66.7%
-11.5%
-3.4%
-1.5%
11.9%
34.5%
32.1%
22.9%
Price*
84,956
44,085
118,221
118,342
109,872
122,368
157,540
212,373
264.729
1983-'841985-'864
1991'92
193'94
1995-'96
1997-'98
1999-'00
2001-'02
2003
ICAGR 10.9% 13.9%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for
price indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate,
(Current Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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APPENDIX 5.10: GROUPED ANALYSIS II
Price Index Matrix - Group: Mansfield, Norwood, Randolph
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
193-84 68,060 -72,351 -
19-92 129,700 -8.4% 134,936 -11.8%
19-94 131,839 1.6% 138,786 2.9%
1995-'96 127,319 -3.4% 140,525 1.3%
1997-'98 159,924 25.6% 160,757 14.4%
1999-'00 187,666 17.3% 204,668 27.3%
2001-'02 239,913 27.8% 266,589 30.3%
2003 307,630 28.2% 321,584 20.6%
CAGR 14.7% 14.5%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*Sa)+(b*pb)+..., source for price
indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate, (Current
Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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II
Impact Control
APPENDIX 5.11: WILMINGTON
Prc IdxMt - Wilinto
Impact Control
Price* % Change APCAGR** Price* % Change APCAGR**
1987-'88 186,720 - 151,245 -
1989-'90 187,632 0.5% 154,562 2.2%
1991-'92 162,257 -13.5% 138,138 -10.6%
1993-'94 158,338 -2.4% 147,958 7.1%
1995-'96 185,670 17.3% 161,472 9.1%
2001-'02 294,430 30.2% 285,753 31.0%
2003 391,231 32.9% 334,267 17.0%
CAGR 8.6% 9.2%
* Calculated with hedonic equation (price=constant+(a*pa)+(b*pb)+..., source for price
indexes
**Analysis Period Compound Annual Growth Rate, (Current
Value/Past Value)A(1/years)-1
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APPENDIX 6.1: MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM
Office of Jury
Commissioner
Boston
Municipal
Court
Depart
1 Chief Ji
29 Associate
8 Divisi
Supreme Judicial Court
1 Chief Justice
6 Associate Justices
Massachusetts Appeals Court
1 Chief Justice
24 Associate Justices
I Administrative Officeof the Trial CourtChief Justice for Administration and Management
Housing
Court
Denartment
nent
ustice 1 Chi
Justices 9 Assoc
ons 5 D
District
Court
Department
1 Chief Justice
157 Associate Justices
62 Divisions
ef Justice
iate Justices
ivisions
ill
Land
Court
Department
1 Chief Justice
5 Associate Justices
Juvenile
Court
Department
1 Chief Justice
40 Associate Justices
11 Divisions
Office of the
Commissioner
of Probation
Superior
Court
Department
1 Chief Justice
81 Associate Justices
14 Divisions
by County
Probate &
Family Court
Department
1 Chief Justice
50 Associate Justices
14 Divisions
by County
The number of justices for all Courts is the maximum authorized by statute; the actual number of judges varies
depending on vacancies.
Source: http://www.mass.govlcourtslcourtsandjudgeslcourtslstructure coor.pdf
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APPENDIX 7.1: COMMUNITY STATISTICS
Burlington Lexington Littleton Mansfield
1980 Population 23,486 29,479 6,970 13,453
1990 Population 23,302 28,974 7,051 16,568
2000 Population 22,876 30,355 8,184 22,414
A in Pop 1980-00 -2.6% 3.0% 17.4% 66.6%
2000 Housing Units 8,395 11,274 3,018 8,083
2002 40B units 622 796 240 577
% Affordable units 7.4% 7.1% 8.0% 7.1%
2003 Med House Price $360,000 $615,000 $360,000 $350,000
2000 Med Income $75,240 $96,825 $71,384 $66,925
A in Med House Prices 1993-03 114.9% 140.2% 147.0% 138.5%
A in Med Inc 1990-00 34.5% 43.7% 38.8% 42.2%
2000 Med Gross Rent $1,061 $1,288 $680 $761
2000 Housing units/ acre 1.11 1.07 0.28 0.62
2000 % Owner-occ units 79.5% 82.6% 83.1% 71.8%
2000 % Renter-occ units 20.5% 17.4% 16.9% 28.2%
2000 % Vacant units 1.8% 2.0% 3.1% 2.2%
2000 % White 86.7% 86.1% 96.5% 95.0%
2000 % Non-white 13.3% 13.9% 3.5% 5.0%
2000 % High school or higher 92.3% 96.3% 92.6% 93.2%
2000 % Bachelors or higher 42.6% 69.1% 48.1% 42.1%
2000 % Housing units w/ mort 70.2% 67.0% 74.4% 84.1%
2000 % Housing units w/o mort 29.8% 33.0% 25.6% 15.9%
Norwood Randolph Wilmington Woburn
1980 Population 29,711 28,218 17,471 36,626
1990 Population 28,700 30,093 17,651 35,943
2000 Population 28,587 30,963 21,367 37,258
A in Pop 1980-00 -3.8% 9.7% 22.3% 1.7%
2000 Housing Units 11,911 11,497 7,141 15,312
2002 40B units 642 654 490 877
% Affordable units 5.4% 5.7% 6.9% 5.7%
2003 Med House Price $348,500 $278,000 $344,000 $331,000
2000 Med Income $58,421 $55,255 $70,652 $54,897
A in Med House Prices 1993-03 111.2% 122.4% 120.2% 129.9%
A in Med Inc 1990-00 36.5% 27.8% 35.4% 28.6%
2000 Med Gross Rent $895 $863 $948 $881
2000 Housing units/ acre 1.78 1.78 0.65 1.89
2000 % Owner-occ units 57.2% 72.3% 90.3% 61.2%
2000 % Renter-occ units 42.8% 27.7% 9.7% 38.8%
2000 % Vacant units 2.7% 1.9% 1.8% 2.6%
2000 % White 91.5% 61.5% 95.8% 89.0%
2000 % Non-white 8.5% 38.5% 4.2% 11.0%
2000 % High school or higher 91.8% 87.3% 92.4% 88.1%
2000 % Bachelors or higher 39.2% 26.6% 31.4% 29.5%
2000 % Housing units w/ mort 63.9% 71.1% 76.5% 67.5%
2000 % Housing units w/o mort 36.1% 28.9% 23.5% 32.5%
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